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Justitia et constans et perpetua voluntas 
jus suum cuique tribuendi 
1 *' 
- Ulpian • 
Our animal needs ..• consist in food, clothing 
and shelter. If justice means anything, 
nothing can be more unjust than that any man 
lack them. But jus does not stop here. 
So far as the general stock of commodities 
holds out, every man has a claim not only to 
the means of Ii , but to the means of a good 
life. 
d . 2 - Go Wln • 
(* "Justice is the constant and perpetual will to 
gi ve to each that which is due to him~ en, 
i 
PREFACE 
The exponential expansion of the human population of the 
earth, together with the accelerating pressure that is being 
placed on natural resources, is of a magnitude that threatens 
soon to render the expression 'scarce resources' pleonastic. 
Too many people chasing too few goods is a reliable recipe for 
disaster. The problems are of such a magnitude that the 
search for real solutions can readily appear futile. This is 
especi ly so because the gravest problems are often not 
theoretical at all, but practical. They are the problems of 
convincing contrary human beings of the necessity of radical 
changes in their life styles, and in their aspirations and 
The first step, however, is to £ind the correct theories. 
High on the list of priorities must be an adequate theory of 
the morally proper distribution among people of the scarce 
goods and resources which they all require. Once we have 
such a theory, it will be time enough to worry about getting 
people to listen, to understand, and to act. 
The received opinion, in many circles, is that the 
current distribution of goods and resources is unjust because 
it is gravely unequal. For all that there is evident truth 
in this claim, the problem of expressing it in a clear and 
theoretically perspicuous manner has proved to be an 
intractable one. 
The fault lies with egalitarianism itself. In its 
incomplete apprehension of the nature of injustice, it has 
embraced a collection of hal truths with a tenacity and a 
fervour which have seriously impeded further progress. My 
primary thesis is that egalitarianism, as a theory of social 
justice, is false. 
Some of the beliefs to which egalitarians have 
subscribed do deserve, however, to be preserved. My 
secondary thesis is that this can be achieved by 
incorporating these insights into a properly formulated, 
nonegalitarian, socialist theory of justice. This theory 
will not be presented in detail: instead, the discussion 
will range over a variety of considerations which converge 
upon socialism, as providing the only morally acceptable 
theory of distribution. If the treatment is sometimes 
tentative, speculative, and controversial, that is because 
the "time has passed for toying with safe and cautious 
approaches to these problems. 
ii 
1 
CHAPTER ONE 
MORALITY AND EQUALITY 
I 
A philosophical theory of morality should identify the 
basic empirical sources - the sources in the natural and 
social realms - of moral significance and moral value. The 
world is a rich and diverse place, and it is by no means 
always obvious, when moral demands arise from it, what the 
ultimate sources of those demands are. As I conceive the 
matter, the fundamental points of contact between morality and 
the empirical world are to be found in morally-relevant facts. 
That is, certain things, events or states of affairs have, in 
virtue of their empirical attributes, some moral significance. 
I assume here the truth of the basic principle that, whenever 
states of affairs in the world give rise to moral requirements, 
and whenever states of affairs are defensibly evaluated as 
morally good or evil, it is of necessity the case that some of 
the natural attributes of those states of affairs are possessed 
of an irreducible moral significance. This does not take us 
very far, however, and in particular, it leaves open the ti-
cal que9tion of the nature of the relationship between empir-
ical facts and the moral significance that some of them have. 
Given, however, that this principle states a minimal yet 
necessary condition of any adequate ethical theory, it can 
,contribute significantly to moral debate, as my arguments 
against egalitarianism will show. 
A theory of simple and complex properties is presupposed 
by my procedure here l . According to this theory, some 
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empirical properties are complex, are compounds of other, 
simpler properties. For present purposes, it is not necessary 
to show that there are absolutely simple properties: it is 
sufficient to maintain the more limited thesis that some are 
more simple than others. The importance of this for moral 
theory is tha~ the project of identifying the ultimate bearers 
of moral significance has not been successfully accomplished 
in those cases where the complex property identified as such a 
bearer contains component (simpler) properties, some of which 
are not themselves morally significant. The aim must be to 
isolate morally significant properties which contain no morally 
significant simpler properties as components. Some properties 
which appear, at first blush, to be morally significant, are 
compound properties which on closer inspection are found to 
contain some simpler properties, as a component subset, which 
are the real bearers of moral significance. The relational 
properties of equality and inequality - or, more accurately, 
the complex circumstances which are commonly identified as 
both morally significant and as states of equality or of 
inequality - are such properties. 
The fact that equality is a relational property is import-
ant in connection with its 'reducibility', but this should not 
be taken to imply the radically individualistic and false 
thesis, that only non-relational properties can have moral 
"f' 2 slgnl lcance . Exploitation, oppression, ingratitude, altruism 
and mercy, after all, do instantiate relational properties 
which have a moral significance which is not reducible to the 
moral significance of any non-relational properties. My 
argument is that a particular pair of relational properties 
which are widely believed to be morally important, namely 
equality and inequality, do not in fact possess underivative 
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moral significance, that they are compound properties which 
are made up of simpler properties, some of which, sometimes, 
are bearers of moral significance. 
The initial data of any substantive moral theory cannot 
exclude the firmer of our moral intuitions. The normal proced-
ure, granted this much, is to seek principles which explain 
those intuitions 3 • Such principles, however, cannot legiti-
mately be regarded as acceptable without further justification. 
It is not the case that some moral principles are self-
evidently true; nor need it be the case that some, unavoid-
ably, are ultimate commitments which cannot be justified by 
anything beyond themselves. Scientific laws and theories are 
ultimately justified, as regards their empirical content (and 
in some manner which is inadequately understood), by reference 
to facts about the world. General moral principles, I will 
suppose, are similarly justifiable, not by reference to 
ordinary facts, but by reference to morally significant ones. 
Given that the ultimate bearers of moral significance are 
natural properties and states, the most basic moral truths 
will be those which attach a particular moral significance to 
a particular property. How they do this is not my present 
concern. 
Against this methodological background, the aim of the 
present work can be seen as that of testing the claim that the 
, 
attributes of equality and inequality are bearers of ultimate 
moral significance. This claim will be rejected as mistaken. 
The general procedure will consist in showing that, in those 
situations characterized by relationships of equality and 
inequality which seem to have some moral significance, the 
entire signi cance actually devolves onto other properties. 
These properties will sometimes be simpler components of the 
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compound property of equalitYi sometimes they will be 
properties which are related to the property of equality only 
by co-instantiation. 
A particular test that I will sometimes use is the follow-
ing: various states of affairs which have some moral signifi-
cance are modified in order to exclude whatever properties 
might plausibly explain that significance, other than the 
properties of equality and inequality. Since no situation 
can be characterized solely by the latter properties, the test 
procedure requires that some other properties, ones which 
clearly have no moral significance (in that context), be sub-
stituted for the morally significant ones which have been 
eliminated. If it should happen that in every case, the 
resulting situation could not plausibly be invested with any 
moral significance (no matter how slight), serious doubt 
would be thrown on the claim that equality was ever a bearer 
of intrinsic moral significance. 
II 
Egalitarianism should be characterized as the theory that 
the relational properties of equality and inequality are, at 
least in some cases (if that is a coherent qualificationl, 
bearers of irreducible moral significance. Accordingly, I 
regard! egali tarianism
' 
as a term which carrie,s some descript-
ive content, and not purely as a name. People may use names 
however they like: and those who have named themselves 
'egalitarians' have often enjoyed that liberty to the full. 
My concern is solely with any theory which meets the require-
ments that I have laid down for the application of the des-
criptive concept. 
Equality is sometimes conceived to have a moral signifi-
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cance which extends beyond the sphere of justice. Understood 
in this light, some moral principles of equality will be 
regarded as forming part of an ideal of the morally exemplary 
society. This is to say that equalities of these kinds go 
beyond the limited demands of justice: they are required for 
moral reasons of a wider sort. The possibility of defending 
ideals of equality which exceed the requirements of justice 
does not seem very bright, however. Hugo Bedau makes this 
point when he says that the attraction of equality is that it 
is just, "which no one has seriously denied lt • If equality has 
to be recommended on any moral grounds other than those of 
just~ce (he says), it has at best a precarious hold on our 
't' 4 conv~c ~ons • 
The connection between justice and equality, indeed, has 
seemed to a long tradition of moral philosophy to be peculiarly 
intimate. I will argue the contrary case, that there is no 
connection of fundamental moral significance between justice 
and equality. The extension of my arguments to the area of 
morality which lies outside justice should present no particu-
lar problems. Accordingly, while my specific target is the 
egalitarian theory of justice, my implied target is egali-
tarianism itself: I will show that it is an insupportable 
theory. 
III 
Three different accounts are possible of the connection 
between justice and equality: 
(i) Analytic egalitarianism. This theory asserts that there 
is a logically necessary connection between justice and 
equality. In particular, it amounts to the 'neo-Aristotelian' 
claim that all morally substantive theories of justice must 
necessarily be caste in a particular form, into whose state-
ment the concepts of equality and inequality must enter. I 
will show that this position is untenable. 
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(ii) Normative egalitarianism. This theory defends the exist-
ence of a substantive or moral necessary connection between 
justice and equality. This is honest egalitarianism, and 
represents the major object of my critical attention. 
(iii) Nonegalitarianism. This is the theory defended here. I 
will argue that, to the extent that justice and equality tend, 
in certain ways, to be found together, this fact is merely con-
tingent and adventitious, though not inexplicable. 
As should be evident, my concern is primarily conceptual, 
and only secondarily moral. I am not defending the moral 
position of inegalitarianism. Indeed, my departure, in these 
definitions, from ordinary usage is emphasised by the fact that 
inegalitarianism becomes, for me, a species of egalitarianism, 
in virtue of its bestOWing moral significance on the properties 
of equality and inequality. Since the language of egalitarian-
ism is as confused as the theory itself is mistaken, these 
departures from common usage are simply accepted. While it is 
likely that many (sel styled) egalitarians would not care to 
subscribe to all the positions to which I have attached that 
term, it should be pointed out that the use of descriptive 
words must proceed in accordance with criteria of fair usage. 
'Egalitarianism' must surely be a theory which attaches some 
special significance to the relational attribute of equality -
otherwise it does not deserve to be described in that way. My 
insistence on the point is a protest against those who have 
obscured. some of the real sources of moral significance in 
this world by insisting on the moral importance of the fact 
that they are egalitarians. 
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It is very important to seek a deeper and more adequate 
understanding of the values that underlie proposed moral and 
social policies: after all, a person's understanding of the 
reasons why some social situation is to be condemned will be 
reflected in the practical policies he proposes in remedy of 
it. If he begins from a faulty diagnosis - one which attaches 
fundamental significance to equalities or inequalities, for 
instance - he might still hit, by luck, on the right solution. 
Many egalitarians have in fact done SOl in many cases: the 
policies that they have advanced have been models of morality 
and justice, in spite of their radical mishandling of the 
fundamental issues and their failure to describe properly the 
content of their policies. But sometimes, a faulty diagnosis 
finns p.xpression in a faulty remedy - as has also sometimes 
been the case, where the pursuit of equality is concerned. If 
my arguments succeed in disentangling that which is morally 
valuable in egalitarian's demands from that which is perni-
cious - and egalitarians have, sadly, all too often committed 
themselves to the promotion of pernicious policies - that will 
be a considerable gain. 
IV 
The concept of equality itself is not a recondite or 
mysterious one. Equality is a relational attribute which 
holds between any two (or more) individuals in respect to some 
further attribute, just in case they have that further attri-
bute in common. It is logically necessary that each individual 
that is a term of the relation has some further attribute l and 
that it is the same attribute in every case. This definition 
will extend over both equalities in respect to nonvariable 
properties and equalities in respect to variable ones, provided 
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that each distinct degree of the latter is accounted a dis-
tinct property (as indeed it is). Both equalities and 
inequalities are relations which hold in respect to a definite 
property, in every case. Two individuals are equal in respect 
to a property, P, if they both have P, or if they both lack it. 
They are unequal in respect to a property, F, if and only if 
one has F and one lacks it. Any judgement of equality or of 
inequality between two (or more) individuals will accordingly 
be incomplete unless the attribute in respect to which they 
are (respectively) the same or different has been specified. 
The concept of equality with which I am working is, then, 
a des?riptive one for which a precise definition can be 
advanced. A certain amount of 'revisionism' is involved in 
this, given that some people have invested the notion with 
favourable evaluative content, so that an 'unfair equality' 
approaches self-contradictionS. This practice has nothing to 
recommend it. My intention is to return to fundamentals - to 
the descriptive notion - and to unravel the evaluative struc-
~ .. 
tures that have been reared (often so clumsily) on that base. 
Because there are so many relations of equality and 
inequality between individuals (that is, between things gener-
ally), and because they are normally totally unremarkable, no 
rational person could be prompted to defend the view that all 
equalit~es were intrinsically good and all inequalities 
intrinsicallyevil6 • Nor is the far more restricted (but still 
very encompassing) view, that equality between persons is 
always intr1nsically good, in the slightest plausible. If 
relations of equality or of inequality between persons are to 
have any moral importance (even derivative moral importance), 
it must surely be the case that the attributes in respect to 
which the relations hold should themselves have moral signifi-
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cance. The point is both incontrovertible and of fundamental 
importance. If the possession by one person of a certain 
property has no moral significance, and the possession (or non-
possession) by another person of that property has no moral 
significance, when these two facts are individually and 
separately conSidered, then the derivative or consequential 
property of equality (or of inequality), which therefore holds 
(as a matter of logic) between them, cannot have any moral 
significance. This conclusion can be deductively demonstrated. 
If PI is a proposition which attributes a property,F, to 
an individual, 011 and P2 is a proposition which attributes a 
property, F, to an individual, 02, then the conjunction of PI 
and P2 <together with the analytic definition of 'equality') 
entails the conclusion, P3, that 01 and D2 are equal in respect 
to F. A parallel argument, in which P2 attributes not-F to D2, 
will entail the conclusion, P4, that Dl and D2 are unequal in 
respect to F. It follows from this that, if the premises, PI 
and P2, include nothing of moral importance, then neither does 
the conclusion. Indeed, the argument suggests a much stronger 
conclusion than this. It suggests that, whenever a judgement 
about the equality or inequality of two individuals does have 
moral content, that judgement will be wholly replaceable by a 
conjunction of propositions which has precisely the same moral 
content, but does not include reference to the relational 
attributes of equality or inequality. Furthermore, a perfectly 
familiar operation in formal logic leads to the conclusion that, 
whatever moral significance resides in the conjunction, F(Dl) 
& F (P2~ f must reside in the conjuncts, since it cannot be 
introduced simply by virtue of their conjunction. 
If we could be wholly confident that the transformations 
and entailments which formal logic permits accurately captured 
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legitimate moral reasoning in its entirety, this argument 
would be wholly conclusive. As consequential attributes, 
equality and inequality are necessarily incompetent to be 
bearers of any underivative moral significance. But suspicions 
that, in the actual world, relations of equality do have some 
moral significance of their own are likely to persist in spite 
of the evidence of these formal transformations. In any case, 
while these considerations seem to me to have an impressive 
force, I do not intend to rest my case on them alone. My sub-
sequent discussion will seek to show, in a variety of particu-
lar cases, that whenever a special moral significance seems to 
accrue to a relationship of equality, it actually belongs 
elsewhere. However, as my discussion of the principles for 
the distribution of goods under conditions of scarcity will 
bring out, relational attributes cannot be dispensed with 
entirely. Some relational properties, unlike the properties 
of equality and inequality, do appear to have underivative 
moral significance. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
SOCIAL JUSTICE 
I 
Human societies are typically characterized by relation-
ships of both co-operation and conflict. To some extent, 
this is a reflection of the fact that persons are both social 
beings and individuals. 
Each person is a product of his environment, and 
especially of his social environment. He has his character 
and many of his capacities, his aspirations, values and ideals, 
in important part as a causal consequence of the impact upon 
him of influences from the social world in which he develops as 
a person. He acquires his language and most of his beliefs, 
together with much of his capacity for rational thought and 
for moral behaviour, from his social environment. Only in 
society can homo sapiens become persons. Except in extreme 
cases of social disintegration, the social environment will be 
productive of individuals who have both the capaci1:;:y and the 
desire for co-operative endeavour. At the same time, if it 
is the environment offered by a tolerably open society, it will 
also provide the enabling conditions necessary for its members 
, ~ 
to have a developed capacity for self-directed action aiming at 
private ends. In exercising their capacity and desire for co-
operation, people must find ways of regulating their pursuit 
of private ends; they must find designs for the social 
relations which are to exis.t between them. Many benefits, both 
of a material and a non-material kind, will result from their 
co-operation, to the extent that they are successful in order-
12 
ing their social relationships. Especially because most goods 
would not be produced at all, or would be produced only in far 
smaller quantities, if people acted individually, their accru-
ing to society collectively only raises in an acute form, but 
does not answer, the question what is to be done with them_. 
Because the individual persons who compose society have indi-
vidual lives of their own to lead, and especially because they 
have private ends which are not also the collective ends of 
all, they are not indifferent to how socially-produced goods 
are distributed. The roots of most social conflict lie here. 
There is need of a theory which will offer guidance as to 
how both the benefits and the burdens of social co-operation 
and interaction should be distributed. Such a theory will be 
a theory of social justice. 
II 
Scepticism has sometimes been expressed about the exist-
1 
ence of the topic of social justice. Antony Flew has argued 
that originally, justice was concerned only with dealings 
between individuals, especially where they made claims on each 
other on the basis of antecedent deserts, obligations and 
entitlements. From this perspective, the claim made by John 
Rawls that the primary object of the theory of (social) justice 
is the basic structure of society2, is a puzzling one. Indeed, 
Flew suggests that, in as far as the original connections with 
the backward-looking claims that individuals make against each 
other are broken, the modern subject of social justice should 
be seen as having no real connection with the topic of justice 
in its original sense3 • 
There is some merit in Flew's claim. The concerns of 
modern inquiries into social justice often bear only a loose 
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resemblance to the concerns of the classical discussions of 
justice. Indeed, it is arguable that, to the extent that 
modern philosophers have presupposed too strong a basic con tin-
uity of their subject with the subject matter of classical 
thought, they have sometimes been persuaded to impose inappro-
priate requirements upon their theories. They have, for 
instance, considered (although not usually to accepb) whether 
a possible basis for the distribution of socially-produced 
material goods might be moral desert. Yet that is a suggestion 
which has very little to recommend it, apart from the suppos-
ition that, since moral desert is central to the classical con-
cepti~n of justice, it should therefore be found a place 
somewhere in the modern conception of social justice. 
The historical questions which this issue raises are not 
my present concern. I do maintain, however, that there is some 
justification for calling the subject of this inquiry, 'social 
justice'. The subject is the morally legitimate distribution, 
within a society, of the benefits and burdens which arise as a 
result of social interaction and co-operation. (Principles 
governing the distribution - or re-distribution - of goods 
between societies, or between existing political states, are 
at least as urgently needed as are adequate principles of the 
kind with which I am - sadly - exclusively concerned here) . 
Whateve~ are the principles which ought to govern these dis-
tributions, they will be, under this conception, the principles 
of social justice. 
Accordingly, I depart from T.D. Campbell's recommendation 
that the term 'justice' should be restricted to a range of con-
siderations - necessarily tied to the concepts of desert and 
merit - much more narrow than those which are morally relevant 
. 4 
to the problems of dis.tribution in general. Disagreements 
about usage are less frequently worth pursuing to any great 
length than has sometimes been thought, but in some cases 
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(including, perhaps, this one) I such linguistic disputes are 
evidence for underlying disagreements of a substantial nature 
over continuities and discontinuities between different areas 
of concern. So on the one hand, it could be argued that my 
interest is in the subject (the distribution of social goods), 
and that if anyone objects to my calling it 'the theory of 
social justice', then they can call it whatever else they 
like, provided that they understand what the subject is. On 
the other hand; the contemporary appropriation of the name 
'justice' for this subject can and should be defended. One of 
the more widely-accepted points of agreement in classical 
thought is that justice is concerned to give to each person 
that which is due to him5 • Yet in the most substantial modern 
contribution to the theory of social justice, that of Rawls, 
this principle has disappeared without trace. To the extent 
that 'a person's due' is interpreted as that which he morally 
deserves, the principle is, as I have allowed, of minimal sig-
nificance for social justice. Nonetheless, I will argue - in 
the theory of social justice to be developed in this work -
that the principle has an important formal suggestiveness. 
What is so profoundly unsatisfactory about Rawls's principles 
of justice (quite apart from the fallaciousness of the deriva-
, 
tion he offers for them6 ) is that they offer criteria of dis-
tribution which are entirely detached from the possibility that 
each indivi~ual person might have legitimate claims 7 against 
some part of the pool of social goods. Such claims, as I will 
develop this concept, are not equivalent to dues, if the latter 
are understood (as they probably should be) specifically as 
moral deserts. But there is an important conceptual continuity 
here, given that desert is a moral ground for distribution 
precisely because it is one of the species of claims. 
III 
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Individual persons have claims, in virtue of various 
natural facts about them, to certain things - which can be 
referred to generically as 'goods' - in their natural and 
social environments. These claims are of various kinds, 
depending (for instance) on whether a person has a need for 
some kind of good, or whether he deserves it, or whether he is 
entitled or has a right to it. All claims should be understood 
as prima facie, in the sense that, if a person has a claim to a 
good, then there is a presumption that he ought in justice to 
have it, a presumption which can, however, be overridden by 
the existence of an incompatible claim which has a greater 
moral urgency. In that eventuality, the former claim does not 
cease to be a legitimate claim: it only turns out not to be 
legitimately satisfiable. It should also be said that the 
notion of moral legitimacy is built into my concept of a claim, 
so that (in the absence of special argument) the fact of his 
making a claim should not be thought to be sufficient to estab-
1ish that a person has a claim. (Nor is making - or being 
capable of making - a claim necessary to having one) . 
Befng prepared to accept that people, in virtue of various 
of their natural characteristics, have a variety of moral 
claims on some of the goods in their environment, is intimately 
connected with being prepared to see human beings (unlike such 
individuals as pebbles) as having some moral significance, in 
virtue of those characteristics. To be able to see that it 
matters what is done to some of the things in a person's envir-
onment, just because that person has various characteristics 
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which relate him, in one morally significant way or another, 
to them, is to possess an important part of the moral concept 
of a person. To recognize, for example, that certain facts 
about a person's capacities or his past conduct make it morally 
appropriate that he be given something or be treated in some 
special way - to recognize, that is, that he merits or deserves 
these things - is to be prepared to see the moral significance 
that is carried by those natural facts about him. Similarly, 
to see that a person's hunger - his need for food - constitutes 
a reason why he should be permitted to have or should be 
provided with food, is to recognize the moral significance of 
certain other natural facts about him. 
When the classical philosophers spoke of giving to a 
person that which was due to him, they were expressing their 
recognition that people sometimes have some natural attributes 
which give rise to moral claims. The theory of social justice 
that I offer here seeks to capture and to extend this insight. 
I will argue, furthermore, that it is only by reference to this 
basic supposition that we can explain why it is that we should 
take seriously the duty to distribute, in some morally admis-
sible fashion, goods to persons, a duty that we do not have to 
such other individuals as pebbles. Until we have been told 
why it is morally important whether or not anyone receives or 
has access to any goods at all, we lack any reason to seek to 
implement a theory of distributive justice. 
This conception of the presuppositions of justice finds 
room, too, for retributive justice, the theory of just punish-
ment and just recompense. Although the language of 'claims' 
is inappropriate here - it is odd to suggest that a guilty man 
has a claim to punishment - whatever truth there is in a retri-
butive theory of the justification of punishment8 rests on the 
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insfstence that desert is a necessary condition of justified 
punishment. The fundamental difference that there is between 
punishment and those modes of treatment for the criminal which 
do not presuppose his desert, is that in the former case but 
not in the latter, the response which is being made to the 
attributes and activities of a person take him seriously (in 
that respect) as a moral being. This is the sense in which, 
as J.D. Mabbott'sprisoner reminds us I to punish a man is to 
treat him as a person9 . It is to see certain responses as 
morally appropriate to certain facts about a person, and to 
take seriously - in a sense, to respect - his status as a res-
ponsible human being. Yet this theory of punishment can easily 
come to seem too elevated to be a happy description of the 
s i tuat.ion of many of the derelict creatures who are the sub-
jects of criminal punishment. If this is so, it is a reflec-
tion of the fact that people often do not possess all the 
morally significant attributes that this theory ascribes to 
them. If the retributive theory of punishment is false, it is 
not because it is conceptually or morally mistaken, but because 
it is factually mistaken - people are not as it supposes them 
to be. 
To give a person that which is due to him, when this 
involves giving him that which he deserves, is to take him 
morally ,seriously. But it is not the only morally serious 
response that can be made to people. To see that a person has, 
or has the opportunity to get for himself, an adequate supply 
of ;food is also to take him seriously, as a person who is 
also a biological organism, a creature whose needs constitute 
claims: that is to say, a being whose requirements for 
survival, or flourishing, are morally of some consequence. 
Need and merit are the two major bases of claims recognized in 
18 
the socialist theory of justice, the foundations of which are 
laid in the present work. 
Because of the fundamental continuity of subject matter -
mediated by the requirements for treating persons with full 
moral seriousness - between justice as giving to each his due 
(in the classical sense) and the moral problems concerning the 
distribution of social goods, I regard the latter as part of 
the theory of justice. Social justice, under my conception, 
is the theory of the distribution of social goods according to 
claims. 
IV 
Some of the goods which are brought into existence by the 
interaction and co-operation of human beings r.annot properly 
be regarded as of direct concern to the theory of social just-
ice. The roughly-delineated class of 'private goods' is the 
class of goods which belong to the personal realm in the lives 
of people: they are the goods of love and friendship, charity, 
truthfulness, and so on. The enjoyment of these goods is 
obviously not completely detached from the public circumstances 
in which people find themselves, or from their possession of 
goods which are the subject of distributive principles in a 
theory of social justice. Furthermore, they are goods which 
are an integral part of the basic conditions of a good life: 
the concept of those conditions is, I will argue later, one of 
the basic concepts in a substantive theory of justice. But 
none of this shows that these private goods are goods which 
ought to be publicly-distributed. Goods of the latter kind I 
will call 'social goods'. Social goods are those things, among 
the to product of collective action and interaction, which 
are appropriately regarded as goods which ought to be distrib-
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uted according to more-or-less fixed and determinate public 
principles. This immediately provides one sufficient explana-
tion why many private goods are not of direct concern to the 
theory of social justice: they are goods, the values of which 
are inconsistent with the attempt: (were it practical) to con-
trol their distribution in a public manner. This does not, 
however, exclude the possibility that part of the explanation 
of the value of some social goods might be found in their con-
tribution to the conditions necessary for the enjoyment of 
some private goods. 
What are the social goods, the goods which ought to be 
distributed according to the public principles of social just-
1be? An answer to this question would be a contribution to a 
particular normative theory of justice, for apart from anything 
else, it presupposes a particular conception of the claims 
that people have. Which things in the world are goods depends 
(largely} on the needs and interests that people have, and 
which of those goods are subject to d~stributive principles 
depends on which of those interests are appropriately regarded 
as the concern of the public provisions that justice makes. 
Consider a theory of justice which regards as claims in justice 
only the positive property rights that people have. In such a 
theory, even such basic and uncontroversial goods as the 
material necessities of life do not, as such, fall into the 
category of social goods. The necessary and sufficient con-
dition for a thing to be a social good is simply that it be 
the object of property rights (including disputed property 
rights). It is not even necessary that it be a good, in any 
other sense. The proponent of a theory of this kind can admit 
that it is a morally good thing that those who are in need 
should have the basic necessities: but he will deny that the 
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principles of justice are involved here. By contrast, in any 
theory which recognizes needs as grounds of claims, food, 
shelter, and so on, are social goods. 
According to my conception of the nature of social justice, 
the social goods are those goods which (i) contribute to the 
basic conditions of a good life, and (ii) can appropriately be 
distributed in a public (and usually institutionalized) manner. 
This conception is related to Rawls's account of the 'primary 
goods', things which every rational person is presumed to want, 
whatever else he wants. The primary goods are given as 
"rights, liberties, and opportunities, income and wealth, and 
10 the social bases of self-respect" . It need not be the case, 
however, that every primary good is also a social good. That 
will depend on whether or not its distribution according to 
public principles expressly designed to that end is desirable. 
The proper assessment of these questions requires some under-
standing "of the nature of social distribution. 
v 
In all established societies, most goods will already be 
distributed. Whether as a result of de,sign or of historical 
accident, institutions will exist which, even if they do not 
have as their direct object the distribution of particular 
goods according to principles of justice, do in any case 
operate in ways which indirectly produce some de "facto distri-
bution of those goods. The more overt kinds of political 
power, such as the occupancy of legislative offices, are dis-
tributed, in modern Western societies, in accordance with 
institutionalized procedures specifically designed for that 
purpose. The more covert or less obtrusive forms of political 
power, on the other hand, tend to be distributed as an unde-
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signed consequence (or largely so) of the operation either of 
other distributive mechanisms, distributing other goods, or of 
institutions and practices which are officially non-distributive. 
Not only wealth, but power and social prestige as well 
(socialists argue), are distributed by, or as a result of, the 
operations of the free market, even though it is not a part of 
the express purpose of that institution to distribute these' 
things at all. 
Not every distributive mechanism will conform to a single 
type. In an important discussion, Rawls distinguishes three 
different kinds of distributive principles l1 . The basic dis-
tinct jon is between those conceptions of justice which incor-
porate a definition of the just end-state, and those which do 
not: the former category is further divided into two kinds. 
In the case of 'perfect procedural justice', there exists a 
procedure which is sure to realize an independently-defined 
just end~state. In 'imperfect procedural justice', an inde-
pendent definition can still be given ,for the just end-state, 
but no sure procedure for realizing it exists, or is (at least) 
known to exist.' Finally, where the second major category, 
'pure-procedural justice', is concerned, there is no indepen-
dently-defined just end-state; instead, it is necessarily the 
case that if specified procedures are complied with, the result-
ing distribution. whatever it is, will be just. 
A theory of justice might advance principles of any of 
these kinds. Robert Nozick's entitlement theory12, for 
inntance.1 is a theory of pure-procedural justice, because it 
rejects the legitimacy of any attempt to define some end-state, 
some pattern of holdings of goods, as just. Justice is a 
property of the procedures which govern the acquisition, trans-
fer and redistribution of goods I not a property of the pa.tterns 
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of holdings which result from the workings of those procedures. 
On the other hand, the proponent of a different theory of 
justice might be critical of the fact that purely-procedural 
mechanisms are permitted to distribute some social goods, even 
though an independent definition of the just end-state (accord-
ing to that theory) is available for those goods, and yet is 
not realized by the distributive procedures actually in 
operation. 
The conflict between pure-procedural and patterned con-
ceptions of justice is an important one in modern Western 
political and social theory. Broadly speaking, theories in 
the classical tradition of laissez-faire liberalism have 
standardly insisted that principles of pure-procedural justice 
are adequate for the distribution of most social goods. Thus 
Nozick argues that, provided the initial holdings of goods are 
justly acquired, and provided that all transfers of goods are 
legitimate, the resulting distribution of social goods must be 
just, whatever the pattern it happens to instantiate13 . Nozick 
is mistaken, however, in supposing that there could be a theory 
of justice, even a purely-procedural one, which did not also 
include a patterned component. Such a component is necessary 
because the proper operation of just procedures presupposes a 
background of rights and obligations (typically), the just 
distribution of which is defined in a patterned way_ The free 
market operates, Nozick presupposes, in a context in which 
every person has a set of basic and very powerful moral 
rights - roughly (for Nozick is not explicit on this) the 
classical liberal rights to life, liberty and property - and 
a correlative set of obligations to respect the rights of 
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others . These rights are distributed equallY to all persons: 
they are not themselves, that is, distributed in a purely-
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procedural manner. 
Any theory of justice which relies predominantly upon 
the operation of distributive procedures must specify the con-
straints and conditions with which those procedures, if they 
are to operate properly, must comply. Only when these con-
ditions of proper operation are satisfied can the de facto 
holdings to which they give rise be regarded as just. If the 
procedures of the free market are to generate distributions 
which are just, there must be restrictions on the ways in 
whi'ch and th~ circumstances under which people may legitimately 
exchange goods. The basic rights which all participants in the 
market have, and which establish the fundamental conditions of 
legitimacy for market transactions, cannot themselves be the 
object of free bargaining and exchange. It can only be for 
this reason that transactions entered into under threat of 
force (for example) are declared not to be binding. Similarly, 
the right to make and to enforce.contracts is one, the prior 
distribution of which to all participants in the market is pre-
supposed in the claim that, whatever is the pattern of holdings 
which results from proper market activity, it will be just. 
Theories of distribution within the socialist tradition 
have taken the view (broadly speaking) that the distribution-
patterns which result from the free operation of market proced-
ures are not only morally intolerable in a general way, but 
are also actually unjust as well. Such theories have accord-
ingly usually offered patterned conceptions of justice, and 
have sought to define institutional procedures which will, 
whether perfectly or imperfectly, bring about these patterns 
of holdings. Confronted by the objections raised by socialist 
theories to the existing market methods of. distribution, it 
will hardly do to protest, as H.B. Acton does, that because 
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the actual distribution of wealth in liberal capitalist 
societies is that which has come about through the operation 
of (supposedly) just procedures, cannot properly be appraised 
. t . t b f t tt d t . 15 as JUs or unJus y re erence 0 a pa erne concep ~on . 
The point of the socialist objection is precisely that the dis-
tribution neither of material wealth nor of the nonmaterial 
goods with which/ in capitalist societies, wealth is posit~vely 
correlated, should be left to market procedures. The distribu-
tion of social goods should generally be governed, on the con-
trary, by a patterned conception of what the proper holdings 
of these goods would be. 
If it is possible to identify the basic conditions of the 
good Ii for some group of persons, then it should also be 
possible to describe the ideal pattern of distribution, in 
that group, of at least some of the available social goods. 
To the extent that this consideration favours socialist (or 
other) theories which embrace a patterned conception of just-
ice, however, it might be countered by the liberal argument 
that the attempt to implement institutional procedures for the 
patterned distribution of goods of this kind will have very 
unwelcome side-effects. Opponents of public control of the 
economy will identify many such (alleged) danger9 in socialist 
policies. From the moral point of view, however - granted, 
that is, the background theory of the particular virtue of 
social justice defended in the present work - the liberal's 
insistence that property rights are the sole basis of legiti-
mate claims in justice represents a serious misunderstanding 
of the relative importance to be attached to different compon-
ents of the good life. Indeed, whatever the undoubted import-
ance (under the present order of things) of the property-
related liberties which the liberal seeks to protect to the 
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utmost, they are less important to the good life than the 
possession of the basic necessities of physical survival. 
Those necessities, in turn, while they are very often objects 
of property rights, sometimes have a greater value, or a 
greater moral significance, as objects of needs. Other things 
being equal, claims based on needs ought to be preferred to 
claims based on rights. Simply to insist that this violates 
property rights is not morally sufficient16 
All societies evolve ways, more or less stable, more or 
less widely accepted as just, of distributing social goods. 
A theory of justice can (as I have said) be concerned with 
these distributions in either or both of two ways: it can 
appraise social institutions and practices in the light of 
standards of purely-procedural justice, or it can appraise them 
from the perspective of the patterns of holdings which they 
produce. 
This contrast, between procedural and patterned concep-
tions of justice, is closely correlated to the contrast between 
planned and unplanned distributions. Some institutions and 
practices are deSigned, and function in fact, to distribute 
social goods in accordance with a plan of what that distribu-
tion ought to be, or of how it ought to take place. The dis-
tribution of some other social goods is unplanned, in the sense 
that it results, as a more or less unintended, but not neces-
sarily a totally unforseen consequence, from the proper 
operation of institutions and practices which have quite a 
different purpose or function17 . The adherent of a socialist 
theory of justice will generally favour the introduction of 
institutions or community practices which will produce planned 
(patterned) distributions of some of the goods whose distribu-
tion was (under the non-socialist order) unplanned. The 
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laissez-:fa:ire liberal, who will generally oppose both patterned 
conceptions of justice and the public planning and control 
which tend to go with them, will usually favour the retention 
(or the re-introduction) of institutions which operate in 
accordance with the requirements of procedural justice to pro-
duce what are otherwise unplanned distributions. The opponent 
of socialist distributive and redistributive policies can 
accordingly advance at least two importantly different argu-
ments. Firstly, he can reject the socialist theory of justice 
itself: as I have pointed out, this standardly involves 
regarding property rights, rather than (primarily) needs, as 
the basic source of claims in justice. I have also implied 
that there are moral reasons, if we grant the centrality of 
the concept of the basic conditions of the good life, for 
preferring the socialist view, because it awards greater moral 
urgency to needs than to rights. The crucial point here is 
that property rights cannot defensibly be regarded as having a 
moral importance which enables them to override most other 
moral claims. The contribution that they make to the basic 
conditions of the good life is much less significant than that 
made by the satisfaction of needs. The liberal will accord-
ingly have to reject this whole conception of the particular 
virtue of social justice. 
The same point - or a closely similar one - can be made 
in another way. The egalitarian socialist18 will argue that 
the liberal theory of basic rights and of the free market does 
not correspond to the real world. People vary, in morally 
signi cant ways, in their ability to take advantage of and to 
prosper by the institutional mechanisms which are responsible, 
in free-market societies; for the distribution of social goods. 
Whatever their 'formal equality', people are substantively 
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unequal: and it is the latter which counts, because it is 
that, and not the formal equality of rights, which largely 
determines the actual distribution of those goods which are 
necessary components of the good life, for all persons. That 
being so, it is necessary to give attention, not just to those 
institutions which are officially involved in the distribution 
of social goods, but also to a wide variety of factors in the 
social and natural environment which causally affect the 
opportunities and abilities that people have actually to acquire 
and enjoy those goods. It is necessary to intervene in the 
market, because the free operations of the latter are product-
ive of injustice, whatever might be their theoretical accord-
ance with a proper respect for rights. In the ideal free 
market, distributive jU8t i CF! pF!rhaps would be (approximately) 
done: such a market might with some plausibility be seen as 
the perfect institutional mechanism for mediating the claims 
to goods that free and equal persons have. But actual markets 
are far from ideal, not least because actual people are not 
usually ideal entrepreneurs. Classical liberalism is a theory 
for another world. 
The other important line taken by opponents of socialist 
justice is based on empirical arguments about the dangers of 
planning, and of granting to public institutions the powers 
necessary for them to exercise control over the distribution 
of goods. This is a powerful argument, and it must be allowed 
that in the world as it actually confronts us, the institu-
tionalization of principles of distributive justice must always 
be undertaken cautiously. A society which is distributively 
just need not be a society which is morally exemplary, or even 
very attractive, in other respects. But whatever the truth 
in this disputed area, the philosophical defensibility of the 
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socialist theory of justice is undiminished by the necessity, 
admitted by those whose adherence to the theory is tempered by 
practical wisdom, of exercising considerable care in its imple-
mentation. 
VI 
A complete theory of social justice is not only concerned 
with the morally appropriate distribution of social goods. 
The conditions of social life generally, and of the production 
of social goods in particular, also impose burdensome neces-
sities upon peop How these burdens should be shared out is 
also -of concern in justice, though it has received very little 
direct attention in the philosophical literature. When these 
burdens consist simpl:l of smaller hol~ing0 of good:; th~n 
would pre r to have, they will be justly distributed by any 
principles which properly distribute those goods themselves. 
However, the burdens which are of direct concern in justice 
are of a different kind from these, arising, in particular, 
from the tasks and responsibilities which are a necessary part 
of the production of material wealth, and from the distribution 
of political power, and hence of (relative) powerlessness. 
Because the egalitarian precepts which might be advanced 
in connection with the distribution of burdens are not signifi-
cantly fferent, in a formal sense, from those with which I 
will be directly concerned, they do not require separate 
treatment. On the substantive side, the complex issues which 
arise do not concern justice alone, but also pose problems of 
'the justifiable coercion of individuals to social goals, the 
source of the obligations which people take on as members of 
communities, and the like. It is not a subject to be ade-
quately treated in a few remarks. Accordingly, I will examine 
only that part (but it is the major part) of the theory of 
justice which involves the distribution of goods. 
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In sum, I will be concerned with the general form of the 
theory of social justice, with the intention of showing that 
the relational attributes of equality· and inequality have no 
irreducible significance in it. I will also sketch the found-
ations of a particular normative theory of jus ce - a 
socialist theory - which is both morally plausible, and illus-
trative of the substantive content that normative theories of 
justice might take, in accordance with the format of the 
general theory. This particular theory, however, is logically 
independent of the nonegalitarian background, which neither 
stands nor falls with the fate of the former. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
THE EMPIRICAL GROUNDS FOR EGALITARIANISM 
I 
Moral appraisals and moral demands can be rationally 
defended: that is a fundamental premise of the present work. 
Unless a prescription can be justified in some way, unless 
some reasons can be given for acting in that way rather than 
in other ways, there can be no basis (other things being 
equal) for treating it seriously. Moral demands need not be 
groundless imperatives. The point of issuing them is to 
direct people's intentional actions in certain ways, in 
order to bring about some morally preferred gtflte~ of 
affairs. This influence upon human activity is sought by 
giving to people reasons why those particular states of 
affairs should be pursued. While moral appraisals do not 
describe the world as it actually is, yet they do, in a way, 
still describe the world - that is, the world as it ought to 
1 be·. Unlike ordinary descriptive judgements, however, moral 
appraisals, necessarily, are intended to have some 
prescriptive force, a force which arises from the fact that 
the world actually is not how it ought to be. At the same 
time, morality cannot restrict its concern with the actual 
world to those respects in which the world falls short of 
what is morally required. To suppose otherwise is to give 
up all prospect of being able to distinguish, on rational 
grounds, the more-defensible from the less-defensible 
members of the indefinitely large class of different possible 
moral demands that could, in principle, be made. If there is 
to be a reason for subscribing to some particular account of 
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how the world ought to be made over, it must be a reason 
which is attached in some way to how the world actually is 
already. The defence of a moral condemnation consists in 
showing that, because some part of the world is thus and so 
now, its also now being in some other way, in some other part, 
is morally indefensible. 
Defensible moral judgements are backed by reasons, and 
reasons attach to the world as it is. This is not to say 
that the connection between facts and values is ever logically 
compelling, or even that its logic is presently understood. 
It is to set a minimum requirement that must be satisfied if 
mora~ity is to be a rationally defensible phenomenon. There 
are no conclusive arguments at present for supposing that 
morality is not a phenomenon of this sort. 
This insistence on the rationality of moral judgement 
might be accepted, but the further claim that moral reasons 
must rest on matters of fact be rejected. There is a long 
tradition in Western ethical theory which seeks to supply 
a eriori justifications for moral principles. However, the 
intimacy of the concern that morality has with the actual 
conditions of human beings in the contingent circumstances of 
their world militates against the likelihood of there being 
any a priori moral truths. 
Th~re is a mode of theorizing in contemporary ethical 
philosophy which denies some of these conclusions. It does 
not seek ana priori base for particular, substantive moral 
demands; but it does seek to uncover 'the necessary 
2 
, presuppositions of moral thought in general' . These 
presuppositions, if they did turn out to state genuine 
necessities, would have an undeniable importance. The thesis 
of universalizability, though it is sometimes invested with 
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substantive moral content, does contain logical truths which 
are sometimes ignored. As my discussion of elitism will 
show3 , important results can sometimes be reached by insisting 
on these necessities. But these are results which have 
normative implications only in an indirect way. No a priori 
considerations, it is reasonable to hold, can lead to 
conclusions which have a normative content of their own. It 
follows, if this is so, that a priori negative egalitarianism, 
the position which derives from acceptance of an a priori 
principle of the presumption of equality of treatment or of 
consideration, in advance of any reasons for treating or 
cons~dering people differently, must be mistaken. It is a 
theory which really does have substantive content, however 
minimal it is thought by some to bel yet which pretends to 
an a priori justification. The examination below4 of the 
precise character of its fallaciousness is important and 
revealing because it shows that the defence of the presumption 
principle (in both its a priori and its purely normative 
forms.) tacitly rests on an appeal to certain general facts 
about the world. Apart/then, from the necessity (for my 
general thesis) of showing that, as a variety of 
egalitarianism, this position is mistaken, the reasons for 
its falsity provide powerful circumstantial evidence for the 
truth Of the meta-ethical principle, that the defence of 
every moral prescription must eventually connect it, in some 
substantial way, with facts about the actual world. In the 
absence of a theory of moral reasons, the defence of this 
meta-ethical principle can only proceed in an indirect 
manner. Yet while some of my major arguments presuppose its 
truth, some others tend to confirm its necessity. A clear 
appreciation of this necessity a wonderful solvent where 
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~ome of the pretensions of egalitarians are concerned. 
II 
There has been a tendency, among those whose commitment 
to equality is unreflecting, to suppose that egalitarian 
demands can be freed of the necessity of attachment to facts 
about the world. At its most superficial, this finds 
expression in the claim that, because they are moral demands 
and not statements of fact, principles of equal treatment, of 
equal consideration and respect, and the like, do not need to 
be defended by reference to any supposed equalities which 
5 
exist in fact between people. Certainly, the moral 
insistence that persons ought to be treated equally gains its 
prescriptive force from the fact that they are not at present 
actually treated equally. But if the demand for equality 
between people is a defensible one (as the demand for 
equality between people and pebbles is not), the world now 
must be such that it is an appropriate demand to make. If 
some things in the world as it is at present are morally 
objectionable, that must be because they are morally 
incompatible with some other things which are to be found in 
the actual world at present. Incompatibilities can be 
resolved, of course, by giving up either one of the 
incompatible terms. Moral incompatibilities, however, 
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frequently require that just one of the terms be altered. 
Often, there is no real problem about which should be changed. 
For instance, a person's being tortured, which is one actual 
fact, is morally incompatible with some other actual facts, 
such as his capacity to feel pain; yet it is not legitimate 
to resolve the moral inconsistency between these facts by 
eliminating his capacity to feel pain. Why should this be so? 
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In many cases, we are served with reasonable adequacy by a 
distinction between the world as it actually is, and the 
possible directions that freely-indulged human activity might 
take in that world. Moral problems become problems of 
conforming our activities to the given constraints and 
requirements of the world as we find it. 
This is not a distinction, however, which will take very 
much pressure. Moral problems are not just concerned with 
how individuals should act in a pre-established world order. 
Part of that world is of human origin: this is the world of 
social or 'conventional' facts, and is a world which does not 
lie beyond the reach of legitimate criticism. The practices 
and institutions of society restrain and direct the lives of 
people in vastly complex ways. It has never been the case 
that every person living in a single social environment has 
been able to lead a life which rendered morally irreproachable 
the institutions of that soc ty. Moral criticism of the 
world as it actually is - at least in its conventional 
aspects - is therefore often justified. Our moral problems, 
accordingly, become ones, not just of conforming our 
behaviour entirely to the world as we are given it, but very 
often of changing the world in certain respects. If policies 
of making the world overJ in some respects, are ever 
justified, it must be, again, because we find moral 
incompatibilities in the present world, and because we feel 
confident that we can identify the term which should be 
changed. 
Some facts about the world seem to be more basic or more 
'given' than others, and it is not their modification that is 
required. Instead, we demand that in other respects the world 
should be brought into conformity with those fixed facts. We 
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are no longer dealing with the problem of conforming 
individual activities to the demands of a given, determinate 
environment. Instead, we are proposing to re-shape in various 
ways the environment in which individual activities are 
undertaken, so that the lives of people will be led in a 
different framework, one in which fewer moral 
incompatibilities will arise. The classical distinction 
between 'nature'and 'convention' was adumbrated with these 
sorts of problems in mind6 • Because the problems are real 
ones, the attempt to draw the distinction has lost none of 
its significance. What it suggests is that the natural world 
is given, is to all intents and purposes basic and 
inalterable. The problems of social morality are the problems 
of designing a conventional realm, a set of institutions and 
practices, which will be maximally morally-consistent with 
what nature has provided. 
It has become increasingly apparent, especially through 
the work of philosophers like Roussea~, Hegel and Marx, that 
this bold distinction between nature and convention is far 
too crude. The facts of the world do not divide neatly into 
those that are natural, given, and inalterable, and those 
that are conventional, made by human activity, and alterable. 
Human beings are not creatures who have a complement of 
natural attributes of sufficient determinacy to enable them, 
from the vantage point of a pre-social state of nature, to 
decide how the conventional world should be designed to suit 
them, within the framework set by those natural constraints. 
The contemporary proponents of liberalism, however, 
still show many traces of their implicit acceptance of the 
contract theory of society, and its associated metaphysical 
myths about human nature and human communities. They accept 
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the possibility of speaking intelligibly about persons in a 
pre-social state, possessed already of a reasonably full 
complement of attributes7 . Each person is said to have (the 
most important of) his desires and interests, values and 
aspirations, modes of thinking and of reasoning, of 
deliberating and deciding, in virtue solely of his natural 
origins. Each is what he is naturally. By contrast, the 
social attributes and roles of people are seen as relatively 
superficial and peripheral, no more a part of each individual's 
real nature than are the clothes which he wears: and like 
clothes, they can be taken up or removed as the person inside 
them thinks fit. How a person ought to be treated depends on 
what he iSi what sort of society people ought to institute 
depends on what will be maximally compatible with the natural 
characters of all. The liberal conclusion is that the social 
properties of any person will only be morally legitimate if 
they are compatible with his underlying real nature. 
This view is false. The attributes of persons cannot be 
explained in this way. People are to be found only in an 
environment which is both natural and social, and they are 
amalgams of natural and social attributes. Some of their 
properties are natural in origin, are possessed by people in 
virtue of their being biological organisms, members of a 
particular species in a particular physical environment. 
Others of their properties are conventional in origin, are 
possessed by people as they are members of particular social 
institutions and bearers of definite social roles. Many of 
their properties cannot be attributed exclusively to either 
of these sources, but represent the effect of the impact on 
growing human beings of both social and natural forces. 
While human beings are members of a natural species, persons 
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are members of a social species. 
On the basis of a metaphysical theory of the nature of 
persons which is radically individualist and asocial, the 
classical liberal is able to insist that the institutions of 
society must be designed in conformity with the previously 
given character and behaviour o£ people. If some persons 
reveal more intelligence and entrepreneurial acumen than 
others, and if some are inclined to indolence and criminality, 
then these are facts about the individual nature of each 
8 
which must be accepted. Social institutions and procedures 
must be designed with these constraints and conditions in 
mind. The metaphysic tends, that is, to be profoundly 
conservative. The institutions we have are fitted fairly 
well to the nature of people as we find them: if there is 
poverty in our society, it is because there are people too 
indolent to work and to help themselves. Any attempt to make 
the world over according to some grand plan must inevitably 
run afoul of the inalterable facts of nature. The 
inestimable virtue of long-established institutions is that 
their conformity to the actual nature o£ people is guaranteed, 
for the most part, by sound evolutionary principles. To seek 
to step outside these bounds, to demand that they be changed, 
is to abandon the principle that moral precepts should be 
defensible by reference to facts, for the only facts which can 
serve as the justification for moral appraisals are natural 
facts. The basic problem of morality (on this view) is to 
establish a conformity between the social and natural realms, 
on the foundation of acceptance of the natural realm. as fixed 
and given. If people are not in fact equal in their 
attributes - in their intelligence, their capacity for work, 
their foresight and prudence, their ability to conform their 
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conduct to the directives which society adopts for its own 
smooth functioning - then the demands of egalitarians that 
all people be treated as if they are equal are demands which 
lack justification. 
With the rejection of this false metaphysical theory of 
persons shoul.d go a rejection of the normative positions to 
which it most readily gives rise. Once the possibility of 
distinguishing clearly between natural and social attributes 
and circumstances has been given up, however, the 
characterization of morality as seeking a conformity of the 
social realm with the inalterable demands of the natural must 
also be given up, or at least extensively modified. Morally 
incompatible facts there still are aplenty, but if neither 
fact in each such pair can confidently be identified as a 
part of 'the way things naturally (really) are', then that 
criterion for selecting the basic direction of our policies 
will not be available to us. 
III 
Modern egalitarianism is confronted by severe problems 
of this kind. On the one hand, it rejects the moral 
legitimacy of the inequalities which actually exist between 
people, and demands that people be made equal, in certain 
respects, or that they be treated or considered as equals f in 
certain respects. On the other hand, egalitarianism must be 
able to point to facts about the world and about people which 
show that these demands are not arbitrary or unfounded . 
. Bernard Williams puts the point forcefully. Demands for 
social and political change designed to bring about greater 
equality need not (he says) be regarded as gratuitously 
egalitarian (as based, for instance, on ana priori or an 
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aesthetic preference for equality over inequality}. Instead, 
these demands should be seen as naffirming an equality which 
is believed in some sense already to exist, and to be 
9 
obscured or 'neglected by actual social arrangements" . 
Yet to the extent that people are products of their 
circumstances, and particularly of their social environments, 
there will be a tendency for differences I or inequalities I -in 
their circumstances to produce differences in their very 
characters. Unequal circum stances tend to produce unequal 
people, and apparently - paradoxically - to deprive 
egalitarians of the basis of their moral demands. Their 
response has been (or should be) I first of all, to insist 
that all people possess certain common fundamental 
characteristics and capacities. The origin of these 
attributes is not of overwhelming moral significance, 
provided only that natural and social necessities are such 
that all people (or very nearly' all people) will have them. 
That is, the native attributes of human beings, when brought 
into contact with the social forces that will be present in 
nearly any society (or in any society which turns homo sapiens 
into people), evolve into these 'original' characters and 
capacities, ones which are both of fundamental moral 
significance, and common to virtually all people. These are 
the common attributes which underlie the more superficial 
differences between people, and which justify action to 
repair some of the latter inequalities. Secondly, 
egalitarians need to rethink the classical doctrine of nature 
and convention. Part of the point of that distinction was 
certainly that it should have the force suggested earlier: 
moral incompatibilities between different facts about a 
person's total circumstances should be eliminated by altering 
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the facts which are merely conventional. But why should the 
conventional rather than the natural be changed? 'I'here are 
two possible answers to this. The first rests on the belief, 
the cogency of which should not, perhaps, be entirely 
dismissed,that the natural is ultimately real, and for that 
reason is also right. (If the real is also rational, and if 
morality is essentially rational, then all the materials for 
the classical solutions to these problems are to hand). The 
second answer is that, while human knowledge and technology 
were in their infancy, the distinction between the conventional 
and the natural mapped, very roughly, onto that between those 
circumstances which could be modified and changed, with a 
reasonable degree of control being possible over the direction 
of change, and those circumstances which were not modifiable 
in any controllable waylO. After all, if people are to act 
so as to eliminate moral inconsistencies, then one necessary 
condition is that they can in fact act to that end. 
The growth of knowledge and technology - together with 
the passing of our innocent faith in the moral supremacy of 
the natural - has meant that the classical approach to these 
problems is no longer adequate. In some ways, the question of 
alterability - and of the cost, in both material and 
non-material terms, of bringing about alterations - is the 
most basic11 • To the extent that we are possessed of a power,. 
not just to shape the future according to our ideals of the 
good life for people as they are now, but actually to mould 
peop16, to make them according to visions of what the ideal 
society and the ideal person would be - to that extent the 
justification for our plans and policies, when they are 
directed to such wholesale reconstruction, is again 
problematic. 
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There is a significant danger here, as Williams has 
pointed out12 , that the concept of an identifiable individual 
person will start to crumble once we push hard on the belief 
that any alterable inequalities are fair game. Do any 
attributes which are also sufficient for personality belong 
inalterably to those individuals for whom equality is sought? 
Questions like this become particularly urgent, given the 
necessity of attaching moral prescriptions to facts about the 
world. The egalitarian could maintain that his policies are 
justified by facts alright, but that these are facts about 
that world which will come to exist if his policies are 
carried out: such a world will be, in virtue of various facts 
about it, a valuable world. It is clear, however, that 
unless fairly firm connections between the present world (and 
its inhabitants) and this possible one are maintained, the 
opportunity to evaluate it favourably, now, will not be 
rationally available. But in that case there could be no 
reason, now, for pursuing it. Besides, the egalitarian ideal 
does not have a monopoly on the truth in this visionary realm. 
There are many different possible worlds in which people, 
provided only that they had been adequately moulded to their 
world, could find happiness and fulfilment. Unless reference 
is made back to the nature of people as we find them now, how 
can anyone of these visions be rationally preferred to any 
of the others? 
The most plausible theory at this juncture (as I have, 
in passing, already suggested) is a theory of the permanent 
or abiding characteristics of people. All people will have 
these characteristics, in virtue of their biological 
relatedness, and in virtue of the common features of all 
h . t' 13 uman SOCle les • There are such common characteristics, 
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and some of them are of fundamental moral significance. 
The impoverished prospects for a decent life that many 
people have, and their diminished ability to compete on fair 
terms for scarce goods and resources (in a society with 
competitive institutions of distribution), can often be 
attributed to the disadvantageous circumstances of their 
birth and upbringing. Social forces over which they had no 
control (and parents over whose selection they had no say) 
have seriously impaired their capacity to lead lives which 
are of value both to themselves and to society. It is not 
necessarily the case that someone is directly responsible for 
causing these misfortunes: but it is one of the signs of a 
morally mature society nevertheless that it will recognize a 
collective responsibility to better the lives of such persons. 
A crucial part of the justification for this attribution of 
collective responsibility rests on a definite conception of 
what an individual person was to begin with - the capacities 
and the dispositions that he had, or was capable of forming -
and of the way that he would naturally have tended to develop 
had social circumstances been more propitious. We should see 
socially-disadvantaged people, not as manufactured from poor 
materials, but as distorted by society's poor workmanship. 
The thesis that people have certain original or native 
capacities, dispositions, and abilities, must not be confused 
with the thesis that these are all or mainly capacities for 
good. It is not necessary to subscribe to the optimistic 
theory that persons are naturally gcod, and are only 
corrupted by a bad social environment. On the contrary, 
society must be given some of the credit for those who are 
good, as well as some of the responsibility for those who are 
not. In exercising a profound influence over the formation 
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of mature people out of the raw material which nature 
provides, society has the opportunity to see that the 
capacities of people for both individual and social good are 
fostered, while their more destructive or harmful capacities 
are suppressed. No obvious violence is done to the integrity 
of people by shaping them in this way_ Besides, the 
consequences of not exercising this potentiality for good at 
all would be a state of extreme disintegration and strife. 
Social forces, however, usually manage to act to the 
detriment of some people. Those fu~ong the original capacities 
of such people which would have been of value to them and to 
society have not been adequately nourished, while others, more 
harmful, have not been adequately repressed. The lives which 
such people lead are usually far less valuable than those they 
could have led, given their native equipment and capacities, 
if circumstances had been more favourable. Whatever are the 
responsibilities which society should accept in relation to 
these people, those responsibilities will be justified by 
reference to what such people had it in themselves to become, 
but did not become, because of adverse social circumstances. 
Such a view depends, admittedly, on a fairly firm 
conception of the original dispositions that people have. 
But this is not an unusual theory. The moral justification 
for compensatory programmes, for example, rests on the 
supposition that disadvantaged people are socially rather 
than natively deprived. If the theory is defensible, then so 
are those projects which seek to compensate people for the 
social deprivation they have suffered. Furthermore, the 
theory provides a rational basis for a belief which deserves 
to be rationally based, the bel f t namely, that there can 
still be grounds for moral objection to some social 
environments, even though the people who live in them accept 
them without complaint or resentment. The objection will be 
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legitimate whenever these environments are of a kind which do 
violence to those valuable original capacities and 
characteristics which are common to all persons, and which 
the inhabitants of those environments are (justifiably) 
presumed to have. 
All normal people have, originally, the capacities to 
suffer physical and spiritual paint to find satisfaction and 
fulfilment in a range of activities of different kinds l to 
form projects and to have aspirations and ideals, to direct 
their activities in the light of reflection and deliberation, 
and to suffer disappointment and despondency when they are 
frustrated in the pursuit of their ends. They have the 
capacity to form close and mutually supportive relationships 
with some people, to care something about the circumstances 
of other people, and to share in the life of a community. 
The general character of these c~pacities carries over 
to th~ generality of the moral significance which they have, 
a significance which can be expressed most adequately in a 
doctrine of natural rights 14 and natural duties. It is an 
essential part of this theory that such rights and duties have 
a broadly-defined content, as is appropriate to the 
generality of their empirical bases in the original 
capacities of all normal people. In this respect, they can 
be contrasted with the particular rights and duties which 
people have in virtue of their specific and narrowly-
characterized attributes. Only a person who is in regular 
paid employment, for instance, can significantly claim to have 
a right to paid annual holidays15: only a person who has 
skills of an appropriate kind can have a duty to render 
certain kinds of aid in the event of a disaster. Moral 
directives of these latter kinds must be supported by 
appropriately particular empirical grounds. People vary 
widely in their attributes and capacities at this level of 
specificity, and accordingly, the moral rights and duties 
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that they have, the precise moral significance of their 
particular attributes, is also quite variable. In these 
respects, people are alike neither in their morally significant 
attributes, nor in their moral rights and duties. However, 
when we consider, not the particular, variable attributes of 
people, but the general fact of their common possession of 
attributes of certain kinds, we are still dealing with 
attributes which have a marked, although now a general l moral 
significance. A medically unskilled and inept person has a 
negligible duty to render medical aid to the victims of a 
disaster, but in virtue of his possession of such capacities 
as those for rational thought and action, and for a 
sympathetic understanding of the situation of other people, 
he does have a general duty to render whatever assistance he 
can. What form that assistance should take - if he has a duty 
to render a certain kind of assistance - will depend on what 
his particular capacities and skills are, whether or not these 
skills are widely shared by others. Similarly, the natural 
rights that all people have cannot be defined as rights to 
have or to do very specific things; instead, the objects 
which enter into the definition of those rights are classes 
and kInds of things and activities, the kinds of things and 
activities that are appropriate to the general capacities 
which are their natural base. 
If we are looking for particular moral prescriptions, 
for guides to conduct in particular cases and affecting 
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specific people, then the general principles which apply to 
all persons will often be too broad. While they are 
informative, most importantly in what they prohibit, the 
positive guidance they offer is usually very limited. They 
must be variously narrowed down and interpreted by reference 
to the differing individual characteristics of different 
individual people. For while people are effectively alike in 
respect to certain basic capacities which have general moral 
significance, at the same time they are importantly different 
in respect to many particular attributes which have a 
particular moral significance. 
IV 
The question, whether all people are in fact equal, is 
an ill-formed one, while the question, whether there are any 
respects in which all people are in fact equal, is an 
uninteresting one. Rather more important (qut still 
theoretically less than perspicuous) is the question, whether 
all people are equal in respect to their possession of any 
morally significant properties. The answer to that question k 
I have argued, is that they are (normally) alike in having 
attributes and capacities of kinds which have a general moral 
importance of a sort appropriately expressed in a theory of 
natural, rights and duties, whereas they differ in those 
particular attributes and capacities which are of kinds 
appropriate to generate specific prescriptions and 
prohibitions. 
It does not follow, however, that these conclusions can 
be appropriately expressed by speaking of the factual 
equality, in certain respects, of all people. It is true and 
important that every person has natural rights and duties, 
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in virtue of his possession of certain basic attributes and 
capacities. Nothing of additional moral significance is 
introduced, however, by the wholly consequential fact that all 
people are equal in their possession of these basic 
attributes, and hence in their possession of those natural 
rights and duties which are based upon them. Furthermore, 
given that the original capacities of all are (roughly) alike, 
and given the principle that only (instantiated) properties 
can be the ultimate bearers - or sources - of moral 
significance, it follows that all persons are possessors of 
equal natural rights 16 . The existence of these various 
natural and moral equalities is a conclusion which can be 
deduc'ed, with logical propriety, from premises which ascribe 
the relevant attributes to individuals, and which set out the 
moral significance of those attributes. But anyone who 
accepts the truth of the premises is already in possession of 
the most perspicuous statement of the moral facts; he has, 
accordingly, no good reason to engage in the trivial exercise 
of drawing the egalitarian conclusion. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
NEGATIVE EGALITARIANISM 
I 
Scepticism about the possibility of finding interesting 
respects in which all people are actually the same, and about 
the possibility of grounding interesting moral conclusions on 
such facts, has prompted some philosophers to advance a 
position that might be called 'negative egalitarianism'. 
Alternatively, negative egalitarianism might be regarded as 
providing an additional defence, of a different kind, for 
moral claims based on positive empirical equalities. I will 
argue that, to the extent that the negative theory is true, it 
is equivalent to the positive theory, which bases its 
normative demands on actual equalities between people. 
Negative egalitarianism maintains that the elimination 
of (some) inequalities between people can be justified, other 
than by having recourse to reasons which are based on factual 
respects in which people are actually already equal. 
S.I. Benn, in arguing for this position, sees the real moral 
force of many demands for greater equality as ar~sing from 
the recognition (by morally decent people) that a wide range 
of the more significant inequalities which have characterized 
most human societies are deeply offensive. The distribution 
among people of goods, and more generally of opportunities 
for living self-respecting and worthwhile lives, has been 
grossly unequal, and has been so quite without moral 
justification. Where no moral reason can be advanced for the 
perpetuation of these inequalities (the negative egalitarian 
argues), they stand condemned as unjustified. There is, in 
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other words, an initial presumption in favour of equalityl. 
Negative egalitarianism is concerned with the abolition 
of unjustified inequalities, an activity it regards as 
defensible independently of the defensibility (or otherwise) 
of the positive egalitarian's prograroroe of promoting 
equality. There is a certain initial plausibility in this 
view. If there are serious inequalities between people in 
the material conditions of their lives, or in the respect 
and esteem they receive from their fellows, it is quite 
possibly true that the ones who are worse off are the victims 
of injustices. The existence of such inequalities can often 
help us to identify those who have not been justly treated. 
The negative egalitarian will regard the existence of 
inequalities between people as prima facie evidence of 
injustice. If he is not also a positive egalitarian, he will 
not be able to embrace the position that the existence of 
equalities between people is prima facie evidence that 
justice has been done; but the negative thesis entitles him 
to the very similar view that, in the absence of 
inequalities, there is no reason (other things being equal) 
to suppose that justice has not been done. The existence of 
an inequality iroroediately justifies the suspicion that an 
injustice might exist, whereas the existence of an equality 
does not, by itself, raise any warranted doubts. Of course, 
many inequalities will actually turn out to be justified. 
Negative egalitarianism is not cororoitted to the indefensible 
view that this is only very infrequently, or even never the 
case. However, if it is a significant theory, it is 
cororoitted to the view, I will argue, that on balance, 
inequalities between people are unjustified more often than 
not. 
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Is the negative egalitarian committed to the prima facie 
condemnation of every instance of inequality? As 
D.O. Raphael has argued2 , this is an absurd position. The 
negative egalitarian could defend himself by allowing that, 
in the case of a vast number of wholly trivial and morally 
inconsequential inequalities - such things as inequalities in 
physical dimensions - the prima facie case against them is' so 
readily overridden that it has no importance at all in 
practical contexts. But this will hardly do. It is simply 
not true that there is any reason at all, no matter how modest 
and retiring, no matter how insipid its"}?rima, facie force, for 
4;; • Q 
supposing these inequalities to be bad, or morally improper, 
or unjust. This follows because it is necessarily the case 
that, if no moral significance at all lies in the fact that a 
person has or does not have some attribute - if that 
attribute has no moral importance at all - then no moral 
significance can attach to the further fact, the purely 
consequential fact, that people are e~ther equal or unequal in 
respect to that attribute. This is a significant problem for 
the negative egalitarian. How can he justifiably restrict 
the application of the presumption principle solely to those 
properties which are of moral significance already? His 
answer will depend on the kind of defence that he offers for 
his theory. There is an: a' Eriori defence which - were it not 
fallacious - would lead inexorably to the absurd position 
noted above. There is also a normative defence which can 
protect itself against this absurdity, but only at the cost 
of arbitrariness. 
II 
The a.priOri defence of negative egalitarianism is not 
the unpromising one that relies on the supposed intuiti~e 
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self-evidence of its basic principles (a position not unlike 
the normative one mentioned below). Instead, in the form 
elaborated most carefully in the work of R.S. peters 3 , the 
argument is that the presumption principle is a principle 
which is 'constitutive of practical reasoning'. It is 
logically necessary, that is, that if one does not observe 
the requirements of the principle, one is not reasoning 
practically. This is certainly a powerful claim: but it 
could, without affecting the derivation, be weakened to the 
more sensible thesis that, although one could reason 
practically while not observing the presumption principle, 
one would be reasoning badly were one to do so. The error 
one falls into, on the latter view, is still logical (as 
distinct from moral) error, but its cost is no longer 
literally incoherence. 
If there were a sound a priori argument for this 
principle, it would be an extremely important one, not only 
for moral philosophy, but for philosophy generally. For 
on the assumption that any proposi which has substantive 
normative content is synthetic, the presumption principle 
would be a synthetic a priori truth. Of special significance 
to moral philosophy as well, it would also be an instance of 
a normative proposition which was deductively entailed by 
some set of (presumably) non-normative premises. 
Whether or not the principle isa priori remains to be 
seen. Its normative character, however, is indisputable, for 
it is a principle which has justificatory force. It can be 
formulated thus: 'In the absence of any reasons for treating 
people unequally, they should be treated equally'. Suppose, 
then, that in the distribution of a good, everyone is treated 
equally: that constitutes a prima' 'facie reason for believing 
the distribution to be a just, or a morally right one. Only 
a normative principle could have that conclusion. 
4 The presumption principle is not an insignificant one . 
It is true that it could be held consistently with other 
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normative principles which no real egalitarian would dream of 
subscribing to, principles which warranted very unequal 
distributions of goods along racial, sexual, class or 
religious lines. For the existence of a presumption in favour 
of equality does not entail that it is never, or even that it 
is but rarely overridden. It would be an odd theory, but it 
would be a possible one nonetheless, that recognized both 
the a priori truth of the presumption principle, and also the 
existence of wide variations in the morally relevant 
characteristics of people, such that their rightful shares of 
goods were also widely variable. Perhaps, measured on some 
exotic scale, the claims of human beings vary enormously, and 
perhaps this justifies extremely unequal distributions of 
goods to them. Even so (if he is not very good at a priori 
reasoning), the 'meritarian ' or 'elitist' might be persuaded 
to accept as valid the derivation of the presumption 
principle, and to accept that he should presume people to 
have equal claims until he has definite reasons for supposing 
otherwise. This is possible because thea priori presumption 
does not imply anything about the kinds of reasons that can 
outweigh the presumption. 
At the same time, it would be a mistake to conclude 
immediately to the worthlessness of negative egalitarianism. 
Its significance lies i~ thi~i. that it establi~hes a 
condition of equality as the starting point, the 'initial 
position' to which all other distributions are referred, at 
least implicitly. It establishes that the concept of equality 
53 
has a ve~y basic significance in the theory of justice. 
Indeed, it leads on naturally (if not inexorably) to what I 
call 'the Aristotelian principle', namely that equals are to 
be treated equally, and unequals unequally. At the same time, 
and in spite of their frequent confusion, the presumption 
principle is not equivalent to the Aristotelian formula. The 
latter is not a presumption principle at all, and insofar as 
it might be persuaded to yield (something like) a presumption, 
this will be, as Joel Feinberg has suggested, that "the 
presumption in favour of equal treatment holds when the 
individuals involved are believed, assumed, or expected to be 
equal in the relevant respects l whereas the presumption in 
favour of unequal treatment holds when the individuals 
involved are expected to be different in the relevant 
,. 
respectsu..J. Negative egalitarianism leads naturally to a 
theory of distributive justice which sees it as a pattern of 
initially equal shares, and of justified departures, in the 
unequal treatment of those who are unequal, from that initial 
6 pattern Even though it is not necessary for equality in 
the holdings or shares of goods that people have to be 
statistically normal, there is an important sense in which it 
is morally the norm. All just distributions will be mapped 
onto a pattern which defines them in the language of equality 
and inequality. That is a conclusion which is incompatible 
with the aims of this work. 
There is a further, non-trivial consequence of acceptance 
of the presumption principle - it is not an implicatioll, but 
it is a natural, psychological associate. If the presumption 
principle is taken seriously, then the situation in which 
goods are shared equally has a special and primary 
significance. It is the distribution which, other things 
being equ~l, is already justified. But if this is so, it is 
difficult - psychologically hard, not logically impossible -
to see equality as having as little value as the elitist 
ascribes to it. There will be a tendency to accept, as the 
remaining principles of distribution, ones which preserve 
rather than obliterate the initial normative significance of 
equality_ 
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What really determines the egalitarian or inegalitarian 
flavour of all theories of justice in which negative 
egalitarianism plays a part is the weight given to the 
presumption in favour of equality_ This is a topic on which 
negative egalitarians have been silent: it is also one on 
which the alleged a priori derivation has no light to shed. 
The presumption principle establishes an onus.. To be subject 
to an onus is to be in a position where one is assumed to be 
unsuccessful in justifying one's course of action, until and 
unless one can provide specific and sufficient reasons for 
that action. A presumption in favour of one course of action 
is equivalent to an onus of justification resting on whomever 
would act differently. How much contrary weight must other 
reasons have to override the presumption, to satisfy the onus? 
There is absolutely no basis (in: ~riori considerations) for 
determining that. The presumption of innocence in 
Anglo-Saxon court.s of law I on the contrary, does have a 
fairly determinate weight. The onus of justification is on 
the prosecution to establish 'beyond any reasonable degree of 
doubt' the guilt of the accused. 
Pursuing the parallel with the legal situation suggests 
the following: just as an accused person is favoured by an 
initial presumption of innocence beforeahX evidence at all, 
either of his guilt or innocence, has been presented, so too 
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the perso~ who would treat all people equally is favoured by 
an initial presumption of being right (and the person who 
would treat them unequally by an initial presumption of being 
wrong), before any reasons at all, either for equal treatment 
or for discrimination, have been produced. In this limiting 
case; it is not necessary to possess any particular knowledge 
of the people concerned, knowledge on which reasons for 
treating them equally might be based: it is only necessary 
that there be no known reasons for discrimination 6 based on 
knowledge of some morally relevant differences between them. 
Official action is often pursued under such conditions of 
anonymity •. When different people are known only as names on 
a computer print-out, then nothing is known about any of them 
which would justify treating anyone differently from the way 
in which the others are (justifiably) treated. Any reasons 
that there are for acting in any way which substantially 
affects the welfare of some people (and such reasons will 
presumably be required), will be reasons which apply equally 
to all. Such situations are sometimes regarded as paradigms 
of justice. Whether justice can be done in advance of all 
reasons based on knowledge of the particular individuals 
concerned remains, however, to be seen. 
III 
The advocates of negative egalitarianism have sometimes 
subscribed quite explicitly to the ·apriori character of the 
presumption it advances. A.C. Graham is particularly clear 
here. He insists that it is a mistake to suppose that 
egalitarian arguments must begin from moral premises: the 
presumption principle is not a normative first principle. On 
the contrary, it is tla logical rule of moral and prudential 
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thinking"? But this cannot be right: it is not a logical 
rule as opposed to a moral one, but is, purportedly, both. 
Indeed, that it is a normative principle is much more evident 
than that it is ana priori one. 
The principle has been accepted (in one form or another) 
by a number of philosophers 8 , most of whom have been prepared 
to ascribe a special, if not always an a priori status to it. 
But no detailed analysis of the principle, or of the argument 
for its derivation, has actually been advanced. The argument 
that I will provide is accordingly my own reconstruction of 
an argument for which only a few hints have been supplied by 
its proponents. 
Let us accept (since this is not presently at issue) that 
reasoning in general does have 'constitutive rules'. One way 
of arriving at such rules would be the following. It is of 
the essence ofa priori truths that they are universally true: 
to deny them must always be mistaken. Any assertions or 
sequences of thought or argument will be at fault if they 
involve the denial of an a priori truth. Reasoning is 
necessarily de tive if it is in error about an a priori 
truth, if it treats that truth as though it were false. 
The law of non-contradiction is ana priori truthi no 
proposition, consequently, can possibly be both true and 
false. A 'constitutive rule of reasoning' can be derived 
from this, by the intermediary of a hypothetical imperative: 
if one is to engage in sound reasoning, one must not assert 
that any proposition is both true and false. Because we are 
concerned with rules of reasoning, which apply to those who 
have the appropriate intention (namely, to reason), the 
antecedent of the hypothetical can be regarded as s sfied, 
leaving a categorical imperative: 'Do not assert of any 
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propositipn that it is both true and false'. 
In general, this kind of argument would seem to be valid. 
The derived rules, however, are rules 'constitutive' of 
rational thought and discourse in general, both theoretical 
and practical. It is not immediately apparent how special 
rules of practical reasoning which were not also rules of 
theoretical reasoning could be derived by this method. It 1s 
not at all apparent that there are any a priori rules which 
are distinctively practical. 
For guidance on the derivation of the presumption 
principle, we must look to Peters, who argues that it follows 
from "the general principle of no distinctions without 
. 9 
differences u • For there to be a reason for choosing A 
rather than B (Peters says), "there must be some discriminable 
feature of A which B lacks which constitutes a ground or a 
reason". The crucial point of the argument is not that this 
discriminable feature must be a possible basis for a morally 
plausible reason for differential treatment of A and B, but 
that in the absence of any such discriminable difference 
(whether morally plausible or not), differential treatment of 
A and B will be irrational. It will be conduct insufficiently 
based on reasons. The connection with justice, Peters makes 
in this way: "The notion basic to justice is that 
distinctions should be made if there are relevant differences 
and that they should not be made if there are no relevant 
differences or on the basis of irrelevant differences"lO. 
What j.s 'the general principle of no distinctions 
without differences'? Presumably it is this, that whatever 
distinctions we draw in thought and language must, if they 
are to be valid distinctions, mirror real differences in the 
world (or other realm) to which the language refers. 
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Conversely, in the absence of real differences, there can be 
no valid distinctions. This will be the initial a priori 
truth. The normative exemplification of it is that one 
should (or perhaps that one may) distinguish where there are 
differences, but that one should not distinguish where there 
are no differences. This, however, is not the presumption 
principle. The latter is an asymmetrical principle, favouring 
equality over inequality, whereas the normative principle 
that actually follows, given the symmetry of the initial 
~priori truth, must itself by symmetric It is in that 
respect much closer to the Aristotelian principle than to any 
principle which could establish an onus of justification. 
What" our derived principle enjoins, when translated into the 
appropriate language (however that is supposed to be achieved), 
is presumably something like this: Other things being equal, 
one ought to (or one may) treat differently those individuals 
who are different in any respects, and to treat the same 
those individuals who are the same in all respects. (Two 
individuals are the same if and only if they are equal in all 
respects; they are different if they are unequal in any 
respects). But this is not a principle which generates a 
presumption in favour of equality over inequality. Nor, for 
that matter, is it a morally felicitous precept, given that 
it applies at a level of reasoning prior to that at which 
> 
moral reasons appear. It does not matter, according to this 
principle, that the differences between individuals have no 
moral relevance: the mere fact of their existence (and real 
differences will always - or nearly always - exist between 
any two existing individuals) creates a presumption in favour 
of treating them differently. 
The conclusion to which we are inexorably drawn is this, 
that for ~hereto be a reason for acting in any way at all, 
there must be some characteristics of things to which those 
reasons can be attached. If we have a reason for treating 
59 
two individuals alike (in some way which significantly affects 
their wellbeing), that reason must attach in some way to 
empirical states of affairs, including, presumably, 
attributes of those individuals. We must suppose, in brief, 
that those individuals are alike in some important and 
relevant respects,~ in order that the same reason may be 
attached to each. The presumption principle in fact tacitly 
accepts this necessity. In effect - and this is crucial -
what the principle states is that, in the absence of any 
reasons for treating two individuals differently, we are to 
treat them the same, if we have reasons for treating them the 
same. That is, 'Act on reasons'. 
The presumption principle can never have been advocated 
in a genuinely neutral form, just because it is so obviously 
absurd in that form. There is no reason for supposing that, 
in the absence of reasons for treating things (that is, 
'individuals' in the generic sense) differently, they should 
be treated equally_ Instead, the standard presumption 
principle identifies the kind of things involved, in 
specifying that they are the same in respect to being persons 
(or, more neutrally, human beings). If there is a presumption 
in favour of treating them alike, it is because we have a 
definite reason for treating them alike (they are known to be 
the same in at least one general respect, namely, personhood) 
and none for treating them differently. This is not a 
presumption which operates in advance of all reasons, both 
reasons for equal treatment and reasons for unequal treatment. 
It is a presumption which operates because one reason for 
60 
acting in ,one way is already in. It is not an asymmetrical 
presumption at all, but simply an explication of the notion 
of a 12riIDafacie reason. That notion allows that where there 
is some reason for doing one thing and no reasons for not 
doing it, the present balance of reasons is in favour of 
dOing it. 
But this is not all. The presumption principle supposedly 
operates in advance of any theory about the characteristics 
which are morally relevant - in advance of any theory, that is, 
of moral reasons. Yet whatever moral plausibility attaches to 
negative egalitarianism derives from the belief that the 
characteristic of being a person (or being a human being) is 
one which has moral significance. Does a presumption 
principle which ranges over 12ebbles carry any cogency? It 
should do, if the presumption principle is an a Eriori truth 
with respect to likenesses and differences between individuals. 
We are left with the claim that if we know of two 
individuals that they are both persons (human beings), then 
that knowledge is sufficient to warrant the presumption that 
they ought to be treated the same - until, that is, we have 
any better reasons for treating them differently. What sort 
of claim is this? There is only one plausible justification 
for it, and that is positive egalitarianism. We must suppose 
that all human beings have certain properties which are of 
moral relevance. If we know of two individuals that they are 
both human, then we know that they will both possess this 
further moral significance. They are equals in that respect. 
But that is not the end of the matter, for we concluded 
earlier that a consideration of the morally significant 
general properties which all people have does not show that 
their ~~ualitl in respect to those properties has any special 
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I . . f' 11 mora s~gn~ ~cance . 
Negative egalitarianism can only sustain something 
remotely resembling the presumption principle by falling back 
on its positive cousin, ceasing in the process, however, to be 
a dis tincti vely 'egalitarian theory. 
IV 
With this discussion of both positive and a priori 
negative egalitarianism behind us, the following issue can be 
canvassed. Is it a plausible moral principle that we should 
treat people equally unless we have reasons for treating them 
differently? There is no question now of this being an 
a priori truth. The question is whether a prima facie duty 
to treat people alike follows from the common characteristics 
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individual is a person, then he will have certain morally 
relevant capacities. Even if we know no more of him than 
that he is a (human) person, we are still in a position to 
ascribe certain natural rights to him-. Natural rights are 
those broadly defined moral considerations that I spoke of 
earlier12 • The general moral significance that people have, 
in virtue of those basic capacities that all have, is captured 
in the natural rights we ascribe to them. If we know that an 
individual is a human being, but know nothing else of him, 
then we are still in a position to ascribe the basic natural 
rights to him. We know that people (generally speaking -
that is, we should 12resume that we are not dealing with one 
of the rare exceptions) have various morally significant 
capacities. They have the capacity to experience pain and 
grief, and these things are primafa'cie evils. There exists" 
then, a Erirna:fa:cie moral reason for not behaving towards any 
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person in a way which would cause him pain or suffering. This 
is part - an important part - of what is contained in the 
doctrine of natural rights. It follows, but only as a purely 
consequential fact which has no added moral significance, that 
all persons (who have these capacities) are equal in respect 
to having these rights. Because this is nearly always true of 
people, it is a safe empirical assumption that in any case· 
where we are dealing with a human being, that being will have 
these capacities and these rights. There is a presumption 
here alright, the presumption (to put it in the currently 
popular form) that all human beings are personsi or, as in 
J.R. Lucas's expression of what is basically the same 
principle, the presumption of humanity13. Of course this 
presumption can, and will occasionally, be overridden. But 
it is a safe and justified presumption to make, because the 
generalization on which it rests is empirically (and hence 
only contingently) true14 . Thi's is unmysterious. 
There is no room for a specifically egalitarian 
presumption, however. Such a presumption would be inductively 
warranted if it were the case that inequalities between people 
were unjustified more often than not. But that is an absurd 
thesis, and its absurdity is not eliminated by restricting 
its range to morally significant properties. If we focus on 
the 'property'· of personhood, it is of course true that in 
presmhing (as we are warranted in doing) that all human beings 
have this characteristic, we are presuming it of them all 
equally. But this only means that in every case we are 
supposing that they possess certain rights in virtue of 
possessing certain natural capacities. Because they possess 
these rights, there are broad restrictions in force on the 
way in which they can justifiably be treated. The natural 
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capacities are the same, and therefore the rights are the 
same, and the broad restrictions are the same. The equality 
is wholly consequential, and of no irreducible significance. 
There are powerful independent reasons for denying the 
moral plausibility of a presumption of equality. Such a 
principle does not specify how people are to be individually 
-treated, only that (collectively) they are to be treated the 
same. It is consistent with this principle to treat them 
equally by denying to all of them their natural rights. Yet 
this is morally abominable, and it is nothing but 
supersti tion to suggest that it is morally less abominable for 
involving equality of treatment. If equality is intrinsically 
valuab I then it should be the case that there is something 
of value in treating everyone equally vilely. But this is 
absurd. The greater the number of people who are treated 
badly, the worse it is: it does not get better for 
approaching ever closer to equality of (vile} treatment. 
Besides, unless it got conspicuously better for doing so, 
whatever value equality had intrinsically would be 
inconspicuous, and uninteresting. The principle that we 
should initially presume to treat people equally must be 
supplemented by principles specifying how they are to be 
individually treated. But once that has been done, we have 
sufficient principles governing our conduct towards them, 
and the principle of equality of (humane) treatment becomes 
as transparently superfluous as it has always, though darkly, 
been in fact. 
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·CHAPTER FIVE 
ANALYTIC EGALITARIANISM 
, 
I 
The existence of a necessary connection between justice 
and equality has often been alleged. Even if it is not often 
asserted as explicitly as this, it is still a basic part of 
the received opinion on these matters that the denial of su'ch 
a connection involves some form of absurdity stronger than 
moral absurdity_ Chaim Perelman captures something of the 
strength and persistence of this opinion when he writes: liTo 
everyone the idea of justice inevitably suggests the notion of 
a certain equality. From Plato and Aristotle, through 
St. Thomas Aquinas, down to the jurists, moralists and 
philosophers of our own day runs a thread of universal 
agreement on this point~,l. It is my belief that there is no 
sound basis for this 'universal agreement'. 
The'theory of analytic egaiitarianism2 asserts the 
existence, not of a substantive moral ,connection between 
jus ge and equality, but of a formal and logically necessary 
connection. While the analytic theory will often be 
accompanied by a substantive one which is also egalitarian, 
there is no necessity that this should be so. Analytic 
egalitarianism purports to be a theory of the formal 
charact~r of the concept of jus ce, a theory which shows 
that the concepts of equality and inequality must be built 
into the very structure of any theory if it is to be a theory 
specifically of justice, and not a theory of something else. 
The full authority of the classical thinkers is often 
cited in this connection: "If, then, the unjust is unequal", 
Aristotle says, "the just is equal, as all men suppose it to 
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3 be, even apart from argument". All men - all philosophers 
at least - have indeed supposed this to be so, not only apart 
from argument, but in the absence of real argument as well. 
I will show that neither the problems of social justice 
themselves, nor the theory of distri.bution which is needed to 
solve them, are illuminated in any way by the effort to 
characterize them by the concepts of equality and inequality. 
To the extent that it is not possible to keep the discussion 
confined to the plane of the non-normative, I will also draw 
on my arguments against normative egalitarianism (strictly 
so-called). These arguments show that, if we are to explain 
why a particular distribution of goods is unjust, we can do 
so perfectly adequately without using the concepts of 
equality or inequality, and without resting anything of 
Significance on the relational attributes to which those 
terms refer. When these concepts are used in an explanation 
of an injustice (for example)t either the real reason why 
the distribution is unjust has been missed, or the reference 
to equality or inequality is wholly superfluous, and could be 
eliminated without loss. 
It is very difficult (perhaps impossible) to discuss a 
normative theory, such as the theory of justice, wholly on a 
non-normative, conceptual level. When the concepts 
themselves are impregnated with value, when an important test 
of the adequacy of a theory is the extent to which it fits 
and explains our considered normative judgements, it is 
necessary to concede that the familiar analytic model, with 
its· :distinction between normative and conceptual realms I 
might not be entirely appropriate. Analytic egalitarianism 
is one variant of the thesis that an entirely formal (that 
is, conceptual and non-normative) characterization of the 
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theory of justice is possible, that such a theory can be 
viewed as a construction of formally-related concepts, into 
4 
which different normative contents might be poured. But the 
theory of social justice is not like that. It is a subject 
which is defined in irreducibly normative terms, as the 
theory of the proper distribution of goods according to 
claims. While it is certainly possible to provide some 
further analysis which does not actually specify what these 
claims are, it is not possible to say anything very 
interesting that does not presuppose, at least tacitly, a 
background moral theory into which the concept of a claim 
can be fitted, together with theories of the nature of 
persons and of human societies. From such theories, in such 
contexts, values cannot be wholly eliminated. 
With these reservations in mind, my initial intention is 
to advance purely conceptual arguments. The most important 
of these arguments either make no normative suppositions at 
all, or if they do so, they are suppositions which I suppose 
to be generally uncontroversial. Where controversial moral 
precepts are advanced - as they are in my defence of a 
socialist theory of distribution - they are explicitly 
defended. 
The theory of justice that I am attacking here -
analytic egalitarianism - is not a theory which is 
necessarily egalitarian in the stronger, normative sense. 
It may, but need not, advance such principles as that serious 
disparities in holdings of material wealth, the concentration 
of political power in the hands of a hereditary caste, the 
existence of relationships of social deference, and similar 
inegalitarian states of affairs, are all unjust. Similarly, 
my rejection of the theory will not commit me to the de 
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of any disreputable moral precepts, whether inegalitarian or 
otherwise. My own basic theory - considered, as far as 
possible, formally - is consistent with either an egalitarian 
or an inegalitarian normative content, although it rejects 
that particular distinction between different normative 
theories. At the same time, my own theory is developed 
within a background metaphysic of persons in society in which 
one particular normative development of the theory is more 
strongly indicated than is any alternative. The social 
necessity of a theory of justice, when viewed against this 
metaphysical background, leads fairly readily and naturally 
(but not, of course, necessarily) to socialism. This result 
is of particular interest in that it shows, in spite of an 
impressive battery of assertions to the contrary, that 
socialism is not really committed to egalitarianism in any 
inalterable way. This is fortunate, for whereas the socialist 
tradition has given rise to crucial moral insights about the 
proper relations of people in society, egalitarianism - any 
moral theory, that is, which truly deserves the 
characterization - has sometimes had a pernicious influence 
upon social thought. It is my wish to rescue socialism from 
the egalitarians. 
This is the normative background of the present 
discussion. As far as possible, I will meet analytic 
egalitarianism with conceptual arguments, but if normative 
preconceptions sometimes intrude, that will be a reflection 
of the fact that the distinctl0n between analytic and 
SUbstantive egalitarianism is not a completely exclusive one. 
II 
The major themes of the orthodox or received view are 
captured in the following composite portraitS. It is a view 
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which has been widely and uncritically adopted. In the light 
of its ancestry, it might also be called 'the neo-Aristotelian 
view' . 
Every theory of social justice, whatever might be the 
particular normative principles of distribution which it 
advances, must conform to a single pattern. Conformity to 
this pattern is definitive of its being a theory of justice. 
The formal atures are captured by the Aristotelian 
principle, that equals are to be treated equally, and unequals 
are to be treated unequally. (lilt appears that the just 
equal, and so it is, but not for all persons, only for those 
that are equal. The unequal also appears to be just; and 
so it is, but not for all, only for the unequal. n6 ) This is 
not, however (according to the orthodox view) I a substantial 
concession to egalitarianism. This purely formal conception 
of equality amounts to little more than the essence of rule-
following. At this level of formal abstraction, the virtue 
of justice is closely allied to the virtues of rationality, 
of impartiality and consistency. Rationality is intimately 
related to the readiness to conform one's reasoning and 
jUdgement to rules. In particular (in the present case) I it 
involves the readiness to agree that, if a particular 
judgement is appropriate in one case, it must be equally 
appropriate in any relevantly similar case. What counts as 
a relevantly similar case is determined by the rule itselfi 
but the universality which is a necessary feature of all 
rules entails that l if a justification is given in one case 
for acting in a particular way, the same action must be 
justified (other things being equal) in any other case which 
is covered by the same rule. If a person justifies his 
action in one case by alluding to certain characteristics, 
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then he is committing himself to the rule that actions of 
that sort are appropriate {other things being equal} to all 
situations which have those characteristics. If he wishes to 
act differently in any other situation which has those same 
characteristics, he must either abjure the rule, or be 
prepared to identify relevan·t characteristics which 
differentiate the present from the earlier situation. Jus.tice, 
according to the received view, is pre-eminently the rational 
virtue. 
Even at this level of abstraction, a normative 
application can be found for the Aristotelian principle. 
Administrative (formal or legal) justice crucially involves 
the equal application of a rule, or body of rules 7 . An 
injustice is done (other things being equal) if those who are 
equal according to a set of rules are yet treated unequally 
within the jurisdiction of that body of rules. The importance 
that precedent has in legal reasoning partly incorporates the 
formal demands of equality. Although, on the face of it, 
those whose duty it is to administer justice should be 
concerned wholly with the actual circumstances of each 
individual case, it is vital that they take into account how 
relevantly similar cases have been dealt with in the past. 
A prima facie injustice will be done to at least one of the 
parties if one of them is treated in a substantially 
different way from the others, even though, in the respects 
defined as relevant by the law, the cases are alike. Formal 
equality is not sufficient for administrative justice to be 
done, to the extent that substantive principles of fairness 
8 
are also necessary; but it is necessary (according to the 
orthodox theory) • 
The constraints imposed by the Aristotelian principle on 
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any normative theory of justice are actually quite minimal. 
The content of the rules is left entirely open, to be 
determined by the particular substantive conceptions 
advanced. These rules will define the respects in which 
people are relevantly alike and relevantly different, and 
will define the particular relvance in justice that these 
characteristics have. Accordingly, the rules operate with 
two sets of variables, ranging respectively over 
characteristics of persons (and of their situations), and 
over the goods to be distributed to them. On the one hand, 
the attributes of people which entitle them to some share of 
some good must be identified; on the other, the kind of 
good and the size of the share of it which is appropriate to 
those particular claims must also be identified. Substantive 
principles of distribution match goods to claims. When these 
principles are put into the form required by the Aristotelian 
principle, they become principles of proportionality. Thus 
it is, as Frankena describes it, "that the typical case of 
distributive justice involves (I) at least two persons, A 
and B, (2) something to be distributed, P, (3) some basis of 
distribution, Q, and (4) a geometrical proportion or ratio 
such that 
A' sshare of P A 'sshare of Q 
B's share of P = B I s share of Qu 9 • 
We must not suppose, however, that the relational property of 
'geometrical proportion' has been substituted for that of 
equality. Aristotle is explicit on this: uThe just, 
therefore, involves at least four terms; for the persons for 
whom it is just are in fact two, and the things in which it 
is manifested, the objects distributed, are two. And the 
same equality will exist between the persons and between the 
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things concerned •.•• The just, then, is a species of the 
proportionate .... For proportion is equality of ratios, and 
. I f ttl t h lO lnvo ves our erms a eas ..• . The significance of the 
equation is precisely that it brings out the fundamental 
that the relation of equality is an essential part of all 
just distributions. 
This much (the orthodox view maintains) is common ground. 
Any theory of justice whatsoever must conform to this 
pattern. Where different substantive theories part company 
is in the interpretation they give to the variables in 
Aristotle's formula. Of particular importance, especially 
for the disputes between normatively egalitarian and 
normatively inegalitarian theories, are the different kinds 
of theories of the distribution bases (claims) that have 
been advanced. Different theories identify different 
characteristics of persons as relevant to what they should 
have in justice. Theories of distribution according to needs, 
to merits or deserts, to rights, to contributions or work, 
and to effort, have all had their champions, and the lesson 
to be learned from the long history of dispute between these 
theories is that no final resolution is likely. Egalitarians 
and inegalitarians occupy opposing positions an 
irreducibly normative contest. 
A crucial fact about the human situation that people 
are all fairly much alike as judged by some of proposed 
criteria for distribution( but are significantly different as 
judged by others. The variation in (basic) needs, for 
example, is actually rather limited, so that if a distribution 
of goods is made according to needs (and according to the 
formal demands of the Aristotelian principle), then people 
will all receive roughly similar amounts. A distributive 
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theory which attaches primary significance to needs will be 
egalitarian. 
Substantively inegalitarian theories of justice 
distribute goods on the basis of characteristics which are 
themselves distributed unequally among people. Theories 
which attach the distribution of goods to rights (for 
example, Nozick's entitlement theoryll), and those which 
attach goods to deserts (for example, Aristotle's own 
theory12), are substantively inegalitarian. 
That is the orthodox theory of the concept social 
justice. It is not of course entirely mistakenj but it is, 
most importantly, seriously astray in its use of equality 
and inequality as structural concepts. The elements of 
justice are distorted, I will argue, by being forced into 
this framework. 
III 
The Aristotelian principle is really a principle of 
proportionality. It does not follow /- Aristotle and his many 
followers notwithstanding, that it is therefore a principle 
of equality. Indeed, Aristotle is mistaken when he says 
that "proportion is equality of ratios, and involves four 
terms at least The basic relation of proportionality 
has two terms, terms which, when measured according to some 
one standard, can be assigned values which combine to express 
a ratio. If one object has a weight of four units and 
another has a weight of two units, the ratio of the weight 
of the first to the weight of the second is two to one. The 
concept of a proportion is just the concept of a ratio. It 
follows that there are an infinite number of different 
relations of proportionality. One particular case, from this 
infinite range, has been picked out for special attention, 
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and that ·is the case of equality, the ratio of one to one. 
A possible way of describing every other proportional 
relation is to characterize it indiscriminately as an 
'inequality'. The two terms together exhaust the whole range 
of proportionalities. However, far from its being the case 
that the concepts of equality and inequality are necessary in 
order to define the concept of proportionality, the converse 
seems to be the case. Equality (the basic concept of the 
pair) is just one kind of proportionality, and inequality is 
just all the other kinds. Unless we start from the 
supposition that equality has some special significance, 
however, the characterization of the whole continuum of 
possible ratios as that of 'equalities and inequalities' is 
arbitrary and misleading. Every ratio is what it is and not 
some other ratio. Every ratio other than one to one is an 
unequal ratio, but that is a fair characterization only if we 
already suppose that its being not an equal one has some 
special significance. Suppose that some special significance 
attaches to the ratio of three to one, which we call fa 
triple'. Every single ratio can now be characterized as 
either triple or nontriple. Is this still a fair 
characterization of the continuum of ratios, even if we 
suppose that three to one has no special significance? 
The terms between which proportionalities obtain can 
themselves be complex. They can themselves be relational, 
'-' 
for example, the situation that Aristotle mistakenly 
identifies as basic. But unless the particular case of 
equality of ratios (that is, a second-order ratio of one to 
one between two first-order ratios) has some special 
significance, the characterization of the whole continuum as 
composed either of equalities or of inequalities is specious. 
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In partic~lar, the mere fact that proportionalities obtain 
is not sufficient to warrant that conclusion. Instead, some 
explanation why the ratio of equality has a special 
significance that the others do not have must be given. 
The first conclusion, then, is that the Aristotelian 
principle is not a principle of equality (and inequality) at 
alIi it is a principle of proportionality. This is a 
sufficient refutation of analytic egalitarianism. 
IV 
The theory of justice for which I am arguing gives far 
less emphasiS than is normal to comparative considerations 
(in a sense of that term to be clarified later). The 
orthodox tradition, on the contrary, defines justice in a 
comparative way, that is, in terms of the comparative 
circumstances of people. It is important, then to show how 
little support for this view can actually be derived from the 
Aristotelian principle. 
It is necessary, first of all, to distinguish between 
two crucially different activities that one might undertake 
in respect to a system of rules or principles. On the one 
hand, there are the activities involved in applying the 
rules; on the other, the activities involved in formulating 
. 14 
those rules • The formal analysis of justice, as advanced 
within the orthodox theory, concerns the logic of rule-
application; the material or substantive analysis of justice, 
as understood by that theory, concerns the content of those 
rules, that is, their formulation. 
The Aristotelian principle is alleged, by its modern 
adherents, to capture the concept of rule-following, that is, 
of the application of a system of rules. How those rules are 
formulated and what their content is, is not at issue at 
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present •. It is logically necessary, if a system of rules is 
to be properly applied, that the rules be applied to all the 
cases (and only to the cases) to which they apply. This is 
the basic truth of the matter. It is not an interesting 
truth, because it is trivial and analytic: it defines the 
concept of 'proper application' for a system of rules. 
However, it is this truth, and only this truth, that the 
Aristotelian principle - considered as ana priori principle 
states: those who are equal in this respect, that one and 
the same rule applies to them, are to be treated equally, in 
that this rule is to be applied to them; those who are 
unequal in this respect, that different rules apply to them, 
are to be treated unequally, in that those different rules 
are to be applied, as appropriate, to them. This is 
certainly true: but what purpose is served by rendering the 
simple analytic truth about the proper application of rules 
in this exaggerated form? The Aristotelian principle is a 
wholly trivial implication of the basic (if not very 
interesting) truth. 
Aristotle does not speak of the concept of applying a 
rule: it is not in explication of this that he advances his 
principle. Instead, he actually specifies something of the 
content of such rules, that they include variables ranging 
over attributes of persons, and over goods. Surely, then 
(it will be said), the admittedly trivial explication of the 
Aristotelian principle given above misses the point. The 
real significance of the principle is this, that it r~quires 
that those who are equal in respect to their claims are to 
I 
be treated equally, in respect to the goods they receive: 
those who are unequal in respect to their claims are to be 
treated unequally in respect to the goods they receive. But 
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this is false. 
If we are considering solely the application of rules, 
and are not concerned at all with their content, then this 
expanded conception is inadmissible. For it specifies 
something of the content of these rules, namely, the 
nontrivial fact that they are rules matching goods to claims. 
Yet only the rules of justice (according to my conception of 
the subject) are rules of this kind. The general concept of 
the proper application of a system of rules - rules of any 
kind - can only be the trivial principle that rules are to 
be applied to all and only those cases to which they properly 
apply. 
Nor can the expanded principle be regarded as an 
explication of the notion of the proper application of the 
rules of justice. Under such an interpretation, the principle 
would combine the definition of rule-application with that of 
justice as giving to each his due. But no reason has been 
given for formulating these notions, neither of which uses 
the concepts of equality and inequality, in a principle which 
employs those concepts in a significant manner. 
In any case, the Aristotelian rendition of these two 
definitions is less informative than might at first be 
thought. It requires thiS, that if two persons are equal, 
in the sense that they fall under a single rule, then they 
are to be treated equally, by having the same rule applied 
to them. If two persons are unequal, in the sense that they 
fall under different rules, then they are to be treated 
unequally, by having different rules (as appropriate) applied 
to them. Further, a person 'falls under a rule' in the 
relevant manner if and only if he has a claim in justice of 
the kind specified in the rule. A rule is 'applied to' a 
person in the relevant way if and only if he is allocated the 
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quantity (or value) of goods that the rule specifies as 
appropriate for anyone possessing his claim. Two persons who 
fall under a single rule willI consequentially, be allocated 
equal shares of a good: but this is not in fact the equality 
of treatment that the Aristotelian principle specifies. When 
that p~inciple speaks of equality of treatment, this must 
interpreted as 'being treated according to the dictates of a 
single rule', and not as 'receiving an equal value of goods'. 
This can be brought out by considering inequality of persons. 
Suppose there is a third person who falls under a different 
rule, and is therefore unequal to the first two persons. 
His inequality (relative to the others) consists in his 
falling under the provisions of a different rule. He falls 
under a different rule because he has a claim of a different 
kind. It is not necessary that he be 'treated unequally' in 
the further sense that he should be allocated a different 
quantity (or value) of goods, for different sorts of claims 
might yet be to like quantities or values of goods. What is 
necessary is that he be allocated those goods, whatever they 
might be, which are specified by the rule under which he 
falls. The inequality of treatment between the first two 
persons and the third consists solely 'in this, that they are 
treated in accordance with whatever are the provisions of 
the different rules under which they fall I even if they are 
consequentially equally benefited. 
The Aristotelian principle seems to mean more than this, 
only because we tacitly import substantive moral content into 
it. Consider the schematic form of the principle, obtained 
by excluding all normative content from the interpretation of 
the variables: those who are equal, in respect to P, are to 
be treated equally, in respect to q, while those who are 
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unequal, ,in respect to P, are to be treated unequally, in 
respect to q. If any principle like the Aristotelian 
principle is necessarily true, it must be some such principle 
as this. After all, no normative suppositions about the moral 
propriety of distributing goods according to claims, rather 
than on some other basis, are being made here. However, it 
is only when some normative content of that very kind is 
supposed that the Aristotelian principle is true. If this 
normative content is excluded - if we consider the schematic 
principle, which is equivalent to the normal form less the 
normative principle matching goods to claims - then we find 
that, under many interpretations of the variables, the 
principle is actually false. Thus, suppose that 'p' is 
replaced by fa like kind of claim to a like value of goods'. 
Two claims will be of a like kind if they are both based on 
needs, or both based on deserts, or both based on rights; 
otherwise (assuming these are exhaustive of the kinds of 
claims) they will be of different kinds. Accordingly, if 
each of two persons has need of the same value of goods, 
those persons will be equal, according to this principle. 
Suppose now that Iq' is replaced by 'the value of goods to 
be allocated'. So-interpreted, both halves of the principle 
will sometimes be false. Two persons might be equal in that 
they both need the same quantity of water, but the moral 
weight to be given to their claims might be different. One 
person might need the water to drink, while the other needs 
it to wash his hair: in that case, if there is inadequate 
water for both, justice might require treating them unequally, 
even though they are equal in the respect defined by the 
principle. Similarly, two persons might have claims of 
different kinds to goods of equal value (one needs them, for 
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example I while the other deserves them), yet their claims 
are of like moral weight: they should, then, be treated 
equally (in the allocation to them of goods of equal worth, 
as the principle requires) even though they are unequal (in 
the respect defined by the principle) • 
... Justice is done when goods are allocated to persons 
according to the claims that they have. In determining what 
justice requires in any particular case, consideration must 
be given to the content of particular claims, and to their 
moral urgency15. If the Aristotelian principle is to come 
out true, the interpretation given to the variables must 
reflect this complexity. The simplest interpretation which 
is true is also very obviously trivial. It requires that 
those who are equal in justice be treated equally in justice, 
and that those who are unequal in justice be treated 
unequally in justice. But this, of course, is just the 
requirement that each be treated justly, that is, according 
to his claims. 
The Aristotelian principle, then, does not show that 
equality and inequality, or even proportionality, are 
necessary, formal elements of all theories of justice. On 
the contrary, the trivial truths that"it expresses, when it 
is interpreted in ways that make it true, have nothing to do 
with those concepts. Or, to put the point briefly, the 
Aristotelian principle is the subject of one of the most 
persistent muddles in the entire history of moral philosophy . 
• 
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CHAPTER SIX 
.THE FUNCTIONS OF THE PRINCIPLES OF JUSTICE 
I 
Th~ orthodox theory of justice, in its adherence to the 
Aristotelian principle, has failed to show that,'the concepts 
of equality and inequality (or proportionality) are basic to 
the theory of justice. What my analysis does suggest, 
however, is the centrality, given a certain axiomatic 
assumption, of what I call 'principles of appraisal'. The 
axiom is that justice involves the allocation of goods 
according to claims or dues. The Aristotelian prinCiple, in 
its true forms, follows analytically and trivially, once it 
is supposed that we have principles governing such 
allocations. The evidence is, furthermore, that in the 
absence. of this fundamental axiom, the Aristotelian principle 
does not work at all. One of the crucial problems for a 
theory of justice, then, is to formulate adequate principles 
of appraisal. 
( 
The traditional concept of dues is not entirely , 
satisfactory in this context. In particular, it is 
associated too closely with particular normative theories of 
justice - those which interpret dues as desert or merit -
than is advisable in a concept which 9~eks the maximum of 
moral neutrality. The concept of claims, although not 
entirely satisfactory either, will be employed instead. 
Particular normative theories will advance different 
attributes of persons as bases of claims in justice. 
Following David Millerl, I will regard the different criteria 
of claims that are usually (seriously) considered as 
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subsumable under one or other of the concepts of needs, 
rights or deserts. To allow that a person has a claim in 
justice, then, it is not necessary to wait for him to make a 
claim. It is necessary only that he should have the 
appropriate sorts of attributes. To assign a claim to a 
person is to evaluate those attributes in a particular ,,'lay: 
it is to assign a definite moral significance to them. If. a 
person has a claim in justice, then he has certain 
attributes such that it is morally appropriate (for a 
particular sort of reason) that he should have, or should 
have the opportunity to acquire, certain things. In 
identifying some personal attributes as grounds of claims, 
we are identifying particular reasons why someone should 
have certain things, things which thereby become goods. It 
followstha-t the sorts of attributes on which claims are 
based must meet certain requirements. In the first place, 
it is reasonable to insist that they should be personal 
attributes, that is, attributes of the person whose claim it 
is. Some reasons for allocating goods to persons are not 
based on any particular personal attributes of those persons, 
unless we are prepared to countenance such ad hoc properties 
as 'being the one millionth person to cross the.bridge'. 
Any goods which are allocated to people on the basis of 
properties such as these are not goods whose distribution 
is, for that reason, a part of justice. Instead, justice 
allocates goods to persons on the basis of properties of 
those persons themselves. The intuitive concept of a real 
personal attribute seems to me to be clear enough here, 
given that the present intention is only to identify, in a 
. general way, a set of conditions which might reasonably be 
imposed on any theory of claims. My own theory of claims, 
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in suggesting a definite end that justice should be seen as 
serving, will provide more definite guidance for the 
identification of the sorts of attributes that might 
defensibly be regarded as the sources of claims. 
In the second place, any property which is to serve as 
the basis of a claim must be a property which has some 
. ab1 1" f' 2 recogn~z e mora s~gn~ ~cance • Accordingly, the 
identification of claims involves the moral appraisal of 
properties. At the same time, not just any kind of moral 
significance will do: only certain kinds of significance are 
relevant in justice. I will sketch a theory of claims in 
which the guiding notion is that of the basic conditions of a 
good life for a person. It follows that the particular theory 
that I am advancing is one in which justice is (partially) 
subordinate to goodness (by contrast with Rawls's theory, in 
which lithe concept of right is prior to that of good,,3). 
Given that my subject is justice, however, no attempt will be 
made to provide a fully-elaborated theory of the good life. 
It will be necessary only to give some account of the notion 
of that set of conditions which must standardly obtain if a 
person is to have a reasonable opportunity to enjoy a good 
life. What is required is less an account of what the good 
life would be than an account of the conditions which are 
commonly necessary for there to be a reasonable opportunity 
for people to realize a good life of any kind. 
The goods which justice is concerned to distribute are 
those goods which are necessary to a good life: the 
distribution of other goods than these, whatever moral 
contraints of different sorts might apply there, is not the 
concern of justice. Similarly, the attributes on which 
claims in justice are based are those attributes in virtue 
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of which the possession of certain goods is a basic 
constituent or a condition of a good life. People often have 
interests of other kinds in these same goods, but they are 
not interests whose satisfaction is a basic necessity if they 
are to enjoy a good life. Such interests do not give rise to 
claims in justice. 
The appraisal of personal attributes which leads to a 
recognition of claims in justice is, then, an evaluative 
appraisal made from a definite pOint of view. A person's 
condition is appraised as one in which his capacity to enjoy 
a good Ii is impaired in some respect. In calling these 
'appraisals', it is not of course denied that a background 
of causal knowledge, knowledge of means to ends, is 
presupposed; instead, it is recognized that the precise 
conditions which define the basic features of the good life, 
the exact manner in which a person's capacity to enjoy that 
life is impaired, and the seriousness with which it is 
impaired, are all evaluative problems. Justice, after all, 
is part of morality. 
II 
Two main problems need to be solved in the formulation 
of a theory of claims. The first is the problem of 
identifying the kinds of personal attributes which are bases 
for claims. The consequences of making different 
identifications can be momentous: a theory of justice which 
recognizes deserts as the sole kind of claim will lead to 
very different distributions from one which extends 
recognition to needs as well. If the theory of justice is 
not provided with a background, if no attempt is made to say 
what the point of justice is, and why it is important, then 
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different substantive theories with their different accounts 
of claims will indeed (as Miller concludes 4 ) be forced into 
irresolvable confrontation. But if the sort of background 
that I have proposed is accepted, some basis can be found 
for sorting out claims of different kinds. 
The second problem, which arises once the kinds of 
att-ributes which can give rise to claims have been determined, 
is that of appraising their particular significance in 
justice. I will argue that claims have two relevant sorts of 
variables: (1) the kind and the volume of goods needed to 
satisfy them, and (ii) their urgency. The former of these, 
given the background assumptions relating to the conditions 
of a good life, is to a considerable degree a technical 
problem. If a person is in a certain condition which 
constitutes an impairment of his capacity to enjoy a good 
life, under some agreed conception of that life, then it is 
more or less an empirical question what is the kind and 
quantity of goods needed to eliminate that condition of 
impairment. Those who are hungry need food, and those who 
are short-sighted need spectacles. The problems here are 
philosophically less interesting than the problems raised by 
the concept of the urgency of claims. 
Claims which differ in urgency are claims which 
constitute reasons having mo~or less 'strength' or 'weight'. 
This concept - of urgency - is a crucial one for the theory 
of justice that I will develop. It recognizes that the 
different personal attributes and circumstances of 
indiViduals can amount to more or less serious impairments 
of their ability to enjoy a good life. The seriousness of 
the impairment is not a function simply of the quantity of 
goods claimed: an adult might need far more food than a 
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baby, even though the latter is starving, and therefore has 
a more urgent claim than the former! who is merely hungry. 
Nor is the seriousness of the impairment a function directly 
of the kind of claim: needs, deserts and rights can all vary 
widely in urgency. Nor, indeed, is it the case that claims 
of the same kind to the same quantity of goods are of equal 
urgency: there can be different reasons - reasons of 
different urgency - why two people both need, or both deserve, 
a definite quantity of goods. Urgency is an additional 
variable: it is a function directly of the seriousness of the 
impairment to a person's good life. An appraisal of the 
urgency of a claim is an appraisal of the moral seriousness of 
his condition and circumstances, understood as a state of 
deprivation. 
An adequate theory of claims must tie these different 
strands together. It must identify the kinds of personal 
attributes which are relevant in justice; it must provide 
some account of the basic conditions of a good life, in 
sufficient detail to allow estimates to be made of the nature 
and the quantity of the goods which would satisfy different 
claims by eliminating the relevant conditions of impairment; 
and it must, by reference to these factors and to a 
conception of the varying importance of the different 
elements of the good life, provide some guidance for the 
appraisal of the moral urgency of the claims that people have 
to social goods. 
An egalitarian theory of justice is committed to the 
ineliminability of relations of equality and inequality from 
some part of the theory. The first and the most obvious 
place to look for such relationships is in the principles 
which assign claims, namely, appraisive principles. It is, 
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furthermore, reasonable to suppose that the relations will 
hold between persons: that is, we should suppose that if 
egalitarian justice is done, there must be some interesting 
respect in which the persons to whom justice is done are equal 
to each other, and that the justice of their treatment is to 
be explained, at least in significant part, by their being 
equal in that respect. Do the principles which assign to 
persons claims in justice incorporateineliminable concepts 
of equality (or of inequality) in some such role as this? If 
they do, then it would seem that we should look for these 
relations in one of the areas already distinguished. Does 
the identification of a person's personal attributes as 
constituting a state of need, say, or of desert, necessarily 
involve relations of equality or inequality between him and 
others? Does the identification (not wholly distinct from 
the foregoing) of the nature and quantity of goods necessary 
to eliminate a person's state of impairment, necessarily 
involve such relations? Finally, does the appraisal of the 
moral urgency of a claim necessarily involve these relations? 
In seeking to defend negative answers to all of these 
questions, I will conSider, initially, the more obvious 
places in which relations of equality (or inequality) might 
be found. Later, I will consider some further possibilities, 
especially the thesis that these relations are ineliminable 
from the concept of the basic conditions of a good life. 
III 
The question that arises immediately concerns the place 
of comparisons between persons in the appraisal of their 
claims. If some ineliminable Significance attaches to their 
being equal or unequal in some respects, then comparisons to 
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establish the fact must be ineliminable from the appraisal of 
claims. 
The minimal notion of a comparison is of an appraisal 
which issues in the judgement that two individuals are either 
the same (are equal) or are different (are unequal) in some 
respect. A slightly more sophisticated comparison will yield 
an ordinal judgement, attributing one of the three relations 
of greater than, equal to, or less than, to one individual, 
as he stands to another in respect to some variable property. 
Ordinal judgements of this form distinguish two species of 
inequality. 
Whatever the form that these comparisons take, the 
jUdgements to which they give rise must be irreducibly 
relational, if they are to provide any support for an 
egalitarian theory of justice. This is of major importance 
because not every comparative (relational) judgement is 
ineliminable and basic. The determining consideration is the 
availability or nonavailability of independent or 
noncomparative identifications of a property, or of the degree 
of a variable property, in individual cases. 
The problem concerns the manner in which we identify the 
fact that a person has a certain attribute (such as a need), 
or the manner in which we measure the degree of a variable 
proper~y (and most importantly, its moral urgency). Can 
these activities, of identification and measurement, be 
carried out noncomparatively? If they can, then the concepts 
of equality and inequality, concepts which refer to certain 
comparative relationships holding between persons, do not 
seem to have an ineliminable role. Consider a property the 
identification of which does not involve comparisons, such 
as the property of being male. Whatever is the genesis of 
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our capacity for identification, it is at least true now that 
we can identify (or know how to go about identifying) an 
individual as a male without comparing him with any other 
individuals, and particularly, without relating him to other, 
paradigm males. It is possible for us to identify each of 
two persons as males without comparing them, and to go on to 
assert the existence of a relationship of sameness or 
equality between them in respect to this property. The 
relationship holds as an analytic consequence of the basic 
facts, that each of the two persons has the appropriate 
property. They are undeniably the same in this respect, but 
their having the latter, relational property follows solely 
as a matter of logic from the conjunction of the facts that 
each has the property - of being male - in respect to which 
they are the same. The relationship of equality is a purely 
consequential one in a situation of this sort. If 'the basic 
description' of a situation is one in which none of the 
components of the description is purely a logical implication 
of some of the others (this is a necessary but not a 
sufficient condition), then the fact of equality, in the above 
situation, will not figure in the basic description. That is 
what I mean by describing it as logically eliminable. 
The relationship of equality itself, considered 
ontologically, would seem to be consequential in every case. 
However, our concern must be with the descriptions that we 
give of those situations, with the knowledge of them that we 
are capable of acquiring. Whatever the ontological truth of 
the matter, relationships of equality and inequality -
comparative relationships - are sometimes ineliminable from 
the knowledge that we have or the descriptions that we give 
of things. This is so where the attribute whose 
identification or measurement is at issue is actually 
defined, or its degree is determined (or can only be 
determined) I in a comparative way. Suppose that we know 
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that one person is twice as heavy as another, but we do not 
know the actual weight of either. Then the resultant 
knowledge that we have, or the description that we can give, 
of either or both of these people, in respect to their 
weights, is irreducibly comparative. We know that one is 
half the weight of the other; or perhaps we know only that 
his weight is less than that of the other. If they are of 
the same weight (but we do not know the weight of either), 
then. the description that we can give of the weight of either 
is again irreducibly comparative. 
Are all judgements or descriptions which are irreducibly 
comparative, and on the basis of which significant 
relationships of equality or of inequality might be identified, 
eliminable from the principles for the appraisal of claims in 
justice? If they are eliminable, then there is at least a 
considerable part of the theory of justice which must be 
nonegalitarian. If it should turn out, however, that 
comparative descriptions were not eliminable, it would not 
immediately follow that justice was to that exte'nt 
egalitarian. It would follow only that it was comparative; 
and if ,the ineliminable comparisons which were made ranged 
indifferently across both equal and unequal comparative 
relations, then the relation of equality itself - as distinct 
from that of proportionality - would have no unique 
significance. 
It is in fact necessary to make some use of comparisons 
in the theory of social justice under conditions of scarcity. 
But because the particular comparative relationship involved 
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is that of proportionality, while that of equality has no 
special significance, it cannot legitimately be argued that 
social justice (under conditions of scarcity) is therefore 
egalitarian. The basic importance of this fairly obvious 
distinction j between equality in particular and proportional 
relations generally, is obscured by the practice of 
classifying all proportionalities as relations of equality or 
inequality. 
If appraisive principles directly involve comparisons 
between persons in some ineliminable role, and if the concept 
of equality has special importance in those comparisons, then 
app~aisive principles could legitimately be described as 
egalitarian. If these conditions are not met, then either 
the concept of equality plays some significant and 
ineliminable role deeper in the background of the theory of 
justice - for example, somewhere in the concepts or the 
standards which appraisive principles involve - or justice is 
nonegalitarian. The remainder of this work will be largely 
concerned with testing these different possibilities. 
IV 
In developing my own account of appraisive principles it 
is convenient to begin from an account advanced by Feinberg5 , 
not because his account is s sfactory, or even approximately 
so, but because it is suggestive, and also because it is the 
account from which my own theory was developed. Feinberg 
accepts that all justice involves giving to each his due, and 
sees the task of the principles of justice as that of 
'measuring dues'. He divides these principles into two kinds, 
comparative and noncomparative6 The distinction here is 
intended to reflect a distinction within the realm of justice 
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as a whole, one which is often described as that between 
social and individual justice. My own account of justice 
will capture, in its different parts, a good deal of the 
significance that this more familiar distinction has. 
Feinberg's distinction rests on the two different ways 
in which a person's dues can be determined. Noncomparative 
principles enable us to settle the dues of one person 
independently of any comparisons between him and other 
persons. This is possible (Feinberg says7) because the goods 
which are appropriate to these dues are not goods which are in 
limited supply. What is due to a persori is not a share in or 
a portion of a divisible (and limited) good, and so it is not 
necessary to consider the shares that ought to go to others 
before determining what is due to this person. The judgement 
of what is a person's due "is based exclusively upon data 
about him and is incorrigible, as a judgement, by new 
information about others. When our task is to do 
noncomparative justice to each of a large number of 
individuals, we do not compare them with each other, but 
rather we compare each in turn with an objective standard and 
judge each (as we say) 'on his merits ,." 8 • 
Where the subject is social justice, however (Feinberg 
argues) I a consideration of the condition of (some) other 
people is unavoidable in the determination of anyone 
person's dues. Comparative principles are necessary in these 
cases because "when the occasion for justice is the 
distribution of divisible but limited goods or the assignment 
of divisible but limited chores, how much will be left for 
the others is always pertinent to the question of how much it 
would be just for any particular individual to get.',9. The 
kind of comparison with other people which must be carried out 
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turns out to be the very kind licensed by the Aristotelian 
principle: both n(i) comparison of the relevant 
characteristics, merits, or performances of the individual in 
question, which are the basis of his claim, with those of the 
relevant comparison group", and also lI(ii) comparison of 
consequent 'treatments' ..• accorded this individual claimant 
with the 'treatments' •.• (of) relevant others:,lO. The 
comparative principles of social jus I he concludes, 
essentially involve "equality in the treatment accorded all 
the members of a class u11 • 
Both kinds of principle have the same function, that of 
dete~ining the extent of a person's claims in justice. 
Noncomparative principles achieve this in a direct (and not 
obviously mysterious) way, namely, by assessing a person's 
attributes against standards of moral significance. But this 
procedure (Feinberg argues) will not do in the realm of social 
justice, because in that sphere goods are limited. It follows 
that we cannot ignore the claims of others in assigning goods 
to one person, because we risk using up the entire supply of 
the goods and so leaving some claims entirely unsatisfied. 
It would be reasonable to conclude, however, that where 
goods are limited, it is notal'ternati ve principies but 
sup;eletnentary ones which must be resorted to. That is, in 
every c~se a person's claims in justice would be based on his 
own attributes (his "characteristics, merits, or performances t1 , 
Feinberg says with reference to the dues that are measured by 
, "t' .. I 12) camEara lve prlnCl.p es. In every case, the first, 
necessary step would be to appraise the moral significance of 
these attributes against the standards which are supplied by 
the appropriate (noncornparative) principles. Then, provided 
that the total supply of goods available for distribution was 
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not less than the sum of claims made on it, the appropriate 
amount of goods could justly be allocated to each person. Yet 
Feinberg does not mention the possibility of an initial 
noncomparative appraisal where social justice is concerned. 
Instead/he supposes that the goods which are the objects of 
claims which are measured noncomparatively are goods which are 
not just contingently but necessarily not subject to shortages. 
The good reputation that a person deserves (and of which it is 
noncomparatively unjust for him to be deprived) is not a good 
which other deserving people can have only if he does not. It 
is always possible for everyone who deserves a good reputation 
to have one: hence, problems of scarcity do not affect this 
sort of justice. It is therefore unnecessary, Feinberg 
supposes, to check on the total supply of the good before 
allocating a share to a person who has a noncomparative claim 
to some of it. 
It is not at all apparent why the sort of principle which 
is appropriate where there is a necessary abundance of claimed 
. goods should be thought to be different from the sort which is 
appropriate where there is a contingent abundance of such 
goods. But this distinction without a significant difference 
is necessary for Feinberg's thesis. Suppose (what seems 
independently reasonable) that the subject matter of 
noncomparative justice is defined, not by reference to goods 
which are of necessity abundant, but simply by reference to 
goods which are (whatever the modality) abundant. The 
unacceptable implication which this modified analysis now ha3 
(but which was avoided by Feinberg's original arbitrary 
qualification) is that the claims which people have are 
actually influenced in some manner by contingent, external 
circumstances which seem to have nothing to do with them, 
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namely, by the abundance or shortage of goods in the world. 
Yet the attributes which a person has and which are the basis 
of his claims are not themselves affected or altered by the 
fact that there is or is not a scarcity of the appropriate 
good. It should follow, if the claims of people are 
unaffected, that the principles which appraise those claims 
(in a 12.rimafacie manner) are equally unaffected. Appraisive 
principles should be appropriate in every case. 
An increasingly familiar situation today is that in which 
human beings are confronted by the physical limitations of the 
world. Many of the goods that people have an interest in, 
many that they have claims in justice against, are scarce. 
There are insufficient goods to satisfy all claims and 
interests, and compromises must be made. But what, the 
question should be asked, is to be compromised? Surely the 
answer is, claims. The claims that people have outrun the 
. goods available to satisfy them. Yet as far as material goods 
are concerned, it is only a contingent fact that they are 
limited. It has sometimes been the case, in some parts of the 
world, that valued goods were available in such abundance that 
everyone's claims could be met - and their interests and last 
desires satisfied too - while still leaving an effectively 
undiminished stock of the good. Land was sometimes like this, 
in spacious, newly-settled countries. Until recently, 
tolerably fresh air was such a good almost everywhere. 
Where goods are effectively unlimited, we do not usually 
regard any problems of distribution or allocation which happ::::n 
to arise as peculiarly problems of social justice. People can 
of course be prevented by others from enjoying goods to which 
they have claims, but under conditions of abundance, the 
problems which are distinctive of social justice - problems 
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involving the weighing and mediating of conflicting claims 
under conditiens ef scarcity - do not arise (except in the 
special case of conflicting property rights l3 ). It would not, 
however, follew from the fact that claims were everywhere 
satisfied, that those claims were any the less genuine claims. 
We could only be persuaded that they were if we thought that 
for a person to have a claim it was necessary for him to cl.aim 
it, or to insist en it. But there is often no. need for him to 
do that under conditions of abundance. It remains true under 
those conditions, however, that he has those natural 
properties, such that it is morally appropriate for him to 
have some particular goods. If proof is needed of its being 
morally appropriate that he should have the goods that he does 
have (in the nermal course of things), it is only necessary to 
consider the moral consequences of depriving him of them. 
If some goods which are actually limited were in fact 
unlimited, and if we wished to establish the extent of a 
person 1 s claims to them, what sort of procedure would be 
appropriate? To what sorts of principles would reference need 
to be made? Clearly, not to comparative principles: whether 
or not others have claims to that good, and how much of it 
they get, are of no relevance, if they do not affect this 
person's claim-base, and will not affect how much he will 
require in order to satisfy his claim. The appropriate 
principles will be noncomparative, will be appraisive 
principles. The determination of the nature and quantity of a 
good that is due to a person will proceed by appraising his 
natural condition (his attributes, achievements, and so on) 
against the appropriate standards, will assign a particular 
moral significance to his possession of certain attributes, 
and will prescribe that some goods ought prima 'fa:cie, in 
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justice, to be allocated to him. Provided that we know the 
good to be effectively unlimited, and given that there are no 
powerful reasons, based on considerations external to justice, 
for not allocating those goods to him, then he ought to have 
them. 
Sometimes, however, other things are not equal, and the 
moral requirements and claims that go through without impediment 
when they are equal now appear ina different light: their 
prima facie character becomes evident. In the absence of 
countervailing considerations, the prima facie nature of moral 
requirements is not usually operative. It becomes important 
only ~hen there are reasons against meeting those requirements. 
It is plausible to argue that this analysis applies in 
precisely the standard manner to claims in justice. Such 
claims are always prima facie; but this fact about them only 
becomes important when goods are limited. For a good will be 
regarded as limited only if there is a real possibility that 
the claims to it exhaust or exceed th~ total supply available. 
In that ease, it is important to recognize that the conflicting 
claims being made to those goods are, none of them, always and 
necessarily overriding. Being claims in justice, only other 
claims in justice can bring into the open this particular kind 
of Erima facie status - which is not to deny that the final 
demands ,of justice are only Erimafacie themselves, in the 
larger sphere of all moral considerations. 
If ,the claims that people have to goods are all prima 
facie, and if those goods are sometimes limited, there is ne8d 
of a procedure for determining what the demands of justice are, 
all things considered. With, and only with, the introduction 
of conditions of scarcity of goods do (noncomparative) 
appraisive principles cease to be sufficient. Only in that 
case are principles for the mediation of conflicting claims 
necessary. These principles must enable us to consider and 
compare both the claims of everyone involved, and the total 
quantity of goods available. Such principles will not, 
however, have the form assigned to them by the orthodox, 
neo-Aristotelian tradition. 
One of the more serious shortcomings of Feinberg's 
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analysis is that it cannot be fitted to the natural and 
coherent pattern that I have described. His manner of 
distinguishing comparative from noncomparative principles 
implies a basic discontinuity between them. There is no sign 
that he recognizes the need for appraisive principles -
noncomparative principles - where distributions under 
conditions of scarcity are concerned. It is not impossible 
that principles of a basically different kind might supercede 
normal appraisive principles when conditions of scarcity 
intervene, or even with the shift from necessary to merely 
contingent abundance. But these are unattractive possibilities. 
The continuity which my theory recognizes in the whole subject 
of justice promises, by contrast, to give cohesion to the 
different elements of the subject. There this continuity 
because it is a necessary component of every situation in 
which questions of justice arise that people have those 
persona~ attributes which make it appropriate for them to have 
certain goods. Because this is SOt every theory of justice 
must include principles (which will not always be sufficient 
for justice, but will always be necessary) whose specific 
function it is to evaluate or appraise the moral significance 
of those personal attributes. On Feinberg's analysis, 
however, it is necessary to explain why it should be that the 
claims that people have to goods which just happen to be 
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scarcce must be measured by different sorts of principles from 
those appropriate when goods are not scarce. If the personal 
attributes themselves are unaltered, then it is surely 
necessary (if no longer sufficient) to appraise their moral 
signi cance by those very standards and principles whose 
function is, precisely, to evaluate personal attributes of 
these kinds. 
The cost is high of giving up appraisive principles. 
Theories of justice which pay scant regard to them are 
possible: Rawls has (in effect) endeavoured to make his theory 
independent of the sorts of personal attributes on which my 
theory bases claims. More to the present point, no theory 
which recognizes that justice consists in distributing goods 
according to claims can give up appraisive principles without 
also giving up the very possibility of actually matching goods 
to the claims that people have. there are no such 
principles,' then it is not possib 
each that which is due to him. 
for justice to give to 
99 
OHAPTER SEVEN 
THE END OF SOCIAL JUSTICE 
I 
The special virtue of social justice is that it makes 
available to persons the basic conditions of a good life. 
The claims that persons have in justice issue from their 
actual conditions and circumstances, when viewed from the 
perspective of this guiding purpose. The natural abundance 
or scarcity of goods of the kind to which they have claims is 
an additional element which does not alter the analysis at 
the present level.· 
If ours were an exceptionally well-endowed world, and if 
1 human beings were blessed with a less perverse nature I then 
the virtue of justice (or of the parallel virtue in such a 
world) might well be to bring about the joyful and wholly 
fulfilling life for all. But that is not our world, we are 
not such beings, and the objectives of justice are more humble. 
It is still partly a teleological concepti but it is not one 
which is defined in the maximizing way with which 
Utilitarianism has made us familiar. Good undoubtedly does 
flourish in a world in which justice is done, but the 
maximiz~tion of good is not the value which justice seeks to 
secure. Its special virtue is to seek for each and every 
person the material and social circumstances which are 
necessary i£ each is to have a reasonable and decent 
opportunity to enjoy a good life2 . 
Those institutions and practices which are constrained by 
a public conception of justice are not required actually to 
secure, for each person, the good life. The enjoyment of such 
THE LIBRARY 
UNIVERSITY Of CANTERBURY 
CHI{iS1CHuRc:\-I h.L 
100 
a life, after all, is far from being wholly a passive 
d 't' PIt' 3 con ~ ~on. eop e are no Just consumers i a good life for 
them involves purposive activity and the exercise of powers 
and capacities, especially those powers and capacities the 
exercise of which involves their owner in enriching and 
satisfying activities of kinds which leave little room for 
discontent and ennui, or for a sense of under-achievement. 
Accordingly, it is quite inappropriate to see the good life as 
one in which persons are passive consumers of the social goods 
which are institutionally distributed to them. Instead, as 
far as possible - and as far as is consistent with the goal of 
providing people with a reasonable prospect of securing for 
themselves the basic conditions of a good life - distributive 
institutions should generally require an active contribution, 
a willingness to make something of one's life, and to turn to 
one's own ends the benefits which are made available through 
'1 t' 4 soc~a ac ~on . In particular, my conception of socialist 
justice is not committed to paternalism on a grand scale, or 
to the omni-competent welfare state. To the extent that 
people are individually motivated, that they are guided by a 
freely acknowledged conception of what their own good life 
would be, the role of social institutions· and practices must 
be a supportive one, leaving to each individual, as far as is 
practicable, the opportunity to make what he will of the 
chances he is given. After all, social action is collective 
action, and the good life for all will be actively pursued 
socially jU3t to the extent that people, acting both singly 
and collectively, do themselves actively pursue it. 
The liberal ideal of autonomous activity can easily be 
given an unreal interpretation in this connection. Persons 
are of course initiators of activity, but they are themselves 
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extensively shaped and influenced by the continuous interaction 
they have with their social and physical environments. The 
interpretation of autonomous action as action which reflects 
the self-examined beliefs and desires of the agent is 
compatible with the conception of it as action which also 
bears heavily the marks of the environment of which the agent 
is an inseparable part. Even on this more limited and 
realistic interpretation of autonomy - as characterizing the 
examined life - it is still the case that the social 
arrangements which have prevailed throughout most of human 
history have not encouraged its existence. But if these 
arrangements are alterable to some extent, and if there are 
reasons for supposing that the most satisfying deployment of 
the native talents and capacities of human beings requires 
some measure of critical self-awareness in thought and 
action, emotion and desire, then the fact that few people have 
attained to a reasonable autonomy cannot be used in proof of 
the inapplicability of the ideal. What is necessary is not an 
assertion of the value of individuality at the expense of a 
person's place in a web of social interactions and 
responsibilities, but - with Marx and Engels - a recognition 
that "Only in community (with others has each) individual the 
means of cultivating his gifts in all directions; only in the 
community, therefore, is personal freedom possible:'S. We must 
substitute for the crass liberalism which regards the social 
relations of an individual as external and contractual, not 
the equally crass collectivism which absorbs the individual 
without trace into the social organism, but the humanist 
socialism which recognizes that individuality is a property of 
members of social groupings. 
If the provisions of justice are to serve this end, then 
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the goods .with which people are provided must not be such as 
to restrict artificially and unnecessarily the range of life-
styles which are practical within their social milieu. That 
is why the institutions of social justice should seek to 
provide for all, not the good life (as authoritatively 
conceived), but rather those conditions and circumstances which 
make a practical possibility of such a life, whatever its 
particular design, provided it falls within the limits of the 
socially tolerable. Justice will be done if each person has 
adequate opportunities to pursue a legitimate conception of a 
good life, whether or not he takes up those opportunities. 
The good life is one which is lived by real human beings, 
by physical creatures who are born with limited capacities -
and limiting incapacities - into a world which is in many 
respects finite and cramping. Within these natural constraints, 
people strive (to varying degrees) to realise aspirations and 
to act in ways in which their physical, rational and spiritual 
capacities are exercised and developed. In this striving they 
encounter barriers, some of which are more impenetrable than 
others. Some are theproducts of human action, are 
'conventional', while others are 'natural', are products of 
the operation of forces outside the realm of social activity. 
A rational conception of the good life will be adjusted to the 
prevailing realities, both natural and social; but its 
accommodation to alterable (especially social) realities will 
be less automatic and more critical than its accommodation to 
inalterable (especially natural) realities. It is not always 
necessary for a person to accept physical defects 
fatalistically, for example, to seek to accommodate his life 
to them. Depending on the cost - in terms of all the 
resources of time, materials, labour and so on - of overcoming 
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or correcting the disability, doing so might be seen as 
demanded by justice or fairness. For some natural 
disadvantages, however, people can at most be given 
compensation: but to the extent that such disadvantages 
characte ze the human condition as a whole, they will not be 
seen as individual disabilities unless the cost of correcting 
them for all is fairly low and the benefit of doing so is 
clear. (If circumcision had definite benefits, it might fall 
into this category.) Social disabilities as well can be ranged 
along a continuum according to the cost of repairing them. 
A legitimate and adequate conception of the good life is 
one which is sufficiently adjusted to the actual circumstances 
in which a person finds himself. At the same time, a definite 
adjustment of some of those circumstances to the demands of 
such a conception may be rationally sought. Central to demands 
of the latter kind are those which are claims in justice, the 
demands that people may make to share in those conditions 
which are necessary if they are to have a reasonable chance of 
enjoying a good life. It follows that the concept of a 
legitimate conception of the good life for a person is a 
complex one, formed out of an interplay between a person's 
aspirations, and the natural and social circumstances of his 
life. In the course of the interplay, both factors will be 
adjuste~ and adapted to each other. An adequate conception 
is one in which some proper compromise of this kind has been 
reached. 
The major activities in which a person engages should 
ideally arise from his own examined aspirations and choices, 
should reflect the kind of person he is, and should not simply 
be accounted for by the pressures and compulsions of a coercive 
or an unjust socio-economic system, or by the dead hand of 
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conformity. Even so, to the extent that individual 
capacities, attributes and aspirations are themselves the 
product of social and historical circumstances, what will count 
as a legitimate conception of a good life for an individual 
will itself be partly dependent upon the actual social 
conditions in which each finds himself. At the same time, of 
course, every conception of a good life must square with those 
universal attributes and capacities which people have as 
biologically determinate creatures. This means that there will 
be both sameness and difference in human nature, and in 
adequate conceptions of the good life, from epoch to epoch. 
What sort of life would constitute a good life for an 
individual human being! then, is not something which can be 
determined ah.istorically, precisely to the extent that many of 
the facets of human nature with which a conception of the 
good life must cohere are themselves at least in part 
historically determined. For similar reasons, any individual's 
particular conception of his own good life not only will, as a 
matter of fact, reflect his historical and social milieu! but 
it ought to reflect that milieu, if it is to be adequate to 
the human material for which it is intended. 
No complete account of the attributes and circumstances 
which give rise to claims in justice can accordingly be given 
independently of some definite historical context. To the 
extent that conceptions of a good life will reflect the actual 
social and historical conditions in which that life is to be 
pursued, they will also tend to be constrained by public 
knowledge of the kinds and quantities of goods that are 
actually available in that milieu. It is, after all, possible 
to conceive of a world (including, one would surmise, our own) 
in which creatures have latent capacities such that, were 
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certain kinds of things which do not exist in that world 
available in it in actualitYl those capacities could be 
exercised to the benefit of their owners. Do we human beings, 
living (we will suppose) in a world of that kind, have claims 
to such goods, even though they are not available to us, and 
even though we do not know what they are? Unless legitimate 
conceptions of the good life are seen as constrained by actual 
circumstances, it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that we 
do have such claims. It is clearly necessary, then, to argue 
for the limitation of such conceptions by standards of what is 
attainable or realizable by persons in their actual contingent 
circumstances. 
This is not to concede that the particular conditions of 
moderate scarcity which give rise to the need for principles 
for the mediation of conflicting claims also act at this stage 
to moderate the scope of individual claims, when these are 
considered in isolation. The sorts of goods to which a person 
can have claims in justice are those which are actually 
available to people generallYl in the broadest grouping to 
which that person may, in a morally legitimate sense, see 
himself as belonging. Under contemporary conditions of 
international exchange and interaction, the world community is 
just such a reference group, though this was not the case under 
the conditions of separate development which prevailed in 
earlier ages. 
The influence upon the legitimacy of claims of the 
actual conditions which prevail in a person's environment does 
not mean that these claims include all manner of ephemeral 
and 'acquired' wants, of tastes manipulated and instilled by 
commercial pressures and other, less-guided social forces. 
Instead, the content of a person's claims - that part of them 
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which is not biologically determined - evolves out of the 
beliefs and expectations which enter into his fundamental 
conception of himself and his needs, and which form the 
horizons or boundaries of his understanding of what it is 
reasonable, possible, or indeed desirable to seek. For the 
most part, it is not the case that people see their 
opportunities for self-development and fulfilment as 
constrained or limited by the natural limitations of their 
physical environment. If they do, it is likely to be so 
because they are aware that other human beings are living in 
richer environments, in which case their deprivation may often 
reasonably be attacked as unjust anyway_ But in the absence 
of interaction with more fortunate people, natural limitations 
tend to express themselves in the horizons of a person's 
perception of the good life, and in the boundary conditions 
of the kind of human nature which evolves within those physical 
and social settings. 
II 
This approach to the problem of appraising claims does 
not accept that each individual person is the sole judge of 
what those claims are. For the liberal, such an'approach 
poses the danger that the liberty and integrity of each 
individ?al will be compromised by his submission to 
institutionalized ideals of the good life. The conventional 
kinds of lives that any society will tolerate, and regard as 
rationally defensible, will rarely extend widely enough to 
encompass all the diversity of life-style to which some people 
actually aspire. It might seem, on the one hand, that if the 
distributive mechanisms of a society are geared to a 
particular conception of the good life, then the worst that 
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can happen to the eccentric and the nonconformist is that they 
will have irrelevant goods made available to them, and will 
have to fend for themselves in those areas of their lives in 
which their basic requirements are unusual. But this, the 
liberal will object, is to ignore the pressures for conformity 
and the potential for oppression of all who are different which 
appear in a society in which particular ideals of life have 
been institutionalized. 
The liberal is opposed to 'idealism' in the design of 
social practices and institutions6 • He argues that, because 
the public recognition of ideals tends to be oppressive for 
those who do not share them, those ideals cannot provide 
satisfactory criteria for assigning claims to all people. Yet 
it is only when such ideals are legitimately available that 
public criteria exist allowing the appraisal of a person's 
condition as representing some impairment of his capacity to 
realise a good life. Such criteria do not take expressed 
preferences as sufficient to establish claims. 
Liberalism rejects all theories of distribution which 
disregard expressed preferences. The unreconstructed classical 
liberal regards self-ordered preferences as sufficient, in 
fact, to determine what a person's claims in justice are, and 
seeks principles designed to distribute the goods which are 
desired, according to a formula which takes only such claims 
into account. Theories of these kinds regard their own 
independence of ideals as necessary to any defence of the 
individual, and of liberty, against oppressive and paternalist 
institutions. Liberalism is not, however, independent of all 
ideals itself. Instead, it advances a definite conception of 
the individual and of his relations to society; and in 
particular, it defends an ideal of the good life as one in 
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which# as far as possible, a person's actual preferences are 
satisfied. The ideal might be a positive one, regarding this 
life as actually the one which is the best of all possible 
lives; or it might be negative, advancing this conception as 
a defence against the abuses to which all other ideals are 
prone. But in either case, a significant claim is being made 
about the best life for people under the conditions which . 
actually prevail in human societies. 
The 'idealist' theory of claims that I have been building 
up rejects both the liberal's own theory, and the charges made 
against itself on the grounds of its oppressiveness. At the 
same time, it recognizes the need to extend the account given 
so far to include some of liberalism's crucial insights. In 
the first place, the liberal, individualist view of human 
beings must be rejected, not as mean or degrading (nor even 
just as reading into human nature traits of acquisitiveness 
and egoism which are characteristic only of men in capitalist, 
market economies 7), but as being in certain respects too 
elevated. People are not as independent of social pressures 
and forces as individualism supposes: nor are their actual 
stated preferences by any means always the most reliable 
assessments of their own requirements. To insist on treating 
them as beings whose own natures are transparent to themselves 
is to consign many of them to lives of self-inflicted misery 
and tragedy; it is to ignore'the fact that the preferences 
that they 9xpress will be conformed willy nilly, anyway, to 
prevailing conceptions and ideals. 
It is true and important that the considered preferences 
of individuals cannot legitimately be ignored, that in some 
things and under some circumstances, a person's considered 
appraisals of his own requirements will be the best guide to 
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the conditions that are necessary if he is to enjoy the basic 
conditions of a good life. At the same time, it is necessary 
to recognize the limitations, as the ~ole ground for claims, 
of expressed preferences, since these are often ill-considered, 
advanced by people not capable of performing the feat of 
abstracting themselves, to any significant extent, from the 
mechanisms of social conformity. If our concern is to provide 
for all the conditions of a good life, then the liberal's 
approach is not sufficient. 
The distributive institutions of a society can operate 
according to ideals without being oppressive, if these ideals 
are minimal ones. They do not, in that case l extend into the 
details of the individual lives of people, into those regions 
in which people impose their own conceptions of themselves 
onto the private and immediate circumstances of their lives. 
The virtue of justice is that it seeks to secure the minimum 
conditions that are still necessary if people are to have 
reasonable opportunities to pursue, with some success, the 
good.life. For the purposes of any single set of distributive 
institutions, the supposition can be made, and will generally 
be justified, that the goods which these institutions 
distribute will be goods which all people will require. A 
common minimum for all can generally be assumed. If 
situations occur in which this assumption is falsified, any 
enlightened society whose institutions are well-designed will 
have some procedures whereby the necessary adjustments and 
special provisions are made. If this does not happen in 
practice, that is because the societies with which we are 
familiar are not particularly enlightened, and their 
institutions are not particularly well-designed. This is a 
reason for reforming society, not one for rejecting the theory. 
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The liberal gives insufficient weight to the fact that 
what most people are prepared to accept as the good life for 
themselves is profoundly influenced by the prevailing ideals 
and patterns. Where their own individuality is stamped on 
their lives, it will almost always be in those parts which 
lie beyond the minimum which justice serves. A common 
conception of the minimum is not incompatible with 
individuality, because people simply are creatures who are 
largely the products, in their aspirations and values and in 
their images of themselves, of their natural and social 
environments, and this is the very same environment (assuming 
idea~ized conditions, and especially the absence of rapid or 
revolutionary social change) from which the prevailing ideals 
have sprung. To the extent that all this is so, that a 
person is a social being in a reasonably persistent and stable 
social and natural environment, it will often be true, not 
only that he will usually adopt as his own a conventional 
ideal, but also that such an ideal re~lly will be the best 
for him. When both individual people and the ideals of the 
good life which they adopt grow out of a single environment, 
a conformity of this kind between them is only to be 
expected. If this conformity is often found, the presumption 
that the aspirations and ideals of different individuals will 
include; a common minimum conception of the necessary 
conditions for the good life will be particularly well-founded. 
In any case, the oppressiveness or restrictiveness of a 
common conception of the basic conditions of the good life can 
be alleviated - if there is still a residual problem - by the 
proper design of distributive institutions. It is by no means 
always necessary that institutions should distribute particular 
goods themselves: it will sometimes be sufficient to make 
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available adequate opportunities to acquire these goods (or a 
sufficiency of them) at will. The institution of money 
operates to this end, enabling people to determine for 
themselves, at least some of the time, what goods they will 
acquire. The circumstances and experiences which led to the 
rise of the welfare state also suggest, however, that the 
free market - this being the distributive mechanism (for all 
but the basic rights) which the laissez-faire liberal accepts, 
as the mechanism most compatible with the object of letting 
preferences determine distributions - is not sufficient to 
secure the basic conditions of the good life for all. Such 
goods as education, health care and housing, come to be 
regarded, in a welfare state, as basic conditions of everyone's 
good life, and as goods which, in those circumstances, will be 
better distributed for not being channelled through the 
market. 
III 
The claims that people have in justice are determined, 
in the first place, by the particular attributes or 
conditions of each individual. These attributes give rise to 
claims to the extent that they represent impairments to an 
individual's opportunity to participate in the basic 
condit~ons of a good life. The recognition of a claim is the 
morally appropriate response to the recognition that a 
person's attributes or conditions act to impair, in some 
remediable way, his capacity to realize the minimal level of 
Well-being which is necessary for a good life. On the other 
hand, the explicable and justifiable existence of standardized 
conceptions of the good life leads to the presumption that 
there are certain goods that all persons will require. Many 
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distributive institutions will not wait to assess the actual 
conditions of each individual before providing him with these 
goods. In a well-ordered society, distributive institutions 
will continue to operate in this sort of way just to the 
extent that the presumption they make is indeed justified. 
The fact that, in practice (for very good reasons) individual 
appraisals are often dispensed with does not show that they 
are theoretically dispensable. 
.cHAPTER EIGHT 
THE APPRAISAL OF CLAIMS 
I 
The first function of the principles of justice is to 
assign to persons definite claims to goods. These claims 
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will vary, not only in the kinds and quantities of goods 
sought, but also, particularly, in their moral urgency. In 
arriving at an understanding of the latter notion, it is 
necessary, first of all, to distinguish between provisions or 
shares of goods, and holdings l of goods. The latter must be 
further divided into initial holdings, those which exist 
prior to a particular distribution. and final holdings! those 
which exist following a distribution. Accordingly, a person's 
final holding of a good (relative to a particular 
distribution) consists of his initial holding plus his current 
share of the good. Alternatively, if goods which were 
initially held by him have been redistributed to others, then 
his final holding (relative to that distribution) will consist 
of his initial holding less the amount taken 
redistribution. 
Some criteria of dues, but not alI, are sensitive to 
initial holdings of goods. The two criteria that are advanced 
in my theory - needs and deserts - support claims which are 
partly dependent on each individual person's initial holdings. 
By cor-trast, a particular thing might be due to a person as 
of right, even though he already holds far more goods of that 
kind than he needs or deserves t and far more than is held by 
anyone else t including people who need or deserve some goods 
of that kind. Property rights! for this reason (and also 
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because they have particular items as their object, and not 
goods of a kind, as needs and deserts typically do), have an 
ambivalent moral status which an adequate theory of social 
justice must clarify. 
Needs and deserts, however, are not independent of 
initial holdi~gs. In the clearest case, this,is brought out 
by the distinction between unsatisfied and satisfied needs. 
In the one case, if a person needs a good then it is the case 
that he does not already hold a sufficient quantity of that 
good to secure the valuable end that it serves. In the other 
case, a person needs a good whether or not he already possesses 
a sufficiency of it, provided only that his possession of it 
continues to be necessary for his securing the particular 
valuable end at issue. 
Actual claims in justice can arise only from needs which 
are unsatisfied. The urgency of such claims is dependent 
upon two factors. The first is the degree to which the person 
who needs a good is deprived of the valuable end which that 
good serves. For anyone particular kind of need, such as 
the need for warmth 1 for food and for shelter, the urgency of 
a claim based on it will usually (threshhold effects and the 
like apart) be directly related to the smallness of the 
initial holding of that good, expressed as a proportion of 
the holding which would satisfy the need. (This otherwise 
useful measure of impairment fails, unfortunately, in those 
cases where the initial holding is zero). It follows that it 
is not the absolute quantity of the good needed which 
determines the urgency of a claim: if this were the case, 
then the starving adult would have a far more urgent claim to 
a limited supply of food than would the starving baby. 
Accordingly, the relevant factor is the proportional 
deprivation of a good which a person's current holding 
represents. 
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The urgency of a claim is also a partial function - and 
this is the second element - of the importance, or the value, 
of the end which it subserves, the contribution which the 
final holding'of that good (were the need satisfied) would 
make to the good life of the individual. The description of 
some needs as more basic than others is one familiar and 
roughly accurate way of drawing attention to relative 
differences in importance of this kind. The general point is 
that the different elements of the basic conditions of the 
good-life have contributions of differing importance to make 
to the whole. The requirement that a person be adequately 
ncuYished is more imporr~nt than the requirement that his work 
be satisfying and enjoyable, and needs based on the former 
will generally have greater moral importance than those based 
on the latter. 
These two elements - the proportional deprivation and 
the value of the end - together make up the degree of 
impairment of a person's enjoyment of the basic conditions of 
the good life. The elements combine readily to form this 
latter function: the greater the proportional deprivation or 
the greater the value of the end, the more urgent (other 
things 'being equal) the claims based on such needs. Likewise, 
as the holding of a good proportionally approaches the level . 
of satisfaction, the urgency of a claim based on it diminishes, 
with the result that claims bClsed on a proportionally greater 
deprivation of a good which subserves a less important 
end-state will now surpass it in urgency. 
This analysis, in much the same form that it applies to 
needs, can be extended to merits and deserts. Again, it is 
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possible to speak of both satisfied and unsatisfied ('met' and 
'unmet') deserts. A person might or might not currently hold 
a good which he deserves to have. If he does not, then it 
must be the case that he deserves that quantity of a good by 
which his current holding of it falls short of the level of 
holdings at which his deserts would be satisfied. 
The two components which together make up the factor of 
degree of impairment can also (though perhaps less usefully) 
be identified in the case of deserts. There is, firstly, the 
proportional deprivation of a deserved good, as represented 
by a person's initial holding, and secondly, the value 
repr~sented by his having the goods which he deserves (or 
simply, as I suggest later2 , by his having his deserts 
satisfied) • 
The concept of moral urgency, which is basic to my theory 
of justice, supposes that this concept of a condition which is 
an impairment to a person's enjoyment of the basic conditions 
of the good life, can be formulated with sufficient precision 
to enable plausible solutions to be found for a representative 
range of distributive problems. It is idle (as Aristotle 
pointed out3 ) to seek greater precision than this. If the 
condition of deprivation suffered by someone whose deserts 
have not been met can be judged only in an impressionistic 
way, and not measured in any reasonably precise, quantitative 
sense at all, then that is a conclusion which should be 
neither unexpected, nor unacceptable. Any theory which could 
provide ways of measuring morCl.1 urgency which were both more 
precise than those we have at present, and morally acceptable, 
would be most welcome; but it is not an objection to a theory 
that it lacks that precision, that it only captures and does 
not improve upon our actual processes of moral reasoning. 
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II 
An objection of crucial importance for the egalitarian's 
case can be proposed here. This is that my procedure here 
simply assumes that the moral urgency to be assigned to the 
like claims of different persons is actually the same, 
whereas in fact the only necessity that this should be so is 
a moral necessity. My theory is apparently committed to the 
acceptance of a normative principle of the equal moral 
urgency of equal claims, or more generally, a principle of 
equal consideration4 • 
There are two distinct issues here, and I will 
disentangle them as I proceed. The first raises the problem 
of the 'elitist' who maintains that some persons have a 
higher moral status than others, and consequently that their 
states of impairment give rise to claims of a greater urgency 
than the like states of many others. I will show that one 
form of elitism - the variety against which some egalitarians 
have aligned themselves - is logically impossible because its 
assertion is self-contradictory. The other form of elitism 
is a possible normative theory which raises serious and 
familiar problems: but egalitarianism is of no assistance in 
countering these arguments. The second issue concerns the 
evaluative appraisal of the states of impairment of different 
people, once we have accepted the (trivial) truth that like 
cases will be of like moral significance. Here it is 
necessary neither to compare people, nor to appeal to 
relations of equality, in order to make the right appraisals. 
Egalitarianism is not the theory we need in this case either. 
III 
Some of the conditions in which people find themselves 
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are unpleasant, or damaging, or evil: some are evils because 
they are impairments to a person's capacity to pursue a good 
life. The ranking of natural conditions as constituting more 
or less serious impairments to the basic conditions of a good 
life is not itself a natural (or factual) ranking, a ranking 
solely in accordance with variations in natural properties. 
It is an evaluative ranking, an appraisal to the effect that 
some conditions are better or worse than others. 
No coherent theory of value can attach value to the fact 
of being a particular individual, independently of the fact of 
his being the bearer of certain properties. Values attach to 
attributes, states or conditions, or to individuals in virtue 
of their attributes, states or conditions. If persons are 
individuals who have moral value or moral worth while pebbles 
and space-time points are individuals which do not have such 
value, this must be so in virtue of some of the properties 
which persons but not pebbles have. This much is logically 
necessary. Yet it is not sufficient simply that persons 
should possess some attributes which pebbles do not possess , 
no matter what those attributes are. They must be valuable 
attributes, or attributes which are value-bestowing. 
Several of the worries which egalitarians have sometimes 
had are not genuine theoretical problems at all. (It does not 
follow that they are not practical problems: moral villainy 
can easily be coupled with theoretical confusion). In 
particular, there is one kind of elitism which is a logically 
mistaken theory, one which correctly derives objectionable 
moral conclusions from mistaken premises. Because its errors 
are not moral ones, it is not appropriate to attack it with 
moral arguments. Egalitarians, however, have often supposed 
it to be necessary to combat elitism by advancing fundamental 
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normative principles of the equal worth of all human beings. 
But such principles (which beg fair to be seen as the central 
principles of contemporary egalitarianism) do not identify 
ineliminable morally significant equalities. Instead, all 
such principles present a conceptual truth in a 
theoretically~misleading normative form. 
Consider the elitist thesis that conditions of like 
impairment suffered by different persons can give rise to 
claims of unequal moral urgency_ Suppose, for example, that 
a man and a woman both have a need of food, such that the 
condition of each represents the same degree of impairment of 
the ~ood life of each. According to this elitist, the claim 
based on the man's need has a greater moral urgency than the 
claim based on the woman's need. Therefore, the needs of the 
man must, up to some point at least, be favoured over those 
of the woman. 
Egalitarians have mistakenly supposed that the only way 
in which this patently objectionable view can be combatted is 
by their affirming, as a basic moral principle, that equal 
consideration must be given to the claims of all persons. 
The question arises, in that case, whether such a principle 
is justified or not. If it is not justified, we have no 
reason to accept this variety of egalitarianism: a basic 
philosophical principle of the present work is that morality 
is firmly based upon reasons (founded on natural facts), and 
that where it ceases to be this, it becomes irrationalS. 
Suppose then that the principle is justified. Egalitarians 
. usually do suppose this when they challenge the elitist to 
disclose the attributes which distinguish men from women and 
which justify the discrepancies in evaluation. If there are 
no such attributes - as, for general moral purposes, there are 
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not - then the elitist must concede defeat. But he has not 
been moraily defeated: he has simply admitted to being 
inconsistent. On the one hand, he had implied that a certain 
set of attributes (possessed by the man) had a certain value; 
on the other, he had denied that the very same set of 
attributes (possessed by the woman) had that same value. But 
this is simple and uncluttered self-contradiction. On the 
one hand, certain properties are being assigned a certain 
value, and on the other, those same properties are being 
denied that value. The properties involved in the two cases 
are the same properties, in the strictest sense, in virtue of 
the fact that the criterion for the individuation of 
properties is that of qualitative likeness. It follows, 
therefore, that any two (separately instantiated) properties 
which are qualitatively alike are one and the same property, 
in the only sense (the proper sense) of that expression6 • 
What the elitist must do is to find those properties 
possessed by the man which distinguish him from the woman 
and which justify the differentiation in value. If he cannot 
do so, he must withdraw from his elitism in the interests of 
consistency. He might assert that the property of 'being a 
man' is the morally significant differentiating one: but 
this will not do. Either this ad hoc property is just a 
compendium of other properties, which will already have been 
considered and rejected; or the elitist is claiming, on 
behalf of each individual (named) man, that that man has an 
intrinsic value which is greater than that of any woman, but. 
which is not dependent on his attributes. This does not seem 
to be a coherent thesis. 
If this argument is correct, then it is not necessary 
for a theory of justice to include an underivative moral 
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principle of the equal basic worth of all persons, or a 
principle of equal consideration for the like interests of 
all. While both principles can carry an undeniable practical 
force, they are not basic moral principles.' The only way in 
which the elitist might seem to have a theory at all involves 
his supposing that some individuals, considered apart from 
their properties, can still have some definite intrinsic 
value, and this is not a coherent possibility. Otherwise, he 
is just being self-contradictory when he attaches a different 
value (or a different moral urgency) to conditions which are 
empirically alike. 
Because this argument is so swift and easy, it must raise 
doubts about whether it really deals with the problem of the 
elitist. There is a very real sense in which it does not do 
so. I have not shown to be logically confused the elitist who 
insists that there is a subclass of persons, identified by 
their possession of some unique properties, whose possession 
of those properties warrants their receiving preferential 
treatment in a wide variety of circumstances. How moral 
argument to shift someone from this position should proceed 
is an interesting and difficult question. But it is not my 
topic, because it doe.s not raise any special egaiitarian 
considerations. Instead, it is the problem of determining 
which p~operties have (or bestow) value, and what their value 
is, a problem which has nothing in particular to do with 
questions of equality. Accordingly, if the principle of equal 
consideration for all persons is justified, it is so as the 
conclusion of an argument, the premises of which detail the 
moral signi cance of the various attributes of persons in a 
way which reveals that none have distinctive properties which 
have a general moral significance ofa kind justifying (a 
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presumption of) preferential treatment. The fundamental moral 
fact is not the egalitarian one of equal worth of all persons, 
but the nonegalitarian one that each person has the (initial) 
moral worth that his properties bestow on him - the same 
{initial) moral worth, as it happens (if it so happens), in 
each case. 
IV 
This conclusion leads to the second problem mentioned 
above. This is the question whether values can be assigned to 
the properties and conditions of different persons independently 
of comparisons between them, comparisons of a kind which might 
rest on significant relationships of equality. The egalitarian 
argument is as follows. The urgency of the moral claim which 
is based on one person's condition must be the same as the 
urgency of the claim which is based on the like condition of 
another person. That much, the argument against the elitist 
shows, is certain. But in the absence of comparisons with 
other people, how can we know, with sufficient precision to 
. guarantee the principle of the equal urgency of like claims in 
practice, what actually is the moral urgency of the particular 
claims based on particular individual's conditions of 
impairment? All we can be confident of is that one claim has 
an urgency which is equal to, or is perhaps greater or less 
than, the urgency of some other claims: that is, while we can 
assign comparative measures of urgency to claims, it is far 
from evident that we can assign noncomparative measures. 
Many of the egalitarian arguments I consider in other 
contexts are defeated by an argument which is not so obviously 
available here. This argument depends on the necessity that, 
if two individuals are equal, then there must be some (other) 
respect in which they are the same. The existence of two 
individuals instantiating a single property underlies every 
relation of equality_ Accordingly, in the present context 
(if this form of argument should turn out to be available), 
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it would be argued that in every case where we judge the moral 
urgency of one claim to be equal to {or greater or than} 
the urgency of some other claim, this comparative judgement 
could be replaced by two judgements, each ascribing a definite 
urgency to one of the claims, and which jOintly entail the 
comparative judgement. 
The objection to this procedure in the present case is 
that value properties in general, and urgency in particular, 
are not the sorts of properties which can be measured with an 
accuracy which renders comparative appraisals superfluous. 
Perhaps all that we can ever know of the urgency of one claim 
is where it stands, relative to some other claims. In 
particular, given the aims of an egalitarian analysis of 
justice, and given the mediating principle for justice under 
conditions of scarcity which I will formulate below7 , it 
becomes important to settle the status of judgements of equal 
urgenc:x:. If such judgements are basic and irreducible, then 
my theory of justice is not, strictly, nonegalitarian. (Even 
so, it would not be egalitarian in any morally interesting 
sense). If the theory is nonegalitarian, such judgements must 
be reducible - in principle if not always readily in practice -
to appraisals of the individual urgency of the individual 
claims. 
To ascribe a definite urgency to a claim is to evaluate 
the condition of the person concerned. Urgency is not a 
natural property of things, one which can be identified, and 
the degree of which can be recognized, by standard empirical 
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procedures. The problem should be seen, not as one of 
recognizing what the urgency of a claim is, so much as one of 
ascribing the appropriate degree of urgency to a person's 
condition of impairment. Values (I assume) are not logically 
independent of evaluations; but the properties of a thing in 
virtue of which we evaluate it do have this logical 
independence. Appraisals of the urgency of claims are 
evaluations of the attributes and circumstances of people, 
when these attributes are regarded as factors which impair the 
ability of people to enjoy the good life. We appraise these 
attributes in the light of the significance that they have as 
factors causing such impairments. In these appraisals, we 
make use of a conception of the basic conditions of the good 
life, and of standards of what constitutes an impairment to 
that life. It does not follow, however, that in these 
appraisals based on standards, we are involved in ineliminable 
references to similar cases. On the contrary, appraisals of 
the latter sort presuppose those based on standards. After 
all, the practice sOlely of comparing like natural conditions 
of impairment with like (and unlike) natural conditions will 
not yield any evaluations, let alone correct ones. Somewhere 
along the line, noncomparative evaluations of these different 
conditions must be made. If we need to know what is the 
urgency of some claim, it will be of no real help to us to 
learn that it is that urgency - whatever it is - which some 
other claim has, if we know no more than this about the 
urgency' of either. 
The standards by which we evaluate can and should evolve 
and mature over time. All such standards should be regarded 
as conjectural: if they seem to give us adequate evaluations 
in particular cases, we should be prepared to regard them as 
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'corroborated'to that extent. But we should not regard them 
as immune to change: their shortcomings and their areas. of 
inadequacy will usually only become evident in particular 
applications, on the basis of which we will be justified in 
making whatever adjustments and modi cations to the standards 
seem appropriate. In extreme cases, we might eventually be 
led to abandon a standard entirely: the kinds of 
'respectability' which people sought in the Nineteenth Century, 
as integral to their conceptions of the good life, are no 
longer seen by most people as important. The standards by 
which we judge claims (for example, to satisfaction for 
offences against our honour) have changed. 
Conceptions of the good life (and of its basic conditions) 
alter as society and its inhabitants alters; but even when 
these conceptions remain unchanged, the evaluations which are 
made of conditions of impairment can still be refined and 
amended. If the existing criteria have survived the testing 
circumstances of many different particular cases, we will come 
to have some confidence in them: we will see those standards 
as expressing the right evaluation of those sorts of cases. 
Sometimes, we might never be free from perplexity, never able 
to make with any confidence a noncomparative assignment of 
value, or of moral significance, to some set of facts. If the 
moral status of a human foetus puzzles us, then we may simply 
have to learn to live with our ignorance on that score. 
Needless to say, the knowledge that all (like) foetuses have 
equal moral significance will not be of any use to us. 
To the extent that we find it useful to compare different 
cases with each other, we do it with an eye to the standards 
which we are seeking to applYI or perhaps to refine. At most, 
precedent and comparison are guides to the proper evaluation. 
This is obscured l however, by the egalitarian principle of 
treating people equally_ If we resort to comparisons with 
other, like cases, in order to settle on the evaluation of 
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this case, we must be careful to select other cases in which a 
defehsible evaluation has been made. There is no merit at all 
in assessing the present case in the light of cases in which 
wildly improper evaluations were made. We seek to compare 
with those like cases where the evaluation seems to be just, 
and we resort to precedents only if we have confidence that 
they are right. Yet to appeal, not just to like cases, but to 
other cases which we believe to be right, is precisely to 
appeal to them as expressing standards. If we are able to 
identify them as defensible standards, then we must be able to 
see that they express appropriate and just evaluations of cases 
of this kind. 
I have argued that, in evaluating the urgency of a 
particular claim, comparisons with other claims, as distinct 
from appeals to standards, are not made. What sorts of 
assessments of urgency do standards enable us to make? We do 
not of course have a numerical scale of urgency. If we did, 
then all judgements of equality and inequality between claims 
would, in principle, be eliminable. But we do have an informal 
scale which serves our purposes reasonably well, in most cases. 
We can sometimes be quite confident that the condition a 
person is in is such that his claim to a particular good is 
critically urgent. Similarly, there is here an analogue of 
the notion of a 'fixed zero', a notion which is crucial in the 
formulation of a non-ordinal scale for the measurement of 
variable properties8 . Given the guiding conception of the 
basic conditions of a good life, we are capable of recognizing 
that, in respect to a person's holdings of some goods which 
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contribute to that sort of life, his claims to those goods 
are wholly satisfied. There is, in other words, a 
noncomparatively definable concept of 'zero urgency'. 
Egalitarians might argue that only ordinal measurements of 
urgency are possible. If we could say of any claim only that 
it was of greater urgency, equal urgency or less urgency than 
some other claims, if we could say of no claim that it was of 
zero urgency (only that it was of 'least urgency' relative to 
some others), then irreducibly comparative principles of 
distribution would seem to be necessary. But in fact, we have 
a fairly clear conception of both ends of the scale of 
urge~cy - of both critical and zero urgency - and we can, over 
time, build up fairly comprehensive standards of the urgency 
of intermediate claims. 
In some cases, some implications of these standards might 
conveniently be expressed in a comparative way. It will 
sometimes be useful to know that needs of a particular, 
non-biological kind can still have an urgency comparable to 
some of the less basic biological needs; or to know that, 
generally speaking, needs are more urgent than deserts. The 
usefulness of these comparative facts clearly presupposes, 
however, that we can give independent (that is, noncomparative) 
appraisals of urgency for some of the claims confronting us in 
any par,ticular case. It is likely that a fly that has been 
sprayed with insecticide suffers some pain as it dies. If we 
were moved to give this fact some weight in our moral 
calculations, it would not be a very considerable weight. But 
it is a moral appraisal which is virtually useless until it is 
tied to some mOIBor less independent standard of moral 
significance. It is all very well to know that spraying a 
room containing ten flies is not as morally reprehensible (if 
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it is morally reprehensible at all) as spraying a room 
containing twenty flies, but what we do need to know is how 
reprehensible it is to do either. The claims of justice make 
definite demands on us: if justice is to take its proper 
place in our practical deliberations, we will need to know 
what sort of weight can be attached to those claims, what sort 
of significance they have. 
v 
The moral urgency of a claim is expressed in evaluations 
of the extent to which a person's circumstances represent an 
impai.rment to the basic conditions of a good life for him. I 
have argued that the different degrees of moral urgency can be 
determined noncomparatively, by reference to standards, and 
that these standards themselves should not be seen as being 
egalitarian, in any interesting sense. Prior to that, I 
argued that principles of equality were not appropriate to 
the attempt to refute elitism. A further, related possibility 
can be mentioned here, although it has already been settled, 
implicitly, in the foregoing. This is the claim that my 
theory of justice presupposes that the enjoyment of the basic 
conditions of the good life is something which has the same 
value, no matter whose enjoyment it is. An egalitarian 
princip~e of the equal value, to all persons, of the basic 
conditions of the good life, might be alleged to lie hidden 
in the bowels of my theory. 
It is not sufficient, however, to insist on the equal 
value of the good life for everyone, for that is compatible 
with ascribing to it an utterly trivial or even a negative 
value. Is it even necessary to insist on equality of value 
here? The value that we place on human livest the importance 
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that we a.ttachto the absence of physical deprivation, and so 
on, are not quantifiable: but they represent, nonetheless, 
definite values. It is possible to trace evolving patterns 
in the amount of value that people (especially 'the common 
people') are seen as having: some societies have had a rather 
casual attitude towards individual lives, and have not 
regarded suffering and deprivation as of outstanding moral 
interest. It is of course true and important that - at least 
among the morally more enlightened - there has been a trend 
towards the inclusion of all human beings in the class of 
those whose lives have some definite value. But this is not 
an arbitrary or an unjustifiable trend: there are reasons 
for regarding all persons as having the capacity to realize 
lives which have some value. It is because and only because 
each person has these properties and capacities that he is 
also a person whose good life is of value. The properties 
and capacities we are mainly concerned with here are of a 
general kind, sufficiently general to be possessed by (nearly) 
all persons, yet sufficiently determinate to allow for the 
definition, in terms of these capacities, of the basic 
conditions of the good life for each. If the good life of any 
person is of equal value to the good life of anyone else, this 
is only because each such life already has some particular 
value. If it did not, neither my conclusion about the presence 
of all human beings in the class of those who have claims in 
justice, nor the egalitarian's similar but theoretically less 
perspicuous assertions, would be rationally defensible. 
VI 
I have insisted that the problems of social justice 
should be seen as occupying two stages. The first stage 
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consists in the appraisal of the claims that each individual 
has. I have developed an analysis of this concept which, 
while sensitive to the very important truths insisted upon by 
those theories which attach morality to particular social and 
historical conditions, yet insists as well on the basis in 
each individual's own condition and capacities of the claims 
he has in justice. I have argued also that the concepts of 
equality and inequality have no ineliminable significance 
here, that the appraisal of claims neither involves nor 
presupposes such relationships. 
If it were not for the fact that this world does not 
enjoy an abundance of all the things which contribute to the 
good life, this account of justice would be sufficient. But 
the conditions which are distinctive of social justice are 
precisely those conditions of scarcity which render a second 
stage necessary_ While it might be conceded (as it is by 
Feinberg9 ) that 'noncomparative justice' is nonegalitarian, it 
seems injudicious, a sign of an immoderate affection for 
paradox, to argue for a nonegalitarian theory where conditions 
of scarcity prevail. But there are powerful arguments for the 
conclusion that, while comparative assessments must sometimes 
be made in practice under conditions of scarcity, such 
assessments are neither theoretically ineliminable, nor 
egali ta,rian in any morally interesting sense. If I finally I 
these arguments should prove unconvincing, they will at least 
serve notice on the egalitarian to produce what we do not yet 
have, an adequate egalitarian theory of social justice • 
• 
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CHAPTER NINE 
JUST,ICE AND SCARCITY 
I 
The critical problems of social justice arise under 
conditions of moderate scarcity. Some goods are available 
in sufficient quantity to satisfy some of the demands made on 
them, but not to satisfy all. A good deal of the conflict 
that characterizes the life of societies, and hence many of 
the institutions and practices which'have grown up in an 
attempt to contain or resolve that conflict, can be traced to 
the competition for a share in the natural resources of the 
labour upon these natural resources, and for the more or less 
intangible goods (political and economic power, social 
prestige, and the like) which arise from the interaction and 
co-operation of people. Any society which is not prepared 
simply to accept those de facto distributive institutions 
which are the fruit of historical circumstance must devise, 
or seek to introduce piecemeal, institutions which will 
distribute social goods in ways which are (at the very least) 
sufficiently acceptable to most people to ensure the 
maintenance of a reasonable peace and stability in society. 
If these ends are not secured, then such mechanisms, whatever 
their other virtues, will not really have solved the larger 
problems of distribution which they confront. If many social 
'goods are in very limited supply, such that any distribution 
whatsoever will lead to desperately impoverished lives for 
the majority of people, then no distributive institutions, no 
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matter how wisely designed, will be of much avail. The 
empirical possibility of designing institutions which will 
distribute goods in ways consistent with the persistence and 
stability of society, rests on there being only a moderate 
scarcity of goods l . 
Where that condition is met, however, it is not yet 
morally sufficient to distribute goods with an eye solely to 
establishing a tolerable level of peace and goodwill in 
society. That the majority of people can be persuaded to 
accept some particular distribution of goods is not 
overwhelming evidence (though it is some evidence) that the 
good has. ',been properly distributed. The question of justice 
arises as well, imposing severe restrictions on what will 
count as a morally adequate solution to a distribution problem. 
The fundamental kind of objection th can be made, from the 
perspective of justice, to a particular distribution, is that 
it has ignored l or has not given sufficient attention to, the 
claims of some people. A situation which promotes social 
peace can yet be a very paradigm of injustice. Suppose 
(improbably) that all persons but one could have their claims 
satisfied, provided only that this one innocent fellow lived a 
degrading and abject life: the source of our objection to 
situations of th sort is precisely that this person has 
claims which have been ignored. If he did not in fact have 
any claims in justice - if it were not the case that his 
attributes and capacities were such that his current situation 
represented a state of impairment - then there could be no 
objections to his situation on grounds of its injustice. 
There might well be other moral objections, but that is not 
the point. 
The problems of soc justice arise because there is no 
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way in which the claims of all can be satisfied, given the 
natural scarcity, relative to the human population, of goods. 
The principles with which claims are individually appraised 
are no longer sufficient. They are, however, necessary, a 
conclusion which is strongly supported by the same 
considerations which show that an attention to the claims of 
each is central to all problems of justice. 
II 
My own theory of justice, under conditions of scarcity, 
is a natural outgrowth of the account already given of justice 
as the proper satisfaction of claims. We are to suppose that 
different people have claims to goods, claims which are of 
varying urgency. Because goods are limited, however, these 
E!ima facie claims cannot all be satisfied. It is possible 
for justice to be done, under conditions of scarcity, even 
though there are some claims which are left (partly) 
unsatisfied. The latter do not, however, cease to be claims, 
or to be objects of moral concern. 
The mediation of conflicts between claims must - if those 
claims are to be taken as having any relevance at all - turn 
upon the details of the actual claims advanced. The most 
obvious - and the obviously right - feature of claims in terms 
of which mediation must proceed, is their urgency. The whole 
conception of justice and of its special virtue which I have 
developed leads naturally to this conclusion. If our concern 
is with the alleviation of conditions which act as basic 
impairments to the good life, then that concern must obviously 
be adjusted to the seriousness of the impairment in each 
particular case. The fundamental moral intuition on which my 
theory rests at this point is that it is clearly wrong, or 
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unjust (other things being equal), to prefer the less urgent 
to the more urgent claim. 
Metaphors have a power to enthrall our thinking, sometimes 
for the worse. The partly-metaphorical concept of moral weight 
is an instance of this truth. The term encourages us to think 
of all processes of moral deliberation as akin to weighing the 
different morally relevant factors on a balance. Each of 
these factors has a definite weight, either positive or 
negative: each tells or against an action with a force of 
that weight. Once each has been placed on the appropriate 
pan of the balance, the final 'balance of forces' can be read 
off. This should tell us, not only whether we ought to do 
that action or not, but also the moral weight which attaches 
to our doing or not doing it. 
Acceptance of this metaphor virtually commits us to an 
acceptance of the utilitarian theory of moral reasoning. 
Once we have settled on the basic theory of value - or of 
claims - the only remaining problem is one of 'moral 
arithmetic'. The single principle which is the natural 
outgrowth of the weighing model is the principle of 
maximization, enjoining the production of the maximum total 
positive value - or the maximum total satisfaction of claims2 • 
Yet this principle can lead to solutions which are quite 
unaccep~able: it is notoriously the case that the utilitarian 
goal of maximizing value can conflict with what are widely 
recognized to be principles of justice3 . 
The concept of urgency, however, does not lend itself to 
utilitarian maximization, precisely because it is a measure, 
not of quantitative differences between claims, but of 
qualitative ones. Where a quantitative scale is concerned, 
like intervals (measured on some appropriate non-moral scale) 
135 
at different points on the scale are of like moral 
significance, whereas this is not the case where qualitative 
scales are concerned. It is not the case that several claims 
of minor urgency could be equivalent (for purposes of moral 
reckoning) to a single claim of greater urgency, any more than 
it is the case that the value of a Schubert song cycle is 
equivalent to that of some greater number of trivial popular 
songs. Qualitative differences of this kind are not 
unfamiliar, and they provide a more accurate model for the 
procedures of moral reasoning than does the quantitative model 
of the utilitarians. 
III 
Any principle for mediating between conflicting claims 
which was genuinely sensitive to differences in the urgency 
of those claims would have to attach priority to claims of 
greater urgency_ After all, the more urgent claims are 
precisely the ones which callout more urgently for attention. 
The intuitive notion to follow, then, is simply that the most 
urgent claims ought to be attended to first, that claims 
ought always to be satisfied in decreasing order of urgency_ 
In this way, our conviction that the more urgent claims have 
an absolute priority over the less urgent is specifically and 
precisely captured. 
In order to arrive at a principle for the mediation of 
conflicting claims, consonant with this moral axiom, it is 
first of all necessary to modify in one significant respect 
the concept of a claim. So far, I have implicitly 
individuated claims of a particular kind by reference to the 
individuals whose claims they are. That is, if a person needs 
a certain quantity of food, then that constitutes one claim -
136 
of a definite urgency - to a share of that. good. This must 
now be adjusted, by recognizing that what has hitherto been 
called a single claim consists - or can be regarded as 
consisting - of a series of (component) claims. This 
conception is only a more precise rendition of the familiar 
fact that, as a claim approaches the level of full 
satisfaction, the urgency which attaches to the unsatisfied 
part of the claim diminishes. Instead of speaking in that way, 
it is convenient to divide claims into ordered series, each 
member of which has (or can be regarded as having) a definite 
urgency. The number of members that will in practice need to 
be rycognized in any claim-series does not rest with the 
supposition that the continuum of decreasing moral urgency is, 
in the end, only finitely divisible. Instead, the criterion 
is wholly pragmatic: the number of members that it is 
necessary to recognize will depend on the particular context 
of scarcity, and on the kinds of competing claims. The 
divisibility of claims is a theoretical device which enables 
us to see how the basic principle of mediation is applied: 
once we have grasped its mode of operation, the details of the 
device cease to be important. 
The fundamental axiom of the mediation of conflicting 
.E!imafacie claims is the following: 
Gopds ought always to be distributed to the most urgent 
claims. 
In applying the principle, the claims to which it refers are 
the individual components of claim-series, which I will call 
'unit claims'. 
Suppose then that several people have claims, of 
differing urgency, to some limited supply of goods. My 
principle requires that goods be distributed first to the 
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person whose claim-series includes the most urgent unit claim. 
No goods will be allocated to anyone else until the unit claims 
of this person which are of outstanding urgency have been met 
('met' in the sense that this person is now in possession of 
the goods, or of the opportunity to acquire them - not in the 
sense that he has, for example, actually consumed the goods). 
If there comes a point in the allocation of goods to this 
person at which he no longer has unit claims which are of 
greater urgency than any of the unit claims of anyone else, 
then he ceases to have moral priority over the others. This 
is the basic procedure for distribution when claims are of 
uneq\lal urgency. 
When claims are of equal urgency, the obviously just 
distribution of goods is typically the one which divides the 
available goods equally among everyone concerned: that is, 
what I call 'equal-maximal' shares are (very often) required 
in justice, at least where some goods are concerned. It is 
not my intention to dispute this secure moral truth, only to 
show,- in a nonegalitarian way, why it is just. The objection 
that we should-have to a principle which simply seeks 
equal-maximal shares is that it does not, finally, really 
explain why this is required. Yet the burdens of insight 
which intuition is asked to bear should be kept to a minimum. 
The situation in which all claims to a good are of like 
urgency is one of equilibrium. The application of my 
principles of justice requires the ability to judge when such 
a situation obtains, to judge, that is, that several claims 
are all of equal urgency. But this does not show that the 
relation of equality is ineliminable, in any interesting way, 
from the theory. To the extent that we are able to make 
fairly precise noncomparative assessments of the urgency of 
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individual claims, comparative judgements of relative urgency 
will be derivative. But if in practice the comparison of 
claims the most useful procedure to adopt, this is to 
concede only that judgements of proportionality must be made. 
We must be able to recognize, not only that claims are of 
equal urgency, but also that some are less and others more 
urgent. In fact, judgements of the latter sort will often be 
easier to make than those of the former. Especially where two 
claims are of quite different kinds, the conclusion that they 
are of equal urgency might be reached only by deducing it from 
the fact that neither claim is either more or less urgent than 
the 9ther. The primary judgement in these cases is not that 
the claims are positively of equal urgency, but that we are 
unable to detect, or are unwilling to commit ourselves to the 
identification of any difference in their urgency. 
In any case, the judgements of comparative urgency which 
the application of my theory requires do not carry any 
particular moral significance. We cannot conclude, from the 
fact that the proper application of a moral principle requires 
of a person that he possess certain capacities (including 
conceptual capacities), that the latter are themselves 
bearers of moral significance. The necessity of'making 
judgements of relative urgency, in applying the 
(nonegalitarian) principle of mediation, does not show that 
any morally significant relations of equality (or inequality) 
are ineliminable from the theory. 
Where a condition of equilibrium obtains, no claim has 
greater urgency than any of the others, and the principle for 
the mediation of claims accordingly does not provide a basis 
for selecting anyone individual as the first recipient of a 
share in the good. However, the first principle of 
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distributive justice is that goods are to be distributed to 
those who have claims on them, a principle which accordingly 
requires that some allocation of goods be made in the present 
case. It does not matter to whom we give the first share, 
provided that we regard his claim as a reason for allocating to 
him some of the good. We are prevented from allocating to 
him a disproportionate quantity of the good by the fact that 
only a small share needs to be allocated to him in order to 
upset the equilibrium, and to restore the applicability of 
the principle of mediation. The latter will require that the 
others now receive some of the good, since they now have the 
most .urgent claims. Since they in turn constitute a group 
which is in equilibrium, the same procedure, in which both 
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equilibrium over the entire group has been restored, and the 
good has been entirely shared out. 
There is no danger that these principles, applied 
strictly, will license the division of goods into infinitely 
small· portions, and the like division of claims (in the large 
sense) into an infinite number of unit cl.aims. This is 
because the condition of equilibrium holds in relation to the 
urgency of claims, not to the holdings of goods. Therefore, 
the equilibrium is only upset one person has a claim which 
is measureably more urgent than the others. There are very 
real .limits to the fineness with which we can discriminate 
such differences of moral urgency. 
The application of the mediating principle is not 
governed by the objective of producing an equality in the 
urgency of all unsatisfied claims, or an equality in the 
sharing of those burdens and disadvantages that are inevitable 
when goods are scarce. Instead, the aim is precisely to meet 
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~s far as possible the claims for goods that people have, 
consistent with the differences in urgency between them. The 
consequences of our application of these principles can often 
(and with dexterity, always) be described as an equality in 
some respects. But there is no theoretical significance in 
that. 
IV 
Granted that my principles provide possible solutions to 
problems of distribution, might it not be the case that some 
egalitarian principles provide simpler, more elegant, or even 
more just solutions? After all, my principles require that we 
be able to make quite sophisticated assessments of the 
different urgency of different claims. Is it possible to 
avoid this, especially as the measurements of urgency we make 
in practice do not seem to be particularly subtle? 
The two most obviously egalitarian principles for 
distribution under conditions of scarcity have fatal 
disadvantages. The first of these stipulates that the 
provisions or shares of goods are to be equal-maximal: that 
is, they are to be as large as possible, consistent with 
everyone's having an equal share. But' instead of providing 
a solution to distributive problems in situations where the 
claims of different people cannot all be met, this principle 
simply ignores claims. It refuses to face the problem of 
justice. 
If two persons both have valid claims to a good which 
is insufficient to satisfy them, and no one else has a claim 
to any of it, it will be grossly unjust to distribute that 
good in equal-maximal shares toal~per·sons. Apart from 
these two persons, no one has any claim at all to the good, 
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in which case it is unjust to distribute among everyone goods 
to which these people alone have claims. Unless we admit 
that claims have some relevance to the question of who is to 
receive a share of the good, there can be no justification 
for distributing any good in any way other than in 
equal-maximal shares (if that is still our objective) to all 
persons. Indeed, it is not obvious that we are justified in 
discriminating against all non-persons in our distribution. 
There must be some way of identifying the individuals to whom 
shares of the good are to be given 1 and it must be a mode of 
identification which indicates why there is a reason (in 
justice) for providing a share to each of those individuals, 
and only to those individuals. Those theories of justice 
which try to do without the concept of a claim will usually 
identify the appropriate individuals as all and only those 
who have interests in the goods. What these interests are 
will normally be spelled out in some way which makes it clear 
why the having of them gives rise to reasons for making 
particular allocations of goods. Yet such a specification 
seems to amount to the recognition that these interests 
constitute claims, in my sense of the term; that is, that 
they are properties of persons in virtue of which it is 
morally appropriate that they should have (some of) those 
. goods. But once this much as been admitted, there is no good 
reason for denying that people have different claims to 
different goods - and that some have no claims at all to some 
goods. Once the relevance of personal attributes (of the 
right sort) to claims has been recognized, the way is open to 
match differences in the urgency of claims to appropriate 
, ? 
differences in those attributes. 
No principle which disregards claims can be satisfactory 
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in justice: yet this is precisely what the principle of 
equal-maximal share does. Nor will it do to qualify the 
principle to one allocating equal-maximal shares to all who 
have some claim to that good: if claims differ in urgency, 
this cannot be right. The only form of the principle which 
will always produce a just distribution is the one which 
assigns equal-maximal shares to each of a group of persons 
under the following conditions: (i) each of those persons 
has a claim to some of the good, (ii) their claims are of 
equal urgency, (iii) no one not of that group has a claim to 
any of the good of an urgency greater than the urgency of any 
residual claims which members of the group might still have, 
on the completion of the distribution, and (iv) the actual 
share that each receives is equal to or less than the amount 
of that good to which he has a claim. Even so, there is no 
reason to regard the principle as an ultimate part of the 
theory of justice: why this principle produces just 
distributions in cases subject to the above four conditions -
but only in those cases - and what its relation is to the 
principles which govern other cases, would require 
considerable explanation. The only plausible explanation is 
the one which - finally - substitutes my own principles of 
distribution. 
The major alternative egalitarian principle of 
distribution seeks equal-maximal hold~ngs of goods, and 
adjusts shares accordingly. But the same objection applies, 
namely, that this principle cannot discriminate in a 
defensible way between those individuals who ought and those 
who ought not to receive shares of the goods to be 
distributed. Even if this information is surreptitiously 
introduced in the statement of the problem - for example, by 
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specifying that a cake is to be divided among a particular 
4 group of people - it by no means follows automatically that 
equal-maximal holdings will always be just. They will be just, 
. generally speaking, only when like quantities of those goods 
have a like contribution to make to the good life of each 
person involved in the distribution. The principle of seeking 
equal-maximal holdings is at its most plausible in the case of 
the more basic and urgent claims which people have, such as 
those based on their survival needs. Because people's basic 
needs are much the same, and because the goods which will 
satisfy them are not often present in amounts so large that 
we need worry about setting an upper limit to mean holdings, 
the goal of equal-maximal holdings of those goods will often 
coincide with that required by justice. But the explanation 
why this should be so, and the explanation why it fails to 
apply in cases where people's needs - and claims - are 
unequal, is only possible by reference to the very data which 
lead naturally to the recognition of ~y own principles of 
distribution. 
Both of these egalitarian principles have a sphere of 
application in which they produce just distributions. By 
subsuming them, together with their restrictions', under a 
single, general principle of distribution, my account of 
justice: is clearly theoretically superior to them. 
v 
The phenomenon of relative depr'ivation might appear to 
show that relations of equality and inequality sometimes have 
an independent significance in justice. The concept of 
relative deprivation is used5 in explanation of the sense of 
injustice that a group of people can feel at being worse off, 
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in some respect, than some other, more favoured group of 
people. It is a sentiment which presupposes, not an awareness 
of absolute deprivation, but one of relative deprivation. If 
there is no more-advantaged group available for ready 
comparison, the sense of deprivation and injustice might not 
arise. 
Suppose that, in the world's wealthiest society, one 
racial group enjoys political and social privileges and 
economic advantages which another does not have. The 
disadvantaged group might see their situation as unjust, 
relative to that of the dominant race, even if they recognize 
that. their own situation is at least as good, in absolute 
terms, as that of any human beings anywhere else at all. 
Their sense of injustice takes, not the normal condition of 
the world's people as its comparison group, but the condition 
of those unusually privileged ones whose country they 'share'. 
(Whether they are justified in restricting the class of the 
disadvantaged to those within their o~n national borders -
and presumably restricting any redistributions they can 
secure to that group - is another question 6 They would have 
to show, presumably, that national or political differences 
either were themselves, or were correlated with,' morally 
relevant differences). 
Tl1e sense of relative deprivation, however, can only be 
regarded as a sense of injustice if an 'appropriate reference 
7 group is chosen. Those who are advantaged, and those who 
are disadvantaged relative to them, must share some 
attributei and it must be, not just any attribute, but a 
morally relevant one. In short, it must be an attribute 
which is relevant to the claims that people have in justice. 
The disadvantaged group sees itself as sharing, with the 
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advantaged group, those very attributes which justify the 
latter in enjoying (some of) those goods. It sees itself, 
that is, as deprived of goods to which it has a legitimate 
claim. The fact that some people whose claims are no better 
are enjoying those goods anyway, is taken as evidence that 
the disadvantaged group have satisfiable claims (to a share 
of those goods) that are not being satisfied. If that is 
indeed the case, then the injustice is one of 'absolute 
deprivation' after all: the comparison with the advantaged 
group serves mainly to make the deprived group aware of this 
fact. 
But it might be the case that the claims of the 
disadvantaged have already been fully met, whereas the 
advantaged are receiving in excess of their claims. This 
postulate rules out many privileges, especially all those 
which adversely affect legitimate access to goods and 
opportunities by those who are less privileged. However, if 
this situation does hold, it must follow (given my theory), 
that the distribution cannot be an unjust one, though it is 
very likely to be animrnoral one. In a society in which 
goods are sufficiently abundant to satisfy all claims in 
justice, but not to satisfy all desires, some moral principles 
will be needed to govern the distribution of the surplus 
. goods. , Such principles might come to be grouped with the 
principles of justice, for obvious reasons. The most familiar 
candidate for such a principle is the one that would 
distribute the surplus in equal-maximal shares. But as we 
have seen, this is a description of a distribution-pattern, 
not a justification for it. In order to provide the latter, 
we must suppose (what is surely not always the case) that 
each person has an interest in receiving as many of these 
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goods as possible: otherwise there would be no particular 
reason for including him in the distribution. But once this 
has been allowed, a principle of distribution of the same 
kind as the principle of urgency will lead to the 
equal-maximal solution. If we are seriously concerned to 
justify equal (maximal) distributions, it is to 
nonegalitarian principles that we must turn. 
VI 
For various reasons, among which looms large the wish to 
circumscribe the power of paternalistic institutions, the 
public administration of justice should often seek to 
distribute, not the social goods themselves, but instead, 
adequate and fair opportunities to secure them. If this is 
so, the sort of ideal which egalitarians have tried to capture 
in their principle of equality of opportunity is an important 
one in the theory of justice. I will be directly concerned 
here neither with egalitarian defences of this principle, nor 
with the attacks that have been mounted on it by other 
egalitarians, who see it as working to divert criticism away 
from existing structures of inequality by allowing those with 
talent to achieve positions of unequal privilege within those 
8 
structures. Instead, I will develop my own account of the 
distribution of opportunities which justice requires, an 
account which will be nonegalitarian. 
It is common for human beings to be motivated, to some 
extent, by the desire to be independent, to secure some of 
the things that they value through their own efforts. The 
good of self-esteem, which is a necessary part of the good 
life9 , can usually be secured by a person only if he is able 
to see some important parts of his life-activities, 
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especially his successes, as due to his own efforts. A 
person's self-esteem will be most secure when he can see the 
circumstances of his life as being, in a significant way, 
partly his own creation, and can take pride in them. Even if 
a single pattern of the good life could do for all people, 
the des of many to secure for themselves, by their own 
efforts, some of the conditions of that life, would require 
that opportunities rather than goods should sometimes be 
distributed. This kind of distribution is even more important 
in the light of differences between the circumstances of the 
good life for different people. It is necessary, in some 
cases, to provide opportunities to secure whatever different 
sorts of goods might be seen to be appropriate to the 
particular conception of the good Ii that each has. That 
is why the distribution of liberties, and of (some of) the 
conditions which give people the power to secure their ends, 
is so important. The prevailing conception of the basic 
conditions of the good life which the institutions of 
distribution will be adjusted to, in a reasonably just 
society, will include a conception of the sorts of liberties 
and powers that a person should have. Like the other features 
of the ideal, this conception will reflect the material and 
social circumstances of the age, and the prevailing values 
and aspirations of its people. It will be adjusted, in a 
general sort of way, to the abundance or the scarcity of 
different kinds of goods, and will express a conception of 
what opportunities, liberties and powers are adequate for a 
person, if he 
ends. 
to have a reasonable chance of securing his 
The principle of anadeguate opportunity for each 
captures what is important but ill-expressed in the principle 
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of equal opportunity. Unlike the latter, it recognizes a 
definite level of opportunity that each should have: there 
can be no reason to suppose that fairness is satisfied if 
the opportunities of all are equal but minimal. Provided 
only that there is some measure of the adequacy of 
opportunities, the distribution of those opportunities could 
turn out to be equal-maximal, even if each share fell short 
of the ideal level, simply in virtue of the requirements of 
my principle of distribution under conditions of scarcity. 
This is not, however, the end of the matter. The ideal 
of equality of opportunity is often thought to be necessary 
to secure a proper distribution of scarce but indivisible 
goods. Positions of political and administrative power l for 
example, cannot always be divided up into a multitude of 
shares for wide distribution. If not all can enjoy scarce 
goods that all, or nearly all, are assumed to desire, then 
conditions of fair equality of opportunitylO must prevail in 
the competition for such goods. 
It is generally the case that particular kinds of 
personal attributes are thought to be appropriate grounds 
for having certain kinds of goods. The principles of merit 
and desert are of the first importance in this area. A just 
society seeks to match scarce goods (of certain kinds) to 
those who have the capacity to make the best use of them. 
Positions in universities, for instance, should go to those 
who have the appropriate academic skills; and conversely, we 
should see to it that scarce goods do not go to people who 
lack the appropriate attributes, but who have others - such 
as wealth or social status - which are not an appropriate 
basis for the distribution of those goods. The governing 
conception here is of a distribution of goods according to 
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merits, t6gether with the refusal to admit such attributes as 
wealth or social class as justifying the appropriation of 
these goods. The ideal is precisely that of giving to each 
his due. 
A system in which some goods are distributed according 
to merit, when it is also a system which recognizes the 
importance of avoiding excessively paternalistic institutions, 
must incorporate conditions of fair competition. A fair 
competition is one in which those who merit scarce goods will 
be the most likely to achieve them - provided that they are 
willing to exercise, to whatever degree of competitiveness 
is t~ought to be appropriate, their capacities for intelligent 
and resolute action, their will, courage and resourcefulness. 
To seek to state these requirements as the requirements for 
fair equality of opportunity is not very helpful. What is 
crucial is that conditions should be such that the influence 
upon the outcome of the relevant attributes should be 
maximized, and the influence of irrelevant attributes should 
be minimized. These are not egalitarian requirements. 
An exception to this conclusion might be seen in the 
application, to the distribution of o.pportunities to acquire 
scarce goods, of what Joseph Raz has called the principle of 
d ' ., t' 11· non- 1scr1m1na lon • The principle requires that, if some 
have opportunities to acquire scarce goods that others do not 
have, then we should seek to extend those opportunities to 
all (provided, always, that we have a further principle which 
enjoins maximization of opportunities). If the principle of 
non-discrimination overrides the principle of maximization, 
and if it is not possible to extend those opportunities to 
all, then those who have them should be deprived of them. 
Although this principle appears initially to be a 
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genuinely egalitarian one, it is so only under certain absurd 
conditions. If the standard assumptions about matching goods 
to dues are made, however, then it is not an ineliminably 
egalitarian principle after all. The practice of depriving 
some specially advantaged people of powers or opportunities 
can be justified - when it can be justified - by the aim of 
matching goods to merit. The powers of which some are 
deprived are those which give them an unfair competitive 
advantage: that is, they are powers which increase a person's 
chances of obtaining, but which are not themselves morally 
appropriate bases for enjoying, those goods. To equalize 
the chances of two persons obtaining a good which one merits 
more than the other is unjust. Yet the principle of 
non-discrimination will warrant this injustice, unless it is 
qualified in ways which render it equivalent, given the 
appropriate reductive analysis, to my own principles of 
distribution. 
A practical difficulty which has theoretical importance 
arises here: how do we assess when opportunities are equal? 
It is far from obvious that an appraisal of the sting 
social mechanisms and the opportunities themselves will allow 
of such a conclusion. There is one way - a reliable way - to 
judge, and that is to see whether or not the end state that 
these mechanisms are designed to secure is in fact achieved. 
Are scarce goods actually distributed appropriately, that is, 
in accordance with merit? That is, after all, precisely the 
state of affairs which these practices are designed to 
secure: what better criterion of their success could there 
be? Further, this nonegalitarian criterion is at least as 
easy to apply as that provided by any principle which requires 
that we be able to judge when opportunities are equal. 
If we accept the importance of sometime~ providing 
people, not directly with goods, but with opportunities to 
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acquire them, then we accept that it is proper in those cases 
that people should have to ze their opportunities and to 
exercise their abilities if they are to have those goods. If 
their achievement is to be a real one, then they must have 
overcome some obstacles - of some presumably natural rather 
12 than conventional kind - in securing these goods • We also 
accept the importance of matching, as far as possible, these 
goods to merit. These two ideals fit somewhat uneasily 
together, an awkward marriage made more convivial by our 
tradition of regarding success in the competition as part of 
the criterion of merit. But if success has this importance, 
it seems to become additionally important to ensure that the 
obstacles which each person faces should be roughly the same. 
Within certain limits - the obstacles should, after all, be 
neither inappropriately enormous nor inappropriately trivial -
it matters less that they be of a definite extent than that 
they be the same for all. The principle of non-discrimination 
captures this requirement, in its indifference, by itself, to 
the manner in which the equalization of opportunities is 
secured, whether by giving to those who have not, or taking 
from those who have. Do we have, then, an irreducible - and 
fair - principle of equarity here? 
The independent criterion of goods matched to merit is 
no longer available. The existence of a fair competition is 
still definable by its distributing goods according to merit; 
but to the extent that we regard merit as determined by 
success in the competition, this partly circular criterion 
cannot be a sufficient test for fairness. The design of the 
competition is at issue here: it must be a competition which 
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meets certain standards of fairness which are not defined 
wholly by reference to the end-state. These standards will 
be what Nozick has called 'side-constraints,l3. Is a 
principle of equality - in the form of the principle of 
non-discrimination (suitably elaborated) - a necessary 
side-constraint? 
There are, I would argue, serious difficulties in the 
application of the principle. People have many different 
attributes, attributes which do not contribute to their merit 
yet-Which can be of more or less assistance to them in the 
competition. If the wealthy are sometimes successful in 
virt.ue of their wealth, this is not usually evidence that 
wealth is a part of the merit which the competition seeks to 
reward. This is why criteria of merit which are independent 
of competitive success are at the very least always necessary. 
When all this has been said, can judgements of equality of 
opportunity still be made, in a useful way, given differences 
in people's capacities to take advantage of different kinds 
of opportunities? We seem to be forced back inexorably to 
the independent standards of adequacy of opportunity, defined 
in terms of the success of the competition in rewarding those 
whose merit, defined other than by competitive success, is 
greatest. After all l the object of the competition is not 
that everyone should be a winner. If our aim is that the 
best - the most meritorious - should win, but we are not 
certain who the best are, then equally we are not in a 
position to know whether equalizing a particular obstacle will 
help to secure that end. It might be that it is an obstacle 
which is less obstructing to one person, because of some of 
his non-meritorious capabilities, than it is to an equally 
meritorious person, because of his lacking those particular 
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non-meritorious capacities. To seek equality of opportunity 
in this case will be to subvert the aims of the exercise. 
If is often difficult to be confident that competitions 
are such as to reward the most meritorious. I have not 
argued that my principles provide clear and unambiguous 
directions here, only that the egalitarian principle is even 
less helpful. My conclusion is that it is improper to regard 
competitive success as a criterion of merit, that it should 
instead be regarded as evidence of merit, provided that the 
competition was a fair one. The standards of fairness for 
competitions, in turn, rest on their being won, in general, by 
those whose merits, as judged by independent (noncomparative) 
criteria, are greatest. 
Justice is a demanding virtue, and her administration is 
not easy. I do not claim it as a distinctive merit of my 
theory that its practical institution is straightforward. 
But it is at least as easy to apply as any egalitarian 
theories, while its theoretical superiority to those theories 
is no longer, I take it, at issue. 
CHAPTER TEN 
, 
REMARKS TOWARDS A THEORY 
OF CLAIMS I:· RIGHTS 
I 
The concept of the basic conditions of a good Ii is 
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not one that can be defined by reference solely to a person's 
biological attributes together with the appropriate features 
of his physical environment. That is because people are also 
social beings: not just creatures who must live with others 
for at least part of their lives in order to live at all, nor 
even ones who must live with others in order to live a good 
life, but ones ~·!ho acquire many of their dist::Lnctt vl?'ly 
personal characteristics because they are nurtured in an 
association of human beings. The natural attributes of 
people, the physical characteristics that are common to all, 
do not provide an adequate grounding for a full conception of 
the basic conditions of the good life under varying social 
circumstances: but in a world in which such basic goods as 
food, water and fuel are growing increasingly scarce, the 
achievement of a condition which is little more than one of 
sheer physical survival is all that many ever really 
anticipate. The conce:rn of justice in such a world will often 
be with the most basic aspects of survival, with the promotion 
of conditions which are common to every conception of the 
good life. There are some claims in justice, often the most 
urgent, which every person will have, in virtue simply of 
being, biologically, a member of our species. 
If the most basic claims that people have are more or 
less invariable, this is not necessarily true of the remainder. 
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The natural base surely imposes limits on what sort of person 
a human being can become, but within those limits, considerable 
variation is possible, and has occurred. Whether or not the 
possession of some particular thing or the enjoyment of some 
particular condition is good for a person might well depend 
on his possessing attributes which he would not possess, were 
he a person in a quite different social world. While it is 
important not to exaggerate the extent to which a person's 
characteristics can be attributed to his social environment, 
or to overlook the influence of genetic factors and of the 
natural environment on the possible permutations of the 
social realm, it is equally important not to fall prey to 
that delusion of the study - that everyone, in the end, is 
really just like me. 
II 
The claims that people like us have in justice can be 
categorized in various ways. Miller has usefully argued 
that the different categories that have been recognized in 
Western moral theory can be reduced to three basic types, 
namely rights, deserts and needs l • I adopt this thesis here. 
One way to identify the subject matter of a theory of 
social justice would be to define it as the theory of the 
distri~ution of goods to persons in accordance with their 
. rights, their deserts, or their needs. But this is a 
procedure which, unless pursued very much further than it 
usually is, leaves unanswered the crucial question of why the 
distribution of social goods should be based on those 
criteria, and not on some others. For some philosophers, an 
inquiry of the latter kind would be an ill-considered one. 
Rights (they might say) are sorts of things that just are 
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claims on others, and which are correlated with duties. To 
be a morally mature person it is necessary to have the 
capacity to recognize that this is so, together with the 
willingness to conform one's behaviour accordingly. 
Similarly, the satisfaction of claims based upon desert might 
be seen as possessing an ultimate, intrins moral propriety: 
to ask why a person's deserving some good (or some 
punishment) is a reason for his having it, is to ask an 
/ 
improper question. 
The concepts of rights and deserts are developed moral 
concepts; that is, they are ways of organizing certain 
phenomena in accordance with their moral significance. They 
are not basic moral notions, if this means that it is not 
possible to analyse their structure and to explain their 
moral point in other (more fundamental) terms. The concept 
of needs, while it has obvious moral significance, is not 
similarly a developed moral concept. That is why it is 
plausible to argue that the intrinsic moral importance of the 
satisfaction of certain human needs is something that one is 
ultimately required to see for oneself, since it can be 
further explained only by spelling out what it is for a 
person to have a need, and the cost to' him of nO.t having that 
need satisfied. There will come a point in any moral theory 
where the analysis can go no further: certain things must 
simply be appreciated to have moral significance. The value 
of a good Ii for a person is one such resting place. 
Familiar considerations ., of theoretical elegance and 
simplicity - encourage the recognition of as few such axioms 
as possible. In the theory of social justice, it is possible 
to wield this methodological precept to considerable effect. 
I will argue here that it is not necessary to recognize 
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(legitimate) demands based upon rights as axiomatic. It is 
sometimes possible to defend such demands by the derivation 
of them from more basic moral facts, to show that, insofar as 
they ought to be respected, it is because they serve the end 
of the good life for a person. But this is not to accept 
theories of axiomatic rights at their face value. On the 
contrary, I will argue in the present chapter that rights are 
only relevant to social justice to the extent that they can 
be related to the end which it is the special virtue of 
justice to serve. Similarly, I will argue in the following 
and concluding chapter that, to the extent that merit and 
desert are relevant to claims in justice, this also is 
explicable by reference to the underlying conception of the 
promotion of the (basic conditions of the) good life. It is 
not necessary to regard principles which distribute goods 
according to rights, or deserts or merit, as axiomatic. For 
that reason, it cannot be the case that justice adequately 
definable as the distribution of goods in accordance with 
2 
rights , nor that it is the distribution of goods in 
accordance with deserts 3 • 
In my approach to these problems, I have started, not 
with an axiomatic theory of claims, but at the other end. I 
have supposed that the good life for a person is something 
which has considerable value, and that one of the guiding 
moral principles of a good society must be that it seeks to 
promote, in whatever ways are appropriate, the good Ii of 
its members. I have further supposed that the promotion of 
this end by the constraining of social institutions, and 
hence of people, in accordance with the principles of 
justice, is prima facie justified. Importantly, I have 
accepted the legitimacy of regarding all social goods as 
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potentially available for public distribution. There is no 
a priori proof of this last thesis. Its acceptance requires 
a recognition that social goods are basically collective 
assets, that they represent, never simply the expended labour 
of individual persons upon natural resources, but are 
fundamentally the fruits of the skills, the efforts and the 
accumulated knowledge of many people, in building and shaping 
the SOCial world wit.hin which alone these individuals, even 
when acting alone, were able to achieve their productive 
4 
successes. My socialist theory of justice regards the 
distribution of goods by public institutions in accordance 
with a public theory as proper, because it regards these 
goods as ones upon which the community as a whole has the 
first claim. 
The claims that persons have in justice are not 
identified, at the primary level, by moral notions like 
rights and deserts. The guiding conception is of those 
things which contribute, at the most basic level, to the 
good ,life for each individual person. Rights and deserts 
come in, if they do at all, only at a higher level, when a 
certain kind of ordering of claims, in accordance with 
features of general significance, is felt to be useful. In 
a sense, all claims are needs, things that are necessary for 
the good Ii That is one reason why the concept of needs, 
proper, cannot be fitted to the sort of account I am proposing 
for rights and deserts. For the latter, I am not suggesting 
that they can or should be abandoned. I am suggesting that 
we will understand why the demands that people make on the 
basis of their rights and deserts have their peculiar moral 
significance, only once we have located rights and deserts 
in the particular context that gives to each of them their 
point. 
The full and detailed analysis of the concepts of the 
basic conditions of a good life, and of rights, deserts and 
needs, will not be undertaken here. In these two chapters, 
I will aim only to defend, in an initial and admittedly 
speculative way, the theory of claims that I have sketched. 
III 
Only some rights are of relevance to social justice. 
The natural rights that people have must often constrain 
proper distributions in certain waya; and the property 
rights that they claim to have (whether or not these are 
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also natural rights) do often in fact constrain distributions 
and redistributions that are sought on other grounds. 
If a person has a natural right to some kind of thing, 
then there is a moral reason, of a certain prima facie kind, 
for his having that sort of thing. The reason he should 
have it does not derive from his legal status, or from his 
role in some social institution or practice: these are 
grounds, rather, for positive rights, rights of a kind which, 
apart from property rights, are not particularly relevant to 
social justice. Instead, in virtue of a person's own 
characteristics and condition - when he is considered as a 
creatu~e abstracted, as far as that is possible, from at 
least the more contingent social roles that he occupies -
there is some distinctive value in his having some things oE 
that kind. The adjective 'natural' presupposes nothing more 
(nor less) mysterious than this distinction between a 
person's natural attributes and his contingent social roles. 
Similarly, whatever moral reasons for action derive from a 
person's possession of such rights will be reasons which rest 
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on the moral significance of a person's (more basic) natural 
attributes, rather than on his (more contingent) social 
attributes. 
Not every existing individual is a possessor of natural 
rights. Each person is, but no pebble is: whether or not 
other animals are is a disputed question. The problem is 
not one of locating instantiations of a property of a 
peculiar kind, namely natural rights, properties which some 
things have and others do not, more or less independently of 
their other properties. Instead, moral rights are 
supervenient 'properties': if an individual has rights, then 
it does so because it has certain other properties. If it 
did not have those properties (or if it did not have some 
sufficient set of relevant properties) it could not have those 
rights. Furthermore, rights are morally relevant: if one 
individual has a right which some other individual does not 
have, then there are some ways in which (other things being 
equal) it would be morally improper to treat the former 
while it would not be morally improper so to treat the 
latter. Rights make a moral difference. It follows that the 
properties in virtue of which individuals have natural rights 
are properties which themselves have moral significance. 
Theoretically at least, the dispute over whether or not 
animals have moral - natural - rights could be resolved into 
the question whether they have the morally relevant properties 
which make it morally improper to treat them in the ways 
that would be forbidden, if they had those rights. If it is 
wrong to kill a creature, for example, then although it is 
not devoid of significance to defend this proscription by 
appealing to that creature's right to life, this can never be 
the basic or ultimate ground for its being wrong. The 
possession of moral rights, unlike,for instance, the 
capacity for suffering, does not have irreducible moral 
significance. 
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Claims in social justice which rest upon natural rights 
do not represent a separate category: if a person claims a 
share of some good on the basis of a right of this kind, 
then his claim, if it is to be defensible, must be derived 
from the fact that a share of this good will promote, or is 
needed fori his good life. If the social good in question 
does indeed do this, then that is the source of his claim; 
if it does not, then he has no claim, and very often no 
right. 
·What, then, is the point of the concept of a (natural) 
right? Why could it not be replaced simply by the recognition 
that a person's possession of certain attributes constitute 
reasons for treating him in some definite ways? Part of the 
reason lies with the sophistication of the concept of a 
right and the way it is embedded in a network of concepts of 
claims and entitlement, obligations and duties, and so on. 
However, of more importance in the present context {and in 
contexts of substantive moral concern generally}, is the fact 
that the natural properties on which such rights are based 
are ones which have a wide 1 ge.neral significanceS. When 
an individual has these properties, it is the case, not just 
that one or two particular sorts of actions in one or two 
particular sorts of situations would be prima facie wrong, 
but that whole classes and kinds of action affecting him are 
wrong. These properties are such as to support prohibitions 
which are, not just particular and very definite, but .quite 
general. It is as though, in virtue of his particular 
properties, each individual were surrounded by a 'moral 
1~2 
space' having fairly definite contours. Certain guaranteed 
avenues ought accordingly to be open to those individuals, 
allowing them to move or to grow at will in those directions; 
and fences against various external forces ought to be 
erected in various places around them, to preserve them 
against the violation of which.ever of their interests are at 
stake. 
To ascribe a natural right to an individual is to 
ascribe to him a permanent interest in having some things, 
and in being protected from others. It is to recognize that 
it is generally in his interests that certain liberties or 
opportunities, certain powers or goods/ should be permanently 
available to him, and that normative guarantees should be 
permanently available against his being deprived of those 
liberties, opportunities, powers or. goods. Generality and 
permanence (or permanent relevance) are a part of the 
character of natural rights. They are compendious ways of 
organizing the permanent moral significance of some of the 
natural characteristics of individuals. If there were 
reason to do so, the content of a natural right could, in 
principle, be spelled out in fine detail, in a way which made 
no reference at all to the concept of a right itself. This 
would involve listing the different kinds of things that 
other persons had an obligation to do or not to do to a 
person, in the innumerable different situations in which he 
might possibly find himself, together with the legitimate 
demands that he might make in those circumstances, in virtue 
of his possessing certain morally significant natural 
attributes. Expressed formally, the suggestion is that a 
proposition ascribing a natural right to an individual is 
equivalent to a proposition (of great complexity) which 
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details the moral significance, in every possible case, of 
certain of the natural properties of that individual. Such a 
proposition might be of the following form: if an individual 
has natural properties p,q,r, then , if circumstances c f arise, 
the morally appropriate action (other things being equal) 
will be e', if cIt then e", and so on. 
It follows that there is a basic continuity in the kinds 
of justification that can be given for acting, or refraining 
from acting, in certain ways. Rights are not a separate or 
special kind of morally relevant consideration, a kind which 
is discontinuous from the other more familiar kinds; instead, 
if an individual has a natural right to a thing, then the 
permanent availability (or provision, or whatever) of that 
thing is something which has a significant moral weight, but 
not a moral weight of a significantly different or special 
kind. 
An important consequence of this account is that natural 
rights are seen not to be unique moral properties whose 
importance is of an unusual and recondite kind. Instead, 
the nature and the moral weight of all such rights will be 
determinable by reference to the interests and the values 
that they preserve. If any right is absolute, and always 
inviolable, then these interests must be of a spectacularly 
important kind. The present accbunt, in fact, offers a real 
chance for progress in arguments about such rights. We are 
no longer confronted with the unyielding problem, whether a 
person's right to the fruits of his own labour (for instance) 
is absolute or not: instead, we are encouraged to unearth 
the values and interests that such rights serve, and to assess 
the moral significance that they have. 
A further important consequence lies in our increased 
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ability to determine the scope of a right. Given that a 
person has a right, such as a right to private property, it 
is not immediately evident precisely what sorts of actions 
are incompatible with that right. But on my account, we are 
required to look to the attributes and capacities on which 
the right is.based, and to seek out the particular moral 
reasons which they support. 
Finally, once our attention has been drawn to the morally 
significant natural attributes of human beings, we are in a 
much better position to determine just what their general 
importance and relevance is, and so in that way to arrive at 
a defensible and defended theory of natural rights. 
The sorts of things which people have claimed as of 
natural right have very often been precisely those things 
which are the basic conditions of a good life. Demands based 
on those ghts, and the claims based on needs that people 
have in justice, will often for that reason coincide. 
However, natural rights, on my account of them, should be 
dispensed with in the theory of social justice, to the extent 
that theoretical simplicity is one of our objectives. Once 
needs have been accorded their full moral significance, the 
theory of claims need make no ineliminable use of a doctrine 
of natural rights. 
IV 
The distribution of goods according to the moral claims 
that people have to them, claims based on needs and deserts, 
will often conflict with the existence of property rights 
over those goods. Most goods, in populous communities which 
have an institution of private property like our own, will be 
owned by someone, not necessarily someone who needs or 
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deserves them. The distribution of goods according to needs 
and deserts, under t~e conditions, will usually involve some 
redistribution, and some violation of property rights. Can 
this be justified? 
The institution of private property does have some value. 
People enjoy.their possessions, and often express their 
personalities, their characters and values, through the things 
they own. A person can make a home for himself in the world 
by impressing his personality upon his immediate environment, 
even if this amounts only to placing a few treasured 
possessions on the dressing table of his hotel room. To 
deprive people - at least, to deprive people like us - of all 
our possessions, is to leave us naked and vulnerable. It is 
to degrade us physically and spiritually. 
Perhaps the most widely acknowledged source of property 
rights is in personal labour: a person, it is said, has a 
right to the fruits of his own labour. There is no need to 
regard this as an axiomatic right, however t provided that we 
are prepared to recognize the creative and self-creative 
aspects of a person's labour upon the world around him. In 
such labour, a person moulds a part of the natural world 
according to his own will, and in doing so, contributes to 
the moulding of himself into a certain kind of person. There 
is, as well, an aspect of freedom involved here. Free 
action is exercised in the world, to bring into being certain· 
ends. To deprive a person, against his will, of the products 
of his labour, is akin to depriving him of the ends of his 
free action: it is to thwart him in the exercise of his 
freedom, leaving him with the memory of the activity, but 
without the accomplished fruit of it. 
The account of rights that I have given should 
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discourage the view that to bwn something is to stand in a 
particular, single and substantial relation to it. Instead, 
there are a variety of different relationships in which a 
person might stand to some thing, and in virtue of which he 
will have certain specific entitlements to use that thing in 
certain ways, entitlements which other persons, or most other 
persons, do not have. If he has some sufficient number of 
entitlements to the virtually exclusive use of a thing, he 
has private property in it. Conversely, a person might be 
entitled, for various reasons, to use an object in some 
specific ways in some specific contexts, but these entitlements 
might not be sufficiently extensive and cohesive to amount to 
the kind of substantial entitlement that is a private 
property right. In assessing the extent of an individual's 
moral entitlement to the use of some thing, a variety of 
considerations will be relevant. The interests of the person 
concerned, which are served by his using that thing, are a 
part, but only a part, of the moral b~sis of a property 
right. After all, the thing over which tht entitlement is 
claimed might itself have morally significant properties 
limiting the ways in which it can legitimately be used; 
alternatively, other persons might have interests in it, 
interests which must be considered; or there might be 
variou~ ways in which legitimate claims and interests would 
be damaged if the unconstrained use of some thing were 
granted to a person. Thus, respectively, people (and 
probably some higher animals, such as whales) cannot 
legitimately be owned; further, there are severe moral 
restrictions on the exclusive use of such scarce natural 
resources as arable land and fossil fuels; and thirdly, the 
dangers of plutonium wastes from nuclear plants are such 
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that the primary moral relationship that a person might have 
to such wastes should perhaps be seen, not as having 
property in them, but as being morally responsible for them. 
The account of rights that I have offered forces us to 
uncover the complexity of the various morally significant 
relationships of these kinds, a variety which is hidden 
behind our normal, naive talk of property rights. 
A crucial distinction should be recognized between what 
I will call narrow and extended private property rights. 
There is kinship here with Tawney's distinction between 
"property which is actively used by its owner for the conduct 
of his profession or the upkeep of his household", and 
. "Passive Property, or Property for Acquisition, for 
Exploitation, or for power,,6. 
The preceding arguments give us some reason to ascribe 
to individual persons narrow property rights. That is, 
people have certain kinds of standing interests in their 
personal possessions, and in the otheF goods which contribute 
to their daily existence, and they have a special interest in 
the fruits of their own creative labour. To deprive people 
of their personal property is sometimes to violate these 
interests. Clearly, on this analysis, the wrongness of 
depriving a person of some of his property will vary from 
case to case, depending on the strength and importance of 
the interests involved. Extended property rights, by 
contrast, are those rights which people have (or claim to 
have) to goods which they have not, in any material sense, 
produced themselves, goods which they cannot legitimately 
count among their personal possessions, as expressions of 
their personality, or as objects of intrinsic value to them, 
or goods which are not among those which regularly contribute 
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to the more personal and private elements of a person's good 
life. 
The distinction between narrow and extended property 
rights is not a neat one, but its moral point is clear. The 
sorts of reasons there are for respecting narrow property 
rights are far weaker where extended property rights are 
concerned. An absentee landowner or a shareholder in a 
modern corporation does not own the things over which he has 
(partial) property rights in virtue of his having laboured 
upon them. Nor, for the most part, are they things which 
have intrinsic or immediate (as distinct from financial) 
value for him. There can be strong property rights in these 
cases of extended ownership only to the extent that they can 
be assimilated to the circumstances of the more favourable 
narrow cases. The ultimate justification for respecting a 
person's property, accordingly, can never be simply, that he 
has a right to the exclusive use and disposal of his own 
things. On the contrary, it is the value, all things 
considered, that they have for him, and the value, all things 
considered, that they would have for others, that are the 
finally conclusive considerations. 
To restrict property rights is not to allow that people 
may legitimately be deprived, willy nilly, of their most 
treasured possessions. But in a world of scarcity, a world 
in which some have accumulated goods far in excess of what 
they can use or can enjoy, while others have desperately 
little, then the more,extensive a person's holdings of goods, 
the less moral reason there is for leaving him in undisturbed 
possession of them. It is not as though we have to concede 
that, whatever the undoubted misery that starving or 
oppressed people suffer, that alone can never justify the 
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violation of a person's rights, as though the latter were 
quite singular moral properties of an especially inviolable 
kind. It is true that in a capital t society, people 
normally have expectations of being left in (relatively) 
undisturbed possession of all their goods, and that they will 
usually be shocked and upset if these expectations are 
disappointed. These factors must be taken into account 
(though there is no reason to suppose that they must always 
warrant reimbursing a wealthy owner the full market value of 
the property seized from him) I but the expectations 
themselves do not introduce a factor which must be given any 
spe~ial consideration, given that they were not morally 
legitimate expectations in the first place. Ultimately, the 
various considerations that we are weighing here are 
considerations of the same general kind: ·the values that 
these goods represent for people, the interests that they 
satisfy. 
Suppose that there exists a machine which will totally 
convert matter into energy, and will dissipate the energy 
into space. Suppose too that one person comes to own, in 
accordance with the proper operations of a free market 
economy, a very large proportion of the world's goods and 
resources. Since he has property rights over all of these 
things~ he is, supposedly, entitled to dispose of them at 
will. Is he entitled, in that case, to put them all into the 
machine? Any decent theory will deny him that right. For 
the socialist, the reason is straightforward: the world's 
goods and resources are, finally, collective assets. It is 
not in the least incompatible with this thesis to allow that 
one of the best ways of putting some of these goods to use is 
to recognize limited property rights over a narrow range of 
170 
them. Other things being equal, a person may do what he will 
with his personal possessions. But the more extensive are 
his holdings of goods, the more willing should we be to 
7 
regard him as at most a steward t one who has those goods in 
temporary trust. His entitlement to enjoy them is subject to 
various restrictions, all of which are explicable by 
reference to the natural bases, in him and in other people, 
of the moral dimensions 6f the institution of property. In 
the right sorts of circumstances - if, for instance, he 
threatens the wanton destruction of the goods he holds - the 
community might be justified in withdrawing its recognition 
of his entitlement, and appropriating these goods back into 
the common pool of collective assets, from which they had 
only been removed in~hA first place in a qualified and 
conditional way. 
v 
The inflation of natural rights ~nto inviolable constraints 
upon .what it is ever permissible to do to persons is one 
possible outcome of ignorance of the underlying moral point of 
ascribing rights to people. The influence of such a view upon 
theories of distribution will depend, of course,' on the 
particular list of natural rights which is adopted. The 
theory ,to be considered now is that which can, with most 
propriety, be regarded as the liberal theory of justice; it 
takes its inspiration from a particular theory of natural 
rights in which the right to private property looms large. 
The theory that Nozick has defended is a paradigm of theories 
of this kind: the grounds for accepting it, I will argue, 
are very weak indeed. 
Nozick apparently accepts, on the authority of John Locke, 
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that all persons have natural rights to life, health, liberty 
8 
and property. The liberty of each person is expressed, in 
part, in the right each has to decide for himself the goods 
that he would prefer to own. No 'ideal' conception of his 
needs or deserts can be permitted to override this right. 
The right to' property, furthermore, is a right to the 
exclusive use of all those goods which a person has 
legitimately acquired. Such acquisitions will have resulted 
from dealings which were in accordance either with the 
principle of justice in acquisition or with the principle of 
justice in transfer9 . These are the principles which set 
out,. in the light of the natural rights of all persons, the 
conditions under which an individual's appropriation of some 
previously unowned goods is justified. and the conditions and 
procedures in accordance with which an individual can come to 
have property rights in goods which were previously the 
property of others. In addition, a principle of justice in 
the rectification of holdings will be needed to repair past 
, 't' 10 In)US lces • 
Given these requirements, what sorts of distributive 
mechanisms are most appropriate? The answer of classical 
liberalism, and of N6zick, is that no institution which 
distributes goods in accordance with an ideal conception of 
what people should have (as determined by their attributes, 
whether actual or standardized) is compatible with the basic-
moral premises. Only the free market can distribute goods 
in ways which are consistent with the rights to liberty and 
to property that those premises recognize. Whatever are the 
holdings which result from the proper functioning of the free 
market, they will be just, because they will reflect, as 
closely as human conditions allow, the actual free decisions 
and compromises and preferences of each individual, acting 
with a minimum of constraint. 
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Like every moral theory, liberalism presupposes 
(although usually only implicitly) a definite theory of the 
nature of persons and of society. It does not advance the 
free market as an ideal which is self-recommending, or as an 
end-in-itself. On the contrary, it is the distributive 
institution which is most consistent with liberal ideology, 
that is, with the underlying metaphysic of persons and 
society, together with the values (the natural rights) which 
are embedded in it. To the extent that it fails to be 
consistent with the rights (and especially, with the 
underlying and unremarked values) that are its justification, 
the free market falls short of achieving the ends which 
recommend it to classical liberalism. Conservative 
scepticism about the possibility of designing institutions 
which distribute goods in any more satisfactory way than does 
the market may come to the aid of the liberal here l1 , but the 
plausibility of this scepticism will depend, in part, on how 
seriously the market fails to secure the values on which it 
rests, and on how serious are the injustices which it 
promotes. 
The familiar objection to the free market, as the sole 
distributive institution, is (as I would express it) that it 
is not stable over time l2 . It presupposes a prior 
distribution to all persons of (effective) rights, and is 
justified by reference to that initial distribution. But the 
effect of the unconstrained operation of free market forces 
is eventually to alter, very extensively and thoroughly, the 
original allocation of rights. Classical liberalism does not 
take seriously the differences between people in their 
acquisitiveness and entrepreneurial capabilities. The 
historical evidence is overwhelming, that left to its own 
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'iron laws' (even granted that it never has been totally free 
of state management 13 ), the free market leads to 
concentrations of wealth, power and opportunities in the 
hands of a few, to the disadvantage and deprivation of the 
many_ To regard the wage labourer, under the conditions of 
unrestrained industrial capitalism, as an entrepreneur 
engaging in free market transactions with his fellow 
entrepreneurs, is to falsify his real position. The free 
market does not preserve the distribution of rights which is 
its .initial justification: it is not, after all, the 
distributive institution which is most consistent with the 
liberal's basic precepts. 
It is because this objection is so obvious and so 
devastating - that liberalism has insisted upon a distinction 
between the possession of rights (to liberty and property, 
for instance), and the enjoyment of the conditions necessary 
for their effective exercise14 • The wage labourer does not 
always enjoy the latter: but he does not have a right to 
enjoy them. The rights that he does have are the very 
rights - the formal guarantees of freedom of contract, 
security of possessions from arbitrary seizure, and so on -
that are preserved, whatever his material condition might be. 
Since these are the rights which justify the free market, and 
since they at least are preserved, the free market is, after 
all, stable over time. 
The analysis of rights that I have suggested brings out 
the fatal weakness of this thesis. It is certainly possible 
to distinguish, as the liberal does, between coercive 
interference with a person's life t his free activities and 
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his possessions, on the one hand, and the provision of social 
and economic goods and opportunities which would enable him 
to secure a good life for himself, on the other hand. It is 
also true that the latter goods can be seen as necessary 
conditions for the full enjoyment of the benefits of free 
activity and of possessions. The crucial question, however, 
is whether goods of the latter kind should be regarded solely 
as conditions for the enjoyment of the liberal's set of 
rights, conditions which are not themselves subject to any 
relevant moral requirements, or whether a right to be 
provided with those goods should also be recognized. The 
issue is that of the scope of the rights which people have, 
an issue which can be settled only by referring back to the 
nnr!prlV1nN 17r!111P~ on wh;(~h riahi:s are arounded. 
--"'--~-..L -~--J - -- --- - .- -" _ ""'" 
If people can legitimately be regarded as having rights 
to liberty and possessions, then it must be the case that 
these things are of value to them. Yet once we inquire what 
these values and interests are, it becomes apparent that there 
is no moral justification for distinguishing, in the severe 
and momentous way that liberals do, between the different 
kinds of humanly-originated circumstances and conditions 
which can limit a person's enjoyment of the ends which 
liberty and possessions serve. There are, of course, morally 
important differences between suffering from the violent 
physical interference of other people, and suffering from the 
blind (or blinkered) working-out of social and economic 
forces. Even granted,that there are limits to the extent to 
which these forces can be controlled, it is not the case 
that society is powerless to remedy, or to compensate for, 
their more disastrous effects. It is true that human 
aggression is different from social and economic oppression: 
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that shows that the appropriate assessments of and responses 
to them might have to be different, not (absurdly) that it is 
only human aggression that has any moral relevance. 
The fundamental reason for recognizing human rights is 
that it is desirable to take a general notice of the presence 
of certain permanent interests that p(~ople have. Gi ven that 
these are the interests that are to be protected, we are 
obliged to recognize that the existence of certain formal 
provisions and legal guarantees might not be sufficient to 
that end. People can be deprived, just as effectively from 
their point of view, of the capacity for enjoyment of liberty 
and personal possessions by constraints or condi~ions of 
other kinds, and especially by social and economic 
circumstances. The laissez-faire liberal is not justified 
in limiting the basic rights that he recognizes to the 
relevant negative liberties - to the guarantee that coercion 
will not be exercised upon a person to restrain him from 
pursuing his own good and gathering property to himself. 
This is an important guarantee - it was especially important 
in the historical circumstances which gave birth to 
liberalism15 - but it is not sufficient to secure the values 
which are liberalism's ultimate justification. 
An opportunity is not a good to a man who has not the 
capacity to use it16 • A person's ability to shape his life 
in accordance with his own will, his own examined aspirations 
and desires, can be seriously curtailed by the existence of 
social and economic conditions which operate, not directly 
through the crude instrumentality of physical force, but in 
more subtle yet equally effective ways. These conditions 
exist as a consequence of human activities. These are not 
necessarily activities which are undertaken by anyone with 
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the express intention of creating conditions which frustrate 
th.e free development of some people, but they have those 
effects nonetheless. If these effects once were both 
unintended and unforseen, they are no longer unforseen. 
Mature moral agents cannot divorce themselves entirely from 
responsibility for the forseen consequences of their 
t ' 't' 17 ac ~v~ les , and from the need to weigh the advantages of 
unconstrained activity against the disadvantages suffered in 
consequence by others. 
The liberal's defence of the market as a morally 
adequate distributive mechanism places him in a dilemma. 
Either the market is accepted, along with an indefensible 
conception of basic human rights, or a moral theory which is 
genuinely adequate to the nature of human beings and the 
conditions of their social existence is adopted, together 
with a set of restrictions on permissible activities which 
effectively require the abolition of the market. 
If rights are regarded, as they so often are, as 
ultimate moral properties, it becomes possible to assign a 
particular content to them without worrying unduly about the 
precise justification for doing so. Taking the Lockean 
rights as axiomatic, as Nozick does, leads with virtual 
inevitability to the classical liberal theory of justice. 
Howeve~, any theory of natural rights must be justified by 
relating those rights to an appropriate underlying ideology, 
a procedure which in this case shows that the classical 
liberal theory of justice is untenable. 
VI 
In spite of the tendency to monopolistic holdings which 
is inherent in free market capitalism, classical liberalism 
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sometimes presents itself as an egalitarian theory. It 
actually has as good (or as poor) .a reason for doing so as 
have many other theories which appropriate that label. The 
fundamental thesis advanced by liberalism is that all persons 
possess equal basic rights and liberties, a thesis which 
finds its most characteristic expression in the constitution 
of the social contract. This thesis (of equal rights) is 
either defensible, or it is not. If it is not defensible, it 
need detain us no longer. If it is defensible, it is so in 
virtue of various basic facts about human beings. If these 
rights can justifiably be attributed to any person whatsoever, 
the~ it must be in virtue of SOfie facts about persons, about 
the attributes which they have which make certain kinds of 
things of permanent interest to them. I£ all persons are 
indeed equal in possessing these rights, then they must also 
possess these attributes. Because rights are supervenient 
properties, it is not logically possible for two persons to 
be equal in respect to their rights but unequal in every other 
(significant) respect. On the contrary, they mpst also be 
equal in their possession of those natural properties in 
virtue of which each has his rights. Each, in short, has 
his basic rights because he has the appropriate natural 
properties: none has his rights solely necause he is equal 
to the,others. That all persons have equal rights might be 
a useful precept, but it cannot be an axiomatic principle . 
• 
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CHAPTER ELEVEN 
'REMARKS TOWARDS A THEORY 
OF CLAIMS I I: DESERTS AND NEEDS 
I 
People have claims in justice to the goods which it is 
necessary for them to have if they are to enjoy a good life. 
These are the goods that they need, for that reason. This 
sufficiently explains why human needs are the primary source 
of claims in justice. 
This approach, however, seems to leave no room for any 
other grounds of claims. The virtue of justice is to promote 
the basic conditions of the good life. Any good which is 
needed to that end is a legitimate object for claims in 
justice. If it is not needed to that end, how can it be 
properly claimed? Yet desert and merit do seem to have some 
relevance in justice. I will argue that people can have 
claims based on desert or merit, just in case the goods they 
deserve or merit have some special contribution to make to 
their good life. It is not really the case that these goods 
are necessities of the good life, but a person 1 s life will 
generally be enhanced, nonetheless, if his good deserts are 
satisfied and if he has the goods that he merits. He will 
not suffer for being deprived of them in the way that he 
would suffer were he to be deprived of goods that he needs, 
but his life will stifl be less satisfactory than it would 
otherwise have been. 
Claims based on needs will accordingly usually take 
precedence over those based on merit and desert. The basic 
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conditions of the. good life should have priority over those 
conditions which merely enhance a person's life. Indeed, 
given that the virtue of justice is to promote the basic 
conditions of a good life, claims based on desert are 
peripheral to justice, or might even seem to lie outside its 
realm. To the extent, however, that there are available for 
distribution goods which, while not (always) needed by anyone, 
yet can enhance the quality of life, principles for their 
distribution are required, and can, with propriety, be 
included among the principles of social justice. 
II 
The general concept of desert, Miller has argued1 j is 
of the matching of appropriate kinds of treatment to the 
specific qualities and actions of people. Good desert is 
the fitting of desired treatment to qualities and actions 
which are generally favourably appraised. The range of 
desert bases (he says) coincides with the range of bases for 
appraisive attitudes. These attitudes, in turn, make 
intelligible the connection between desert and desert base, 
and so explain why a benefit considered appropriate. 
This analysis helps to bring out the fact that to 
deserve something can never be a basic and irreducible moral 
fact ~outa person. (Any theory of just punishment which 
regards the proposition that the guilty deserve to suffer as 
self-evident or axiomatic must accordingly be defective). 
To ascribe good deserts to a person is to allow that it is 
morally appropriate that he should have some kind of 
favourable recognition, in virtue of some of his attributes 
or achievements. Why we regard these attributes favourably 
will explain why it is fitting that he should have that 
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recognition, or those benefits. 
Material benefits are evidently morally inappropriate 
where many species of (good) desert are concerned. The sorts 
of intangible goods which people sometimes deserve to have 
can contribute to the quality of their lives in various 
significant ways. This is especially so to the extent that 
to treat a person as he deserves (if he deserves well) is, 
in a senseI to recognize his personality and integrity, and 
to respond to that in him which is worthy of respect. A 
person's self-respect, and his belief in the value of his own 
life and achievements, are enormously enhanced his fellows 
respond to him in appropriate ways whenever he deserves well 
of them. 
Where some other kinds of desert are concerned, material 
rewards are widely thought to be morally appropriate. These 
are standardly cases where the attributes or achievements 
that are recognized have some special relation to material 
goods, either in their production or (where personal merit 
is concerned) in their consumption. 
If a person makes an unusually significant contribution 
to his community's production of its collective material 
wealth, this achievement of his is usually seen as a ground 
for holding that he deserves some special recognition. As it 
happens I the form that this recognition customarily takes is 
that of an additional share (in excess of needs) of the 
community's goods. But there is no moral necessity that this 
should be so, and in a community which had achieved a genuine 
realization of the attitudes and values that anarchists and 
communists have seen as the mark of a truly humane society, 
it perhaps would not be so. The consciousness that one was 
contributing in some unusually significant way to the 
Erratum: (Insert between pp .180 & 811 
enhancement of the lives of all one's fellows, together with the knowledge 
that others held one in high regard for doing so, would be reward enough. 
The necessity to reward with material incentives those who are 
especially productive is an admission of our moral and spiritual 
shortcomings, and a concession to the shameful fact that many of us 
will only exert ourselves for the good of the community as a whole if 
we can see something tangible in it for ourselves. If there is indeed 
a moral principle which allows that an additional share of material goods 
should be made available to those whose contributions to the community's 
welfare are unusually significant, then it is a morally ambivalent 
principle. Yet it maintains a strong grip upon us. Striking evidence 
for this is supplied by Rawls's principles of justice, in which, in 
effect, material incentives provide the primary ground for justified 
departures from an equal-maximal distribution of goods. 2 True, it would 
be unjust not to recognize such contributions at all; but the justification 
for rewarding them materially is perhaps not that it is a requirement 
of justice, but that, because of the weakness and acquisitiveness of 
people in societies like our own, not doing so would often be inter-
preted as a failure to recognize, in an appropriate way, those deserts. 
III 
There is one kind of desert which can, with moral propriety, serve 
as a ground for claims in justice to various goods, including material 
goods. Someone merits goods of a certain kind whenever his personal 
attributes are such that goods of that kind will make an especially 
significant contribution to the quality of his life. The principal 
relevance of desert to social justice is to be found in 
personal merits of this sort. 
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A plausible accompaniment for the principle of urgency 
is a principle of excellence, a principle that directs us 
(other things being equal) to distribute certain kinds of 
goods in whatever way will be most productive of excellence 
in the quality of life. The dominating ideal is still that 
of the good life; but we are concerned now, not with the 
minimization of impairments to it, but with its optimization, 
with the promotion of that which is best in the lives of 
people. Again, the principle is not an additive one: just 
as claims based on the worst impairments have an absolute 
priority, so claims based on the most outstanding prospects 
for excellence have priority over those based on lesser 
prospects. The dominance of a single ideal - that of the 
good life - allows us to construct a defensible priority 
principle, favouring claims based on the elimination of 
impairments to those based on the promotion of excellence: 
the first priority must always be to secure for all the 
basic conditions of the good life itself. But where those 
conditions have been secured, or where some social goods are 
not the objects of any claims of that kind - that is, of 
claims based on need - the principle of excellence provides 
a defensible way of allocating such goods to persons. 
Justice certainly does require, in the case of many 
goods, that they be allocated initially to those who merit 
them the most, that is, to those, the excellence of whose 
lives will be most enhanced by their having those goods. 
Certainly, too, there are often utilitarian reasons for such 
practices as the admission of people to universities, or 
their selection for touring sports teams, in descending order 
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of merit. But the principle of excellence provides a 
different way of looking at these practices. The production 
of conditions in which people can lead valuable lives is 
still the object; but we are not seeking to maximize 
aggregate value, in the utilitarian manner. Instead, we 
recognize that the pursuit of excellence is an aim which is 
not always served best by the utilitarian's maximizing 
approach. 
The principle of urgency, which ensures the priority of 
claims based upon needs, guarantees that so~ial goods will 
be distributed initially in a way that ensures for all the 
basic conditions of a good life, to the extent that this is 
materially possible. There can be no excuse, then, for 
regarding the principle of excellence simply as a warrant 
for diverting scarce resources away from those whose lives 
are most impoverished, in order that an elite of talent 
might enjoy every extravagent luxury. For if these goods -
or (importantly) the raw materials and the productive forces 
that have gone into them - can !indeed help to eliminate 
impoverishment, then the claims to them which are based on 
those needs will have priority in justice. If there is no 
one whose life is impoverished by his not having some 
particular good, then it seems obvious that this good 
should, be allocated to the person who will make the best 
use of it, the person to the excellence of whose life it 
will make the most significant contribution. Admittedly, by 
allocating goods in this fashion, the inequalities of 
excellence in the lives of people might be greater than they 
otherwise would be. But that fact of itself has no moral 
significance. The egalitarian supposition that it does have 
significance readily leads to the unacceptable conclusion 
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that excellence has to be discouraged. It is not denied 
that the existence of inequalities of this kind might be 
productive of undesirable consequences: sometimes, morally 
distorted relationships of patronage and deference accompany 
wide disparities in personal achievement. This does not 
show that the inequality itself is morally objectionable, 
only that people's behaviour and attitudes sometimes are. 
It is possible, indeed, that there could be conclusive 
moral objections to a distribution which was still socially 
just. But what is far more probable is that the proper and 
morally unobjectionable workings of the principles of social 
jus~ice among people who had been moulded by a materialistic, 
acquisitive and unjust society would initially be productive 
of some degree of resentment and bitterness. Those who do 
not possess any special merits, but whose talents enable 
them to make special contributions to the production of 
goods, might well resent the fact that they receive in 
return no more of those goods than they can justify on the 
basis of their needs: justice Serves neither the 
most-talented nor the least-talented exclusively. The most 
effective way to eliminate mutual resentment is not to 
modify the principles of distribution but to inculcate in 
all an adequate sense of justice. 
IV 
The modern temper is sceptical of deserts. Bad 
arguments have been unduly influential here, especially one 
to which Rawls has ascribed considerable importance. He 
argues 3 that the natural distribution of talents and 
advantages is arbitrary from the moral point of view, that 
no one deserves his. greater natural capac~tYI nor does he 
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merit a more favourable starting place in society (if such 
has been fortune's blessing to him) 4. Rawls concludes from 
this that the distribution to those who are naturally 
advantaged of additional benefits, over and above what 
everyone else receives, is morally unjus fiedS . 
One fa~rly weighty objection to this argument is that 
Rawls has simply assumed, quite falsely, that in order for 
a person to deserve something, he must also deserve the 
particular attributes on which that primary desert is 
grounded. But as Nozick says, in reply to this argument, 
lilt needn't be that the foundations underlying desert are 
themselves deserved, all the way down!,6. 
This does show that Rawls has not deployed his argument 
very well. But it might also encourage the rejoinder, on 
behalf of Rawls, that these considerations demonstrate that 
the concept of desert is in fact incoherent: given that it 
is necessary, if one is to deserve something on the basis 
of some of one's attributes, that one must also deserve 
those attributes, and since it is not possible to deserve 
one's attributes 'all the way down', it is not possible to 
deserve anything at all. 
Leaving aside the question whether this is a very good 
argument - a question which raises the issues of determinism 
and moral responsibility - there is an objection which cuts 
much deeper than this. Rawls assumes, in one of the 
unargued axioms of his theory, that persons are 1Ifree and 
equal moral beings,,7. Because they are, in this basic 
respect, all the same, their basic claims in justice must 
also be the same. However, if any of them actually do have 
any claims in justice at all, it is necessary (as I have 
argued) that they have these claims in virtue of some facts 
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about them. These facts, for Rawls, are that 'moral persons' 
are capable of having a conception of their good, as 
expressed by a rational plan of life, and of having a sense 
f ' t' 8 o JUs l.ce The capacity for moral personality, he says, 
is a sufficient condition for being entitled to equal 
justice. There is, accordingly, an initial presumption in 
favour of equal treatment for all. The existence of 
differential natural advantages cannot justifiably upset 
that presumption, because the only condition under which 
those sorts of advantages could upset it - namely, the 
condition that they were deserved - is necessarily not 
satisfied. 
That is Rawls's argument - and it is fallacious. If 
the attributes in respect to which people differ, the natural 
advantages that some have, are of no relevance to people's 
claims, in virtue of the fact that those attributes are not 
deserved, then likewise, the attributes in respect to which 
people are the same are of no relevance to the claims that 
they have, because those attributes are equally undeserved. 
Since every attribute of persons belongs to one or other of 
these classes; Rawls must conclude that persons have no 
attributes at all which can serve as the basis of claims in 
justice. It follows that people, like pebbles, have 
absolutely no claims in justice, and hence that it is not 
possible to treat them either justly or unjustly. 
Rawls's theory of justice officially includes no theory 
of claims. But if people are to have a significance in 
justice that such other individuals as pebbles do not have, 
then Rawls must allow that they have some personal 
attributes in virtue of which there are sound moral reasons 
for distributing goods to them. The identification of those 
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attributes as preferences or interests can only solve the 
problem if preferences or interests are themselves regarded 
as sufficient sources of claims. Once claims have been 
admitted in this manner, however, there can be no 
justification for formulating principles of justice which 
effectively ignore them. Besides, Rawls faces a residual 
problem here. People, after all, do not deserve the 
preferences and the interests that they happen to have. 
Accordingly, if Rawls's argument against desert is cogent, 
their having those preferences cannot be a morally adequate 
ground for distributing goods to them. What this shows is 
tha~ either Rawls's analysis of desert is mistaken, or that 
he is mistaken in his implicit, assumption that deserts are 
the only personal attributes on which individual claims could 
be based. 
V 
The most important claims in justice are those which 
are based on needs. A need is sufficient to ground a claim 
if it is a need for one of the basic conditions of a good 
life. A theory of needs cannot be independent of a theory 
of the good life, and a theory of the "latter cannot be 
independent of the particular conditions and characteristics 
of particular historical milieux. The patterns of the good 
life which are appropriate to different social and natural 
environments, and to which people in those environments can 
most defensibly aspire, will determine what are the 
important impairments to a good life as well as the relative 
urgency of claims based on those impairments. In some cases, 
the identification of a need and the ascription to it of a 
definite urgency will be unproblematic. In other cases, 
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evaluations will have to be made and preferences expressed, 
in order that some components of the good life can receive 
priority over others in the distributive arrangements that a 
community makes. 
A sufficient and adequate concept of needs, for the 
purposes of a socialist theory of justice, is that of the 
necessities of a good life. People need those goods the 
lack of which is a significant impairment to their prospects 
for a decent life. The concept can only seem vague and 
unhelpful if it is examined in abstraction from the physical 
and social environments, the human materials and the 
appropriate patterns of the good life on which it depends 
for its content. 
VI 
Theories of justice which base claims on needs are 
often described as egalitarian. The claim, characteristically, 
is commonly made on the basis of that cluster of fallacies 
that I have identified as the orthodox theory of justice9 . 
By contrast, the received view is that theories based on 
d t d 't . l't' 10 eser an mer~ are ~nega ~ ar~an • The only reason for 
maintaining these connections is that, since people are 
assumed to differ less in their needs than in their deserts, 
distributionsof goods according to needs will be more equal 
. 
than those which are made according to merits. But why is 
this fact of any interest? The concept of equality is not 
a necessary component of a theory which bases claims on 
needs: if my own theory warrants the distribution of some 
goods in equal shares, or warrants distributions which will 
produce equal holdings, that is because people are alike in 
respect to many of their needs. The equality of these 
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distributions is wholly contingent and adventitious. If 
people's needs happened to vary widely, then the just 
distribution would be an unequal one: but it would not be 
necessary to remark on the fact. If justice is done, it is 
because people's claims are met. When their claims are 
based on deserts or merit, rather than needs, then their 
shares, and their holdings, might turn out to be unequal -
but that is also contingent and adventitious. If desert 
were in fact the sole, or a principal criterion for claims, 
then the inequalities of distribution which resulted could 
not be condemned as unjust. Similarly, if need is the 
principal ground for claims, then distributions made 
properly, according to needs, must be just. Whether or not 
they involve equal shares or result in equal holdings of 
goods is neither here nor there. On the other hand, if the 
connection between justice and equality of distribution is 
regarded as necessary, or as not subject to the contingencies 
of human circumstances, then it can ?nly be a contingent 
truth that need is the primary ground for claims • 
• 
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postscript 
The guiding moral ideal for my theory of social justice 
has been that the goods and the resources of the world ought 
to be distributed in ways which match them, as appropriately 
as possible, to the particular needs and interests, the 
individual talents and capacities, that people have!. This 
is an ideal which is profoundly worthwhile. But it has not 
been a particularly effective ideal. Social justice has 
never been a common achievement in this world: it is 
certainly not a virtue of any contemporary Western society. 
The distribution of too many goods is matched in these 
societies, not to the morally most appropriate attributes of 
people, but simply to wealth, as once it was matched to 
social status. It is true for that reason that these 
societies are unjust. It is also true for that reason that 
these societies are unequal. It is not true, however, that 
they are unjust because they are unequal . 
• 
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Synopsis 
Equality and Social Justice. D.E. Browne 
In this thesis, the deeply-entrenched ief that justice 
and equality are intimately connected is systematically examined 
and rejected. It is shown that, in so far as justice and ,equality, 
injustice and inequality, are found together, their connection is 
merely contingent, and of no fundamental theoretical significance. 
That is, the different relations of equality and inequality which 
can be found in states of af irs which are just or unjust, are shawl 
to have nothing in particular to do with the justice or injustice of 
latter. The arguments to this end are not normative (defending 
an inegalitarian theorY)r but conceptual (defending a nonegalitarian 
one. Detailed attention is given, in the course of the thesis, 
to the belief all people are actually equal, in some morally 
significant res , and certain important moral truths which 
are obscured by this formulation are elicited. The analysis and 
confutation is also undertaken of ~he presumption principle' which 
holds that all persons are to be treated equally, in the absence of 
any reasons for ng them unequally, and of 'the AIistote 
principle', which maintains that all justice consists either in 
the equal treatment of those who are equal, or unequal treatment 
of those who are unequal. 
A 'formal' nonegalitarian theory of social justice is 
developed in which the critical concept is that of a claim. It 
is argued that of necessity, in every situation in which questions 
of justice arise, some people have claims to some goods. Accord-
ingly, any theory of justice must provide an account of what these 
claims are - must provide a set of principles for the ~EEEaisal 
of claims - and also an account of the way in which conflicts 
between claims (in face of a scarcity of goods) are to be 
arbitrated - a set of principles the mediation of conflicting 
claims. A theory which.meets these requirements in a coherent 
way is. developed and defended. That it also provides a sufficient 
theoretical basis for a full normative theory of stribution is 
shown by sketching a soc list theory of justice within the non-
egalitarian framework, a theory of a kind which would normally 
(misleadingly) be described as I (radically) egalitarian'. 
A variety of related topics are discussed as they arise, 
including the relationship between individual human nature and 
soc enviro~ment, the theory of natural rights, free market 
as a stributive mechanism, liberty, private property, deserts and 
needs. 
